The topic of “war is wasteful” is entirely different to “tanks have become obsolete.” The former has been true since the beginning of time, while the latter is a recent idea that’s up for debate.
Tanks were going obsolete in the late 60s/early 70s due to the increasing sophistication of shaped-charge warhead’s ability to defeat traditional metallic armors. The advent of composites gave armor another few decades of relevance.
Now it’s the increasing sophistication of electronics and targeting systems, with fire-and-forget capabilities and pre-programmable, multi-angle targeting/attack profiles, etc., coupled with asymmetric threat environments. This is a different proposition. Armor, in addition to the current generation of active and passive defense systems, is likely going to have to mount some miniaturized variant of the CIWS system, along with active/passive sensor systems (a combination of IR/Thermal/Radar) to detect and engage incoming missiles, etc., if it’s going to stay relevant.
BOLOS, here we come.
And a tank is more than just an anti-Armor platform. With various munitions loadouts, it can be a fairly versatile, well-protected (at least against current conventional threats and current conventional threat axes) multi-system weapons platform.
If the sophisticated targeting systems and smart missiles can be miniaturized and hardened enough for Infantry use, then similar defensive systems and countermeasures can also be miniaturized and hardened enough for Armor use, and tank design and manufacture, as well as battlefield doctrine, has to evolve as well to match new and emerging threats.
IOW, the arms race is far from over, and the only people really banging the “Armor Is Obsolete” drum are Infantry partisans, armchair analysts, and accountants. Like the guy said, “Speed is a matter of price; how fast can you afford to go?”
Now I’m going to spend time I could use productively deciphering the Commandant’s fruit salad.
Well, he’s a Marine, so at least one of them is for eating crayons. Or maybe not eating crayons.
Either way, crayons are involved.
I haven’t been keeping up with this thread, but I saw this article this morning.
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Y’know that Johnny Cash song, “I’ve been everywhere, Man”? Thats what the ribbon rack on everyone at JCS and their deputies stands for.
A few years ago the head of the National Guard Bureau wore his upside down to SOTU and it was only noticed after he was already on camera. That’s how understandable it gets at that point.
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It’s a bit of a late reply, I know…
The thing to keep in mind is that not only are the Russian losses pretty staggering for a force of ~350,000, in all likelihood they’re concentrated in the combat arms units- infantry, armor and artillery. Probably in that order too.
So not only have they suffered huge losses, but they’re not spread around the whole army, but rather are concentrated in the guys who do the fighting. So while it may be something like 10% overall, it’s likely a LOT higher in the actual fighting companies, battalions and regiments- probably upwards of 20-25% if I had to take a wild-assed stab at it.
That’s not good. That’s pushing the casualty levels that get units labeled “combat ineffective”, and I think we’re seeing the results of that with the pullout from near Kyiv, and the lack of a big push in the East.
Not sure if this is the right thread, but as the Russians fall back to the east:
-Doesn’t that open up avenues for greatly increased military and humanitarian aid?
-What will the Donbas be like when/if Russia solidifies their control over it? How badly is the infrastructure damaged?
-What sorts of military actions will the remainder of Ukraine be able to launch towards Russian troops in Donbas - or over the border in Russia?
I’m just trying to figure out what sort of an endgame Russia can envision when.
I cannot imagine Russia can walk away from this without something.
Likely they will keep the Donbas region. IIRC that region was in a revolt against Ukraine prior to all of this. I assume they want to be part of Russia and are, mostly, ethnic Russians. Ukraine will probably lose it when all is said and done.
Right - but I’m trying to imagine what that looks like. Russia ends up w/ the Donbas. Does Ukraine just allow that, or keep lobbing shells into the area indefinitely? Is the Donbas - as it exists after this war - an economic plus or minus? How much is needed to rebuild infrastructure? Or is it just maintained as a road/pipeline to the Crimea? Does Ukraine seek NATO membership after?
Well, as it exists after the war is a big question. Prior to the separatist war in 2014 it was a major coal mining and industrial region producing 30% of Ukraine’s export economy.
The coal (and natural gas) is still there to be extracted. Some of the heavy industry is probably still functional - some in rebel areas were exporting in 2020 and big cities like Donetsk and Luhansk were already separatist controlled and so not subjected to Russian attack. But the area suffered significant damage in the civil war and economic sanctions don’t make the situation any better. Long term it is potentially a valuable asset to Russia beyond just the strategic position. Short-term I’m sure it is not. The question is how long “short” or “long” are likely to be.
If I can answer these a bit out of order, Russia’s stated war - sorry, special military operation - goals are vague enough that they can walk away at any time and claim victory. Thier stated goals are:
- de-nazify the Ukraine
killing one member of the Azov battalion/regiment can be ‘proof’ of this absurd goal has been met - demilitarize the Ukraine
they can claim they have already met this goal with the amount of losses inflicted on the Ukrainian military. Indeed their official claims of Ukrainian losses are so inflated that they are approaching the point where they can’t claim to have destroyed any more without exceeding 100% of the inventory they have credited Ukraine with. - prevent NATO expansion into the Ukraine
which wasn’t just about to happen to begin with, and NATO won’t take in new members who have unresolved border conflicts - protection of the Donbas
again, this is vague enough that anything can be taken as fulfilling this goal.
So their endgame could be as simple as offering a ceasefire in place and talking it out, or as drawn out as they want to/can afford to make it letting the fighting drag on for months to come. Providing the West stays as resolved as it has been and continues to provide aid to Ukraine at the rate it has been, time is not on Russia’s side.
Any economic advantage of the Donbas has to be considered against the damage being done to the Russian economy as a result of sanctions, so economically it’s a net negative, but the value attached to the Donbas in this conflict isn’t entirely, or even primarily economic, its nationalistic.
The Russian withdrawal doesn’t open up avenues for increased aid only because they were never closed, or even seriously threatened. Kiev was never encircled. The withdrawal just removes any pressure of the threat of being able to cut off Kiev, or cut off the western part of Ukraine from the eastern part.
Ukraine hasn’t done much to carry the war outside the borders of Ukraine, but what it has (probably) done has been fairly spectacular; the ‘mystery’ Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships that destroyed Russian fuel stores at Belgorod, the missile attack at Millerovo airbase, and if it counts as outside of Ukraine proper, the crippling of the cruiser Moskva - assuming it is able to make it back to port. If it sinks, the Moskva will be the largest warship lost since World War II, its slightly larger than the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano sunk in 1982 during the Falklands Islands conflict.
This is an interesting video which bears on this topic (recently posted…some really interesting points are made):
If anyone is interested the video above references this video: Tanks are obsolete, apparently since 1919
Warning: NSFW Language.
Also: this guy does stuff more for comedic effect than factual.
For instance:
Tankers come in all sizes;
Not all tankers like beer, I knew several who never touched the stuff;
It was whiskey or nothing for them;
There IS fat on an M-1 Abrams; It’s the four dirt-bags who crew the beast.
Having said that:
To state the rather obvious, offensive actions are generally more difficult to execute than defensive ones. It’s easier to kill tanks attacking you than those dug in defensively. Hitting overextended supply lines and pushing back troops which can’t be supported is easier than attacking fortified positions.
The western line of the area which was controlled by Russia prior to the invasion has both sides dug in and will be difficult to move either way. Map.
The Russians are trying to encircle the Ukrainian army there while their goal is to prevent that.
While the Ukrainians are claiming some progress in the east, most of their successes have been in the west.
I wish I knew how to play Go.