What were more effective, dive bombers or torpedo bombers?

Factual Questions
1

In WWII carrier aviation, navies employed both dive bombers and torpedo bombers. Each, I’m sure, had their own pros and cons.

Dive bombers seem hard to avoid. I mean, granted, in a pinch a ship doesn’t have anything to lose by juking back and forth like a mofo, but given how short of a drop time a bomb has, this doesn’t seem like it would do much good. They’re also attacking from high altitude, which seems like it would be effective at minimizing AA exposure.

Torpedo bombers have a weapon that few ships can really protect against. Plenty of ships got stuck by the odd bomb hit or two, but in the right circumstances that bomb hit didn’t hit anything vital and the ship could carry on. But a hit below the waterline seems tough to ignore- the ship is going to take on water which slows it down and causes it to list (tilt).

In carrier battles, Torpedoes brought down the Yorktown and Lexington, and crippled the Bismark. But Bombs set the Soryu, Kaga, and Akagi ablaze. So which is better? And how did commanders decide how many and where to use each asset?

2

Dive bombers can attack targets on land.

3

A mix of assets is always preferable to the use of just one. Note that at Midway, if it hadn’t been for the torpedo bombers, the dive bombers would have been much less successful.

4

As I recall, the torpedo bombers were very slow and thus the mortality rate was very high. Once on track to release the torpedo, they had to get relatively close to a ship and couldn’t vary their course without aborting the strike. Both planes’ payloads were effective, but perhaps more bombs were delivered to their targets by the dive bombers.

5

Torpedo bombers were employed in a level bomber role to attack land-based targets.

6

Torpedo bombers were not used to attack land targets, at least not US ones. The SBD Dauntless and SB2C Helldiver were, yes, both used to attack land targets, but not as level bombers. They didn’t have the bomb sights necessary to accurately place ordnance in a level attack. Instead, they both used a technique called “glide bombing.” Contrary to what the name might imply, glide bombing is not bombing in unpowered flight, at least not in this context. Essentially it is a shallower version of dive bombing. Whereas dive bombing attacks against a warship might be at an angle to the horizon of 70 degrees or more, glide bombing an unarmed merchant or land target was usually at angles of 30 to 45 degrees.

The question of which was more effective can only honestly be answered with that old standby: “it depends.” At the Battle of Midway, the TBD Devastators where famously destroyed with little effect beyond serving as decoys, while the SBD’s sank 4 carriers. Later in the war, the TBF Avenger and SB2C (yes, it was both a dive bomber and torpedo bomber) were much more effective. In fact, the superbattleships Musashi and Yamato were both sunk by aerial torpedo attacks.

The best tactic, however, was not to rely on one type of bomber over the other, but to stage a combined attack of fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo bombers at the same time. This split the defenses between different altitudes, directions, weapons, and evasive techniques. The American and Japanese admirals weren’t dumb, they knew this. Achieving this, however, required a level of training and co-ordination that wasn’t always available. Pearl Harbor was, in fact, a good example of combining all three (plus some level bombers) in a fairly well-coordinated fashion swamping the defenses. Ray Spruance attempted this at Midway, but through various mistakes, the torpedo bombers and dive bombers got separated and the escorting fighters lost both.

The planes themselves also became better as the war advanced. The TBD’s were obsolete even before the war started, while the TBF’s were in service into the early 60’s.

While TBF’s were slower than SBD’s during the attack run, the general perception of really, really slow torpedo bombers is more accurate when discussing the TBD’s and British Fairey Swordfish. It is true, however, that the parameters for dropping a torpedo were tighter than for dropping a bomb. It generally required a straight and level run of a certain height and speed to drop the torp. To compensate for this vulnerable flight path, the favored attack pattern of both the Japanese and US navies would be for the torpedo bombers to single out one ship and attack in two groups. One would attack from the port bow and the other from the starboard. The axis of attack for each would be at a 45 degree angle to the path of the target ship. Since this made the angle between each group 90 degrees, if the target turned towards one group to “comb the wakes” of their torpedoes, the torpedoes of the other would strike the broadside of the ship, usually resulting in multiple strikes.

A dive-bombing attack run would start at a fair altitude, but well within the range of the heavy AA guns of both navies. Executed correctly, the bomber would then pitch over at an extreme angle, so much so that the pilot was basically hanging form his straps and the rear gunner was lying on his back. This dive would then
continue as the target got closer and the bomb would be released at a point much closer to the target. The pull out might take the bomber down to maybe 100-300’ above the target or (sometimes) even closer. There are frequent mentions in official reports and memoirs of pullouts at “masttop” height, although undoubtedly anything closer than 1000’ would feel like you were unbearably close.

The upshot is that, executed correctly with capable pilots and good planes, either torpedo bombers or dive bombers were very, very dangerous weapons. The “capable pilots” bit is actually key. In 1941-1942, the Japanese pilots had more training and also had operational experience that the American pilots lacked. As the war progressed, however, the early war Japanese pilots were killed off and their replacements were trained increasingly indifferently. American pilots, in contrast, became better at their jobs and were executing devastating textbook combined attacks in the 1944-1945 period,

7

I can’t provide a cite but I recall hearing that dive bombing was most effective in the early part of the war. Most pre-war planning on bombing had assumed planes would use drop-bombing and anti-aircraft defenses were based on this assumption.

So when enemy bombers (like the infamous Ju 87 Stuka) instead used the tactic of “aiming” a bomb by going into a steep dive, it was something that the defense wasn’t prepared for. Anti-aircraft guns often weren’t designed to fire at a steep angle and crews were’t trained to track aircraft in a dive.

But adaptations were made. Equipment and training were modified and AA crews became experienced in countering dive bombing attacks. With that, the vulnerability of dive bombers increased and their effectiveness went down.

8

Yes they were. The TBF/TBM Avenger was the standard American torpedo bomber for all but the opening months of the war and was widely used to bomb land targets both by the Navy and Marine torpedo bombing squadrons.

The effectiveness of US dive bombers compared to torpedo bombers early in the war isn’t really a fair comparison. The TBD Devastator was a horribly slow aircraft, and the SB2U Vindicator (nicknamed the ‘wind indicator’) was even slower. Worse, the Mark 13 aerial torpedo was plagued by many of the same problems that crippled US submarine torpedoes for a good deal of the war: running too deep, exploding prematurely, failing to explode at all, etc. From here

9

Stuka’s. Germany.

10

The dive bombers turned the tide at the Battle of Midway after most of the torpedo bombers were blown out of the sky.

11

torpedo bombers are definitely an anti-ship weapon. as such, they are very effective. however, improvements in ship-borne anti-aircraft systems made them risky against heavily armed ships. that’s why dive bombers often constituted the first wave. at least, that’s how the japanese deployed them.

forgotten why but the americans at midway decided to deploy the torps first, with disastrous results. they were relying on surprise.

12

As mentioned above, there was no decision to send in the TBF’s first. The intent was to stage a co-ordinated strike but the various squadrons took different routes to the assumed location and some had to turn around and some did not. These delays and errors in finding Nagumo’s force, not any plan, caused the destruction of the TBF force.

13

The Devastators are infamous for getting their asses shot off at Midway, but didn’t they get an assist on a carrier at the Coral Sea?

14

Correct, with the minor nitpick that at Midway they were TBDs (Devastators) not TBFs (Avengers).

15

And to nitpick the nitpick, there were TBFs at Midway — flown from the island by Torpedo Eight (Hornet) pilots who had been training with them in Hawaii and were sent to Midway when Nimitz was pouring everything he could think of into the place.

Five of six were shot down, making Torpedo Eight’s tally 20 of 21 aircraft and 45 of 48 aircrew lost (the turret gunner in the surviving TBF was killed).

16

Weren’t torpedo bombers upgrade for rocket attacks, late in the war?

17

My understanding was that Spruance launched the airplanes at Midway at the maximum range to be aggressive. It was decided rather than have the planes circle until all were airborne and move out together, they would send the torpedo bombers first since they were slowest and the fighters and dive bombers would catch up to them. Aided by the fact that the Japanese carriers weren’t quite where they thought they were (Hornet’s fighters and dive bombers never found them on the first strike, the torpedo bombers commander thought correctly the Japanese had turned north) they arrived at different times. But the torpedo planes did bring all the Japanese fighters down so the dive bombers could attack unmolested.

The Bismarck could testify as to what one well-placed torpedo from a Swordfish could do.

18

So true w/regard to the Bismark. However, it was a sitting duck without air cover.

19

I figure I’d jump in to clarify this. He isn’t saying that the torpedo planes shot down all the Japanese planes. He’s saying that the Japanese planes had to fly low to engage and shoot down the torpedo bombers. After this they didn’t have time to climb up to altitude and engage the dive bombers. (I forget but those old planes could take quite awhile to get up to those highs.)

20

You’re right, of course. Even more embarrassing is that I not only got it wrong, but I also repeated the error twice. (D’oh!)

To be more definitive about the sequence of actions on June 4th at the Battle of Midway:

Fletcher ordered Spruance to take Task Force 16 (the Enterprise and Hornet and escorts) on a southwesterly course and “attack enemy carriers as soon as definitively located” while he recovered the dawn search on Yorktown.

The range question was a heavy factor in deciding when to launch, as was Spruance’s desire to get the Japanese carriers while rearming after the morning attack on Midway Island. The first factor suggested a later launch, while the latter factor suggested and earlier one. Spruance gambled on the earlier launch.

At 0700, Enterprise and Hornet started launching their strike force. Squadrons for Hornet launched with little difficulty, but on Enterprise errors spotting planes for takeoff brought the action to a near-complete halt.

At 0745, Spruance ordered the planes already in the air to make for the enemy. The first Hornet planes had been airborne and formed up for half an hour, wasting fuel circling TF16. This meant that strike force departed without the fighter squadrons still on the Enterprise’s deck.

By 0815, the last squadrons launched and set off. At this point, instead of the co-ordinated all-types attack Spruance and his staff had planned and ordered, the strike had devolved into 3 separated groups, only one of which had escorting F4F Wildcats along for the ride.

At 0830, Fletcher started lauc
ching an attack from Yorktown with 12 TBD’s, 17 SBD’s, and 6 F4F’s. This group managed to dtick reasonably together.

At 0920, the Japanese finished recovering the Midway strike force, as the first reports of American planes came into the command staff. Also at this time, Hornet’s Scout Eight and Bombing Eight SBD’s reached their intended intercept point for the Japanese, and finding an empty sea, spent some time fruitlessly searching and then returned to Midway or their ship.

At 0928, Torpedo Eight’s TBD’s from Hornet started their attacks without escort and paid for it with the lives of every single member of the squadron save one, Ens George Gay.

At 0930, Torpedo Six’s TBD’s from Enterprise attacked Akagi again without escort and were again nearly destroyed, losing 10 out of 14 planes. Their intended fighter escort was ironically circling just in front of the Japanese fleet trying to make radio contact with the TBD’s.

At 1000, Enterprise’s Scout Six and Bombing Six sighted the Japanese cruiser Arashi hurrying to rejoin the fleet and followed her to their target.

At 1005, Yorktown’s Torpedo Three lost 10 out 0f 12 TBD’s despite their escort of Wildcats, again inflicting no damage.

At 1015 or so, Enterprise’s Scout Six and Bombing Six and Yorktown’s Bombing Three started attacks with SBD’s. 47 SBD’s from two carriers swarmed over the three carriers that were visible (Hiryu was farther north and escaped attack) almost without opposition.

1022 Kaga hit by first bomb

1028 Soryu hit by last bomb

So you can see that it was errors in both judgment and in execution that lead to the disorganized attack.