That reminds me of a Bob Stevens cartoon that appeared in There I was… (or More There I was…). A couple of USAF pilots in a 1950s transport aircraft. The PIC turns the controls over to the copilot, and promptly goes to sleep. The copilot flies through a severe thunderstorm, sweating all the way, while the commander snores away. They fly out of the storm and the weather is absolutely gorgeous as they near their destination airport. The commander wakes from his nap, stretches and yawns, and resumes control of the aircraft. (IDR if he commented on the wonderful weather.)
I understand that for trans-oceanic flights (like the Asiana flight), there are multiple pilots on board who rotate time at the flight controls. For pilots on such flights, do they get PIC/SIC time only when they are sitting at the flight controls? Do they get any credit for the time that they are not actually at the controls?
More information from the Mercury News today
Could it be defective instrumentation? That the instruments were showing the incorrect speed, height, whatever…?
with a combination like this safety is reduced.
with this reduction there should be no other safety reductions. so only in clear calm weather. only with all landing aids functioning. only with easy to use and forgiving airports.
it may push the training schedule for the trainee back a bit but it would be worth it for safety.
after a few good landings by the trainee would you then allow complicating circumstances.
OK. I’d never heard any suggestion/evidence that the first officer (and/or navigator) knew the plane was off course. Can you direct me to any mention that they did? I’m curious.
Thanks.
That possibility is why a full investigation is important. While a highly experienced pilot in type could probably make a decent landing with malfunctioning instruments IF he knew they were malfunctioning and switched to eyeballs as primary data input, the pilot flying was not, as we now know, highly experienced in type. The other pilot was, and perhaps if he had been flying and instruments malfunctioned it would have been a non-event but so far I haven’t heard any indication of bad instrumentation.
I would expect that by the time the passengers noticed they were significantly lower and slower than normal the pilots would be fully aware of the situation. At some point everyone knew things had gone pear-shaped/gone south/left the rails/whatever other expression you care to use. One of the questions is when the pilots became aware Things Are Not OK, and if they should have noticed sooner and taken action more promptly.
There were two early books, one a wretched conspiracy theory mishmash, the other by Seymour Hersh (who did radical things like actually interview the Soviet general in charge of the area). My recollection of them is a bit fuzzy but the argument advanced by Hersh, and supported by the known flight data, was that a slight but simple mis-setting of a waypoint that would have produced the final flight track. I don’t remember how was evidence and how much was supposition, but flight procedures and navigation checks should have showed course deviation as early as leaving the Alaskan mainland coast, and the fact that no correction was ever entered is evidence that the navigator and co-pilot did not make corrections they should have under normal circumstances. Conclusion, supported by other data including similar cockpit screwups not leading to missile attacks, was that the culture of intimidation kept them from questioning the captain’s judgment. IIRC, the captain was very senior, perhaps one of KAL’s most senior.
All from memory; I’d have to go pull The Target Is Destroyed off the shelf and review it to be any more informative.
I Love Me’s comment was about KAL 007, not the Asiana incident.
Going from memory myself–I seem to recall that it wasn’t so much a matter of mis-setting the waypoints as it was the pilot having the navigation switch set in magnetic heading instead of INS mode. Because of the quirks of the system, even if you realize your mistake and flip the switch, if you’re already off the programmed flight path by something like 5-7 miles, the waypoints, even if properly programmed, are useless.
(Again, this is referring to KAL 007)
Re: KAL007 - I recall reading that the pilot entering the waypoints had transposed some digits, thus routing them over Kamchatka. Apparently there was a USAF surveillance aircraft that would troll up and down the coast in international airspace listening in on Soviet telecommunications. The Soviets assumed this flight had gotten bolder and decided on an overflight. Apparently this was a very classified area with missile silos.
The guy who shot the thing down should have seen nicely lit passenger windows on a brightly lit aircraft, not something trying to be stealthy; but he may have been below and behind and some things were less obvious; he would have been less likely to distinguish a 747 (hump) from a military 707.
One of Malcolm Gladwell’s books, IIRC, discusses the whole seniority and respect vs. air crashes issue with the Guam flight. The co-pilot says something like “do you thing we should see the airport by now?” which is as close as the Korean subordinate can come to “Yo, Bozo! You’re way off course!!”
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleseat/2008/12/04/malcolm-gladwell-on-culture-cockpit-communication-and-plane-crashes/
Another point for the Asiana flight - if full throttle was applied, then I assume the engines were developing full power even as the tail fell off; which might explain that last semi-cartwheel, especially if one engine died before the other one.
It actually looks like the engines broke off at different times. What appears to be the right side engine is with the fuselage, appearing to have remained attached through most of the crash sequence. The other engine is way off by itself some distance from the crash site. It may be that the left engine broke off at impact, the right engine stayed attached and was running at full power for a few seconds more, and that’s why the airplane did a near full turn to the left before coming to a stop.
Yeah, that’s what I was thinking, too. Differential thrust. Calls to mind the Sioux City crash, where Al Haynes and crew had to fly their DC10 using differential thrust, since their hydraulics were basically useless.
http://knology.net/~stirmac/POHfiles/BAC777%20POH.pdf
http://knology.net/~stirmac/POHfiles/BAC747%20POH.pdf
Is it the 747 vs 777 thing ? Right there just before touch down, you want to drop speed to the minimum , to avoid the airline billing you for replacement tyres and brakes …
The 777 could have needed to be doing 180 knots at a minimum to fly level,if he was quite heavy.
While the 747 would only need 150 knots .
Seems the pilot set it to 150 knots at about 10 seconds before touchdown, and the dropping speed was enough ?
perhaps airplanes shouldn’t try to land so close to the ‘runway starts here’ marker, so there’s an error margin on the approach side…
The tradeoff is that the further down the runway you are when you touch down, the less distance you have available in which to stop.
As it is, the target touch-down point is already well past the start of the pavement. Go to Google Map, zoom in on any commercial airport (e.g. SFO, specifically the runway where Saturday’s crash happened), switch to satellite view, and check out the runway. You’ll see a blast pad (marked with yellow chevrons), “piano keys” (white stripes parallel to the runway designating its start, # of stripes indicates runway width), the runway identifier (a 2-digit # denoting compass heading of the runway in tens of degrees, possibly along with a R/C/L (right/center/left) indicator, and - well down the runway - the touchdown zone markers (the two trios of white stripes). The TD zone is where they’re supposed to put the wheels on the pavement, and you can see in that shot of the SFO runway that that’s about where the black marks (from all the tires) begin. In a normal approach, this setup has the plane 50 feet above the ground when it crosses the threshold of the runway.
Saturday’s crash was particularly bad because the tail of the plane slammed into a vertical or sloped seawall, but it would only have been a little less severe if the tail had slammed into the horizontal runway surface.
Probably not. First of all, there is no major change in speed just before you touch down. The approach speed is normally stabilized for the last 1000 feet or 3 miles of the approach. There is only a minor decrease in speed of around 5 knots just prior to touchdown. Secondly, the approach and landing speeds are not something you remember, they are different for every landing and depend on the weight of the aircraft. They are recorded in some fashion in the cockpit and prior to setting the speed you check it. So it’s not like you can accidentally revert to the 747 landing speed instead of the 777 landing speed, every flight is different. Thirdly, assuming that data is correct (it looks like it has been put together by a flight simmer), the landing speed for a B777-200 at maximum landing weight is 139 knots so it is actually slower than the 150 knots the B747 document cites, this makes sense as the B747 is significantly heavier than a B777. Finally, the NTSB has already said that the target speed for the approach was 137 knots and that 137 knots had been set in the speed window.
They don’t do that. There are defined touch down markings on runways, that is where the pilots aim to land. They are about 1000 feet from the start of the runway. On a normal approach and landing the aeroplane will be about 50 feet above the ground when it crosses the start of the runway.
Edit: what Machine Elf said.
One of the issues raised mostly the conspiracy theory crowd but given some traction by the legitimate investigation was that the Soviets had to light up a huge new DEW-like radar installation to monitor the incursion, something the CIA et al. had been eagerly waiting for so they could analyze the system’s signals.
I think, but am not sure, that another installation in this now-abandoned system is the one adjacent to Chernobyl that has some prominent web photos and apparently appeared as a setting in a video game. This is now drifting further from topic than KAL 007 itself, so I’ll stop and return you to below-grade landing techniques.
Is there any indication that there was a sudden shift in the wind which might have drastically reduced the plane’s airspeed?
Perhaps these guys can employ The Asoh Defense, first used by (and named for) Captain Kohei Asoh after he landed a DC-8 in the water off of SFO while attempting to land on runway 28L (same as Saturday’s crash) 45 years ago.
The news this morning said that when they realized they were low and slow the instructing pilot told the flying pilot to pull back. I know in my little plane you wouldn’t pull back in that case you’d add power, but I understand in larger planes adding power isn’t almost instantaneous like it is in smaller planes. Was pulling back the right thing to do in a 777 or would a different action be expected?