Armament of US Divebombers at Midway

[colonial]

With the following reply I believe my points will be firmly enough established.

On the other hand Mr. Dissonance’s latest shows no sign of contributing anything
except disingenuousness and self-mimicry, so this time it really is good bye. No doubt
he will post replies needing correction in other threads, and I run across any of them
he will hear from me.

@Dissonance

If this is what passes in your mind as logic its no wonder you have such a hard time making sense of the world. A serious plan is actually you know, planned.

Two fallacies: (1) circular definition (a plan must be planned) (2) Moving Goalpost
(earlier disqualifying criteria consisted of the words “possible” and “future” and
nothing else).

Furthermore, our disagreement does not really lie with definition of the word “plan”,
but with what it takes for intention to be “serious.” More on that in a moment.

@Dissonance

Not just referenced as the target of possible future operations. That’s not planning. That’s talk of possible future planning. It’s not a very difficult concept. It’s hard to believe that you arrive at the conclusion you do from what was said. There was never any serious planning for invading Hawaii. Your own cite says as much. The only reference to a plan is from page 38, which if you read closely isn’t a reference to a plan to invade Hawaii; it is a referencing to the plan to invade Midway, Johnson and Palmyra.

Here again is the quote from page 38, emphasis added:

“After seizure of Midway, Johnson and Palmyra would be taken, setting up an invasion of Hawaii…the Navy optimistically anticipated that this operation would be launched with the cooperation of the Army. It was this plan that (JN General Staff chief) Admiral Nagano personally submitted to the Emperor on 16 April.”

If there is a sequence in one sentence: seizure of A, taking of B, and invasion of C,
and then in the next sentence reference is made to “this plan” then it is sophistry
to contend AB are part of the plan but C is not.

The real issue is whether an invasion of Hawaii was seriously intended, regardless
of how far along planning had gone, or even if intent existed only in the minds of
JN brass. That it was is proven by the fact of the plan’s submission to the Emperor,
who would not have been bothered with any subject not of the utmost, serious importance.

@Dissonance

You may not be, but those of us with our feet in reality are.

Those of you who are off on a tangent.

@Dissonance

It was an early objection because Japan did not have the shipping to carry the operation out. Full stop. Yamamato’s prestige was not going to make enough shipping warp into reality. They did not exist. Japan barely had the shipping to carry out their opening moves in the war and ship the fruit of their successes back home. They did not have the lift to move 4 or so divisions for the assault wave of an invasion of Hawaii to such a distant target, fuel also becomes a consideration and with it the lack of enough oilers available to the IJN.

Objection groundless full stop. JN approved plans for a 5-division operation against Ceylon,
located a like distance from the nearest land bases and for which a like amount of logistical
support would have been needed. Then after Doolittle it dropped its earlier objections,
and so did the Japanese Army.

@Dissonance

Your inability to come to logical conclusions continues to astound. I can assure you that you are alone in reading what I wrote and concluding I’m unaware of the sizes of atolls.

The following quote from post #72:

@Dissonance

It an atoll, there isn’t a lot of room to pack things.

Indicates you either did not know Truk was an atoll, or you did not know Truk (per Wiki)
“…was a significant source of support for Japanese garrisons located on islands and
atolls throughout the central and south Pacific. The base was the key logistical and
operational hub supporting Japan’s perimeter defenses in the central and south Pacific.”

@Dissonance

This is a flat out lie. The different units of measure that Wiki uses that you claim to be unaware of are feet and meters. I took the dimensions from Wiki myself for the G4M, B-26 and B-17 and was unconfused by Wiki’s use of both the English and metric measurements. It’s not exactly something unique to Wiki done to confuse you.

I resent the accusation, and I hope you do not mean to claim to be immune from confusion,
because no one else has ever been.

@Dissonance

Further, you still would remain on unsound ground had you not been using miniature 1/10the scale Bettys for the reasons I explained in post 81.

Your explanation did not assume 20x25 Bettys.

@Dissonance

No, it is yet again your attempt at logic that is corrupt. As I noted, Hawaii is not one huge fuel dump waiting for a spark to ignite the entire island. How exactly do you leap to the conclusion that any bomb dropped anywhere in the vicinity of Hawaii is going to be magically drawn to the flight deck of any nearby carrier?

This reply above does not address any conclusion I have come to in this thread.
My relevant conclusion was that one bomb hit on a Hawaii-based carrier was enough
of a possibility to indicate need for a 10-1 ratio of defenders.

@Dissonance

In other words, you pulled it from where everyone knew you pulled it out of.

It is a reasonable estimate considering the stakes involved.

@Dissonance

Not only is the number wrong, the ratio is anything but reasonable. It is entirely absurd. No nation ever considered anything near a 10-1 ratio of fighters to attacking bombers to be anything but absurd overkill, much less the numbers required at a minimum. By this absurd ratio the Battle of Britain must have been a complete disaster and loss for the British as they didn’t have the 10,000+ fighters needed to stop 1,000 Luftwaffe bombers.

I would be surprised if the US/UK did not maintain 10-1 ratio against perceived
possible enemy attackers over the British Isles as soon as they had enough planes,
and I have read of a 35-1 ratio against German air assets over Normandy on D-Day.

As for the Battle of Britain, it came within about one RAF squadron of disaster for
the UK. Also, the British Isles possess vastly more anchorages than Hawaii suitable
for hiding ships.

@Dissonance

The section I refer to was written by you.

I did not say otherwise. You didn’t have any trouble figuring it out.

@Dissonance

You are not only disingenuous, you remain unable to stay on topic. Your disingenuousness was in listing the aircraft on hand at Rabaul at the start of the Guadalcanal campaign and comparing it to the number of planes available at the height of the campaign at Henderson Field as if there was some useful relation to be drawn between the two. The proper comparison to the planes at Rabaul when Guadalcanal began would be to the planes on Henderson Field at the start of the campaign, which is the grand total of zero.

Conceding that a passage was carelessly written is the opposite of disingenuous.
Now, I suggest you attend to the disingenuousness displayed in your own posts.

@Dissonance

I can assure you those of us reading what you imagine passes for a discussion tired of you long ago…

What you must be tired of is getting your head handed to you on the issue of Japan’s
serious designs of a Hawaiian invasion after a successful Midway operation.

You didn’t do so hot either with your notion that a theater naval base such as Pearl
would require little if any more defensive assets than Henderson assuming Midway
was lost and the AC loss ratio was reversed.

With Midway in Japanese hands and six JN fleet carriers on the loose IMO all USN
PTO capital ships would have been relocated to West Coast bases, and I will stick
with my 1000+ fighter requirement for any scenario which puts them back in Pearl Harbor against those odds.

[Bookkeeper]

Note that references to armoured decks on Japanese carriers refers to armour on the main deck or hanger deck, not on the flight deck (and most did not have deck armour at all). Even battleships usually had their armour a deck or two below the topmost deck for a number of good reasons.

I believe the British were the only navy that armoured the flight deck, as it needed some significant design compromises to avoid making the ship top heavy.

[Colibri]

@colonial

On the other hand Mr. Dissonance’s latest shows no sign of contributing anything
except disingenuousness and self-mimicry, so this time it really is good bye. No doubt
he will post replies needing correction in other threads, and I run across any of them
he will hear from me.

Conceding that a passage was carelessly written is the opposite of disingenuous.
Now, I suggest you attend to the disingenuousness displayed in your own posts.

What you must be tired of is getting your head handed to you on the issue of Japan’s
serious designs of a Hawaiian invasion after a successful Midway operation.

[Moderator Warning]

colonial, only a few posts above I instructed you to dial back on the snark. This is an official warning for violating my instructions. Do not do this again. You already have a number of warnings; if you keep it up you will find your posting privileges under discussion.

Colibri
General Questions Moderator

[TokyoBayer]

@colonial

quoting from Shattered Sword):
(. . . .)

“Obvious and most effective countermove?” “Shrug”? Excellent!-- I take it you are on board with 1000x defenders after all.

The authors of *Shattered Sword * aren’t on board with the several thousand of defenders you’re declared to be necessary. This is their discussion of a theoretical invasion

Furthermore, the Japanese would have to secure air superiority over Hawaii with carrier assets alone – their land-based aircraft at Midway, over a thousand miles away, could play no real role in such an invasion. Yet, unlike the carrier task forces the Americans would go on to employ in 1944, even at the height of its powers Kido Butai never had the ability to stand off an enemy’s island bastion for weeks on end and beat it into submission. In the first place, Kido Butai couldn’t bring a sufficient number of aircraft to get the job done. By April 1942, Hawaii boasted 275 combat aircraft, a figure that had increased as the battle at Midway had loomed. In the event of an event of an American defeat there, Hawaii’s air force could have been augmented still further by naval aircraft shuttled in from Saratoga or Wasp, much as the Americans went on to do at Guadalcanal. This meant that Kido Butai, even with all six carriers available, would have fought against Hawaii from a position of numerical parity at best. But more important, the logistics for a sustained Japanese carrier presence off the shores of Hawaii simply weren’t there.

Sailboat’s quote above from CombinedFleet.com give some more details.

“Well,” you say, “the Japanese could use Midway as an advance base and establish air supremacy over Hawaii from there.” There are two problems with this. First, Midway makes a miserable advance base. It is about the size of a postage stamp, has no fresh water, is possessed of only a relatively small harbor, and has room for but one small airfield. At best it could operate an air contingent of about 90-100 aircraft. In other words, there was absolutely no chance of using Midway as the sort of major logistics center (a la Truk or Rabaul) for further operations down the Hawaiian chain. Midway was, at best, an outpost.

Second, Midway is too far from Hawaii. Even if the Japanese had been able to install an airgroup at Midway, and keep it supplied, it had no chance of exerting a powerful influence on Hawaii, since it is nearly 1,300 miles from Oahu. During the Solomons campaign, the Japanese (who had the longest-ranged fighter in the Pacific in the A6M5 Zero) found it nearly impossible to exert air power from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, which was 650 miles away. By itself, then, Midway was useless as an advance base. If Hawaii’s airpower was to be reduced, and Oahu taken, then the Japanese would have to do it using carrier-borne airpower and seaborne troops – a virtual impossibility for all the reasons just discussed.

The specs for the Zero give the range as follows

Range
1162 miles (1870 km) on internal fuel
1930 miles (3100 km) with drop tank

with Midway at 1,300 miles away, (2,600 miles round trip) the bombers would be going by themselves, and would certainly not need a 10:1 ratio for defenders. It would good practice shooting for new pilots, though.

[mlees]

@Bookkeeper

Note that references to armoured decks on Japanese carriers refers to armour on the main deck or hanger deck, not on the flight deck (and most did not have deck armour at all). Even battleships usually had their armour a deck or two below the topmost deck for a number of good reasons.

I believe the British were the only navy that armoured the flight deck, as it needed some significant design compromises to avoid making the ship top heavy.

Incorrect.

Taiho and Shinano classes had armored flight decks.

[TokyoBayer]

@TokyoBayer

with Midway at 1,300 miles away, (2,600 miles round trip) the bombers would be going by themselves, and would certainly not need a 10:1 ratio for defenders. It would good practice shooting for new pilots, though.

One of the problems that kept running through my head during the fireworks earlier in this thread was the problem of distance.

The aircraft could either be made strong and protect the pilot and plane or light and go further. The US went more with the former and the Japanese the later.

Lightening the planes increased speed and distance for the Japanese, which served them well during the early stages of the war when they were facing inexperienced Allied pilots flying inferior planes. However, as the performance of the US planes caught up and their pilots started to learn more, the Japanese really paid a heavy price. Lacking a similar industrial base as the US, the Japanese were unable to make similar improvements in her planes, and were unable to make as many changes.

They sacrificed a lot of safety to gain distance for the IJN’s land-based bomber, the previously mentioned G4M, including forgoing self-sealing fuel tanks, and helping it earn the nickname, the Flying Zippo.

Assuming 100 planes on Midway for the Japanese, and let’s just go with the IJN standard ratio of 1:2 fighters vs. bombers, subtract out some scouting planes and some torpedo bombers which also wouldn’t have the range for trip (sorry, you get to pick either a drop tank or a torpedo, not both) the Japanese would have less than 50 bombers to launch at Pearl Harbor.

Unescorted, flying matchboxes. Hummm. Unescorted bombers flying out of Midway were not going to happen.

[TokyoBayer]

@mlees

Incorrect.

Taiho and Shinano classes had armored flight decks.

And ironically both of these carriers (only one per class) were sank by subs. In the case of the Taiho, the increase weight of the armored flight deck was a factor.

Some wars, you just can’t win.

[Sailboat]

@TokyoBayer

And ironically both of these carriers (only one per class) were sank by subs. In the case of the Taiho, the increase weight of the armored flight deck was a factor.

Some wars, you just can’t win.

I think you’ve got that backwards. The Shinano had a concrete-armored flight deck and tipped over after taking four torpedoes from submarine USS Archerfish. Possibly the “top heavy” problem from armoring the flight deck was a factor, although she did steam for some time after taking the hits.

Taiho was torpedoed during the Battle of the Philippine Sea by USS Albacore. She took only one hit, but after repair crews made temporary fixes to allow continued operation, she was engulfed in a tremendous explosion. Traditionally it’s been assumed that spilled aviation fuel began vaporizing, and, recognizing the danger but apparently responding incorrectly, someone turned on the ventilation system, distributing the fuel-air mixture throughout the ship. But the Combined Fleet website appears to doubt that explanation.

[Leo_Bloom]

@TokyoBayer

…
The aircraft could either be made strong and protect the pilot and plane or light and go further. The US went more with the former…

[hijack, but a quick answer woud be nice]
This is probably worth a different thread, in GQ before IMHO, but isn’t this in general the type of thinking in all US armament design compared to eg, that of the Russians?
[/hijack]

…the previously mentioned G4M, including forgoing self-sealing fuel tanks, and helping it earn the nickname, the Flying Zippo…

“Self-sealing fuel tanks”

[OttoDaFe]

@Sailboat

I think you’ve got that backwards. The Shinano had a concrete-armored flight deck and tipped over after taking four torpedoes from submarine USS Archerfish. Possibly the “top heavy” problem from armoring the flight deck was a factor, although she did steam for some time after taking the hits.

Taiho was torpedoed during the Battle of the Philippine Sea by USS Albacore. She took only one hit, but after repair crews made temporary fixes to allow continued operation, she was engulfed in a tremendous explosion. Traditionally it’s been assumed that spilled aviation fuel began vaporizing, and, recognizing the danger but apparently responding incorrectly, someone turned on the ventilation system, distributing the fuel-air mixture throughout the ship. But the Combined Fleet website appears to doubt that explanation.

Regarding the Shinano, a major contributor to her loss was that she hadn’t completed fitting out before the decision was made to move her to the Inland Sea to shield her from anticipated air attacks. In particular, only a few of her watertight doors had been installed, and most of those hadn’t been tested.

It didn’t help that she had a ferrying crew aboard, not her intended ship’s company.

[TokyoBayer]

@Sailboat

Taiho was torpedoed during the Battle of the Philippine Sea by USS Albacore. She took only one hit, but after repair crews made temporary fixes to allow continued operation, she was engulfed in a tremendous explosion.

*Taiho *was so heavy from armor that she sat low enough in the water so that the torpedo hit the aviation fuel tank area. Not sure exactly how much of that weight was due to the steel flight deck, though.

@Leo_Bloom

[hijack, but a quick answer woud be nice]
This is probably worth a different thread, in GQ before IMHO, but isn’t this in general the type of thinking in all US armament design compared to eg, that of the Russians?
[/hijack]

I think that would be an interesting thread in and of itself. I’d love to hear more about the Russians, as the Eastern front is my weakest area of the war.

“Self-sealing fuel tanks”

Just as it says. Tanks which were designed to seal themselves after being shot. They used various rubbers and such which would expand. Maybe someone else knows more of the details, but here’s a quick rundown on wiki. The trade-off was that they were heavier, but could take a greater punishment.

The Japanese were really good at hitting people when they weren’t ready, and took a tremendous amount of territory in a very shot time. They built airbases to provide air cover for their invasions of the Malay peninsula and the Dutch East Indies, so getting greater distance from their aircraft was very useful. As the A6M Zero, the Nakajima B5N torpedo bomber, it’s successor or the aforementioned Betty had them, they were able to attack from further distances. This increased range aided on the attack at Pearl Harbor.

When they had the experienced pilots and faster, higher performing planes, these type of things didn’t matter much, but after the US started to catch up in technology and experience, then these things helped doom them. I say “helped” because, unlike the war against Germany, it was a done deal before it began. The essay on Combined Fleets website explains the economics and industrial output differences. As a consequence of this imbalance, where they US continued to develop and produce new aircraft, the Japanese pretty much finished the war with the planes they had or were already in development.

The lack of protection, the nature of the battles which put the downed pilots close to the US side where the Americans could live to fight another day but the Japanese could not, the inadequate training programs and the US advances in technology and tactics were all factors in the Japanese aviation collapse exemplified in the Great Turkey Shoot.

[Raguleader]

Also, from what I understand, the Japanes Zero was never significantly faster than any of the front-line American or British planes it went against, but was rather more maneuverable. American pilots in P-40 Warhawks found (usually too late) that they couldn’t follow a Zero through a turn and would end up getting outmaneuvered.

On the other hand, many of the earlier American planes could outpace the Zero in level flight, and could easily outdive the Zero to escape (hence the Flying Tigers’ preferred tactic of hit-and-run diving attacks).

Later designs only emphasized this, making the planes faster and more heavily armed.

Ironically, it seems the P-40 had the opposite situation dealing with German fighters, being slower but more maneuverable than the Bf-109 (in fights against both the Gemans and Japanese, the P-40 was well-liked for her ability to shrug off a beating too, due to being a tad over-engineered in regards to structural components).