When the allies began the strategic bombing of Germany, there was still doubt about the allies winning the war. however, as the war ran on, it became increasingly obvious that Germany would lose…so at what point, did the USAAF and RAF begin to discuss what NOT to destroy?
Post war Germany was wrecked-but (I am sure) the Allies’ long-range planners wondered about destroying stuff that would later have to be rebuilt.
Of course, it wasn’t till after Germany’s defeat, that the Allies began to realize that the USSR might not be so friendly after all (and wanted Germany as an ally).
Wetre these concerns strong enough that they might have actually prolonged the war?
Having been to Germany many times on business, I’m not sure that the premise to this OP is correct. If anything in the country was left standing after the war, I think it was due to nothing more than dumb luck.
There were always various checks during the war. The first great check was the USA was very much opposed to the return of the “colonial” type of system that Churchill desired. Truman was a LOT more opposed to this than FDR.
Churchill was very distrustful of Stalin. FDR thought that Stalin was full of “bull,” but that Stalin could be easily contained after the war was over. Truman didn’t share that view of Stalin.
Eisenhower for example was all for rushing toward Berlin, while FDR, was correct in holding him off saying "Why bother taking Berlin, when we’ve already agreed it’s going to be in the Soviet Zone, just let them deal with it.
History books often portray the Allies as a solid front, and as a general rule they were but there were many, many minor disagreements that prevented this.
The USA was much more willing to appease Stalin, because they wanted their help to defeat Japan, that is before the A-Bomb was dropped. Again FDR didn’t like Stalin but FDR thought Stalin could be dealt with later on.
Like most wars the Allies in Europe ignored some basic human rights, such as returning Soviet soliders that surrendered. It was certain that death and at best deportment to Siberia awaited them. But the need to end the war was paramount.
I don’t think there was any point where the Allies said the Soviets would be difficult to deal with. I’ve read the Chicago Tribune from that era and I would say if you have to pick a point the Battle of Stalingrad was the first time everyone agreed it was 100% over for the Germans.
In reality the Germans had no hope of defeating Great Britian and even if they had taken Moscow, the Soviets could’ve retreated behind the Urals and the Germans had no hope of defeating them once they got behind there.
As long as the Soviets and the British had the will to fight, the Germans would’ve lost. Oh for sure it might have taken ten or twenty years to exhaust Germany. In that case WWII would’ve resembled the Napoleanic Wars, where France gave out through years of fighting till it was exhausted.
Probably you were only on business in the large cities. Many smaller cities, villages, and towns were mostly or completely spared from bombing. Even large sections of larger cities had little or no damage.
The Cologne Cathedral was (almost) unscathed. The apocryphal story is that it was what the bombardiers aimed for.
story floating around in Russian popular culture is that the valuable iron works factories in the Ruhr in West Germany got miraculously preserved from bombing. I don’t know if that is true or if that is Soviet propaganda.
One way or the other, the “reparations” destroyed a lot of German industry that survived the bombing. My father says that he saw some of the German equipment looted back in late 40s still running in the 80s.
Of course, after the Russians looted the equipment, the Germans got loans from America and modernized. Whereas Britain did not get its equipment replaced in the same way and that may have contributed to their industrial decline 
I didn’t mean that everything was bombed. I meant that if something wasn’t bombed. it wasn’t because it was deliberately spared, but because either there never happened to be an allied air raid in the area, or if there was one then the allies missed the building. Either way, it was a matter of luck.
On the cultural side of things, there was also the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives program, a branch of the U.S. Military that was created to make sure that the Allies didn’t smash too many irreplaceable treasures while rolling back the Axis powers in Europe. In Florence, for example, they prepared maps for bomber crews showing which buildings not to aim for (which was quite a number in Florence.)
(I suppose the above might not be quite what the OP was asking for, but I just watched The Rape of Europa last night and found it fascinating.)
The city of Heidelberg, Germany largely escaped damage during aerial bombing, possibly due to its reputation as an old university town. When the U.S. Army finally arrived to take the city in 1945, one story went that the commanding general took pains to avoid damage to the city because he was an admirer of Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens), who visited there for a few months in his European travels, and wrote about his stay there.
Because it was one of the few relatively unscathed cities in Germany, the U.S. Army later put its European headquarters in Heidelberg, using a former Wehrmacht installation.
I’ve been to Köln and I can well believe that. Even today, the Cathedral is visible for miles, and it is of course very distinctive. From the air, it would make a good navigational aid. In any event there was certainly a good bit of luck involved, as the area around the Cathedral was badly damaged.
I’ve also heard that during the Italian campaign, the Leaning Tower of Pisa barely escaped destruction, because Italian and German forces were using it first as an observation post and later as a sniper post. But nobody on the Allied side really wanted to destroy such a famous, quirky structure if it was possible to save it.
When living in Warsaw I was told by more than one person that the German commander in Krakow decided not to defend the city in order to avoid it being damaged - so it seems some high up officials were starting to look beyond the war. Mind you I was also told that the easiest way to invade Czechoslovakia / the Czech Repulblic was by threatening to bomb Prague so make of that what you will.
You have to remember that in actual practice aerial bombing was a very random process. You could decide in theory that you were going to bomb a factory but not bomb the cathedral a kilometer away but in reality the bombs fell where they fell.
The Germans tried to monitor the Allied bombing patterns so they could predict what kind of targets the Allies were bombing and direct their air defenses there. But in practice the locations of where the bombs fell were so scattered that many times the Germans couldn’t even be sure what city the Allies had been aiming for.
That is my general impression. Of course, the USAAF tried to be precice (like the attempt to shut down the ball-bearing industry (the Sweinfort Raids).
But this was a disaster…the results were not worth the cost.
The USAAF had the famous Norden bombsight-but it was hard to use, and most of the time, the skies were too cloudy for precision bombing.
This is very true. The Germans actually at one point spent a lot of effort trying to deduce why the Allies were bombing German fields.
Apparently at Yalta or one of those conferences, the leaders were discussing what to do about the German government, how to punish them, etc. Stalin said “Simple. We execute the top 50,000.” FDR apparently did not appreciate Stalin’s true nature, thought he was joking, an said something like “49,000 should be enough.” Churchill had no illusions about Stalin.
If you visit the Last Supper in Milan (beautifully restored), the parts of the chapel that were bombed and caved in and rebuilt are still painted plain white. That’s quite a bit of the roof and sides. To protect the artwork, they piled sandbags against it.
SecWar Henry Stimson removed the former Imperial capital of Kyoto from the A-bomb potential targeting list because of its ancient cultural, religious and political importance to the Japanese. See his June 1, 1945 diary entry here: Hiroshima: The Henry Stimson Diary and Papers (part 5)
Of course the Allied bombing of Dresden is still controversial: Was the bombing of Dresden a war crime? - Great Debates - Straight Dope Message Board
Um, cite, please? This sounds more like early Cold War political propaganda than historical recollection.
The most interesting story I’ve heard about how a target was selected (or not) was in Harry Crosby’s A Wing and a Prayer. Crosby was the lead navigator of the 100th Bomb Group of the 8th Air Force in England. There is an except of the story here.
On a mission when the primary and secondary targets were obscured by clouds, the bombardier chose a “target of opportunity” – the city of Bonn. That day theirs was the lead plane of the whole 8th Air Force, and hundreds of bombers followed it to drop all their bombs on whatever the lead bomber chose.
By coincidence, Crosby had just finished reading some German history including the fact that Beethoven was born in Bonn and went to school there. He told the bombardier that they couldn’t bomb Beethoven’s home. So they flew over Bonn without dropping a bomb and picked something else.
As a result, Bonn was never heavily bombed, and in large part because of this was chosen to be the new capitol of West Germany. Crosby said it was the only time he ever made an individual decision that literally changed the course of history.
And it point out something that kind of negates the supposition of the OP. Weather was a big player in the air war game, and assigned targets were were often clouded over. The bombers didn’t take their bombs back to England – they picked the nearest biggest target and dumped their lads on it. It might be a factory. It might be a city. It might even be something that they didn’t recognize.
I’ll look for a cite but I’m sure the Russian part is correct. They wanted to summarily execute the bulk of the Nazi hierarchy. I’m not quite so confident of the accuracy of FDR’s reply.
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=906 search on 50,000 to find the relevant entry in the minutes of the Tripartite Dinner Meeting at the Tehran Conference. I’m sure the same story is related in the unabridged edition of Churchill’s Second World War, but I don’t have it to hand.