Note that they are quoting from a noted historian.
I counted the number of Divisions the German army had on every other front. It;s quite easy to do so. Try this- 1, 2, 3, 4, …
Again: Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference in 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: “Without American production the United Nations [the Allies] could never have won the war.”
I alluded to this in my OP and I thought - perhaps inaccurately - that the Russia/German treaty and Hitler breaking said treaty was a well known fact.
With Russia out of the mix for any length of time, I always thought that the outcome would have been much different. Let us not forget that from the perspective of soldiers lost in WWII, Russia lost several times more men than that of any other nation.
No Russia = no Allied victory? I am not sure, but the question would be much more arguable and hence why I posited the question at the outset with the caveat.
This is very interesting to me. Can you tell me if is this a consensus among historical experts or just your opinion? I had not ever heard or read this before.
Again, what on earth are you talking about? Barbarossa was a very successful offensive by any measure; it was about as successful as could possibly have been hoped for. That it didn’t knock the USSR out of the war in a single campaign doesn’t make it a failure; in retrospect nothing could have. You have not demonstrated in any way that the Soviet winter '41/42 counteroffensive was a failure other than the absurd metric of “the USSR didn’t win the war by January 1942.” Using this sort of logic the landings at Normandy were a dismal failure as Germany didn’t surrender in June 1944, and every battle and every campaign in the war was a failure barring the Battle of Berlin. None of the few specific examples you give to try to prove the winter '41/42 counteroffensive was a failure even occurred during the winter of '41/42. You are trying to cite the encirclement and surrender of 2nd Shock Army under Vlasov as proof of the failure of the winter '41/42 counteroffensive when the 2nd Shock Army wasn’t encircled and destroyed until June 1942 for god’s sake.
No, I’m asking you to provide links to your cites rather than just cutting and pasting without even noting from where you have cut and pasted from.
Impressive. Now how about trying an actual cite rather than proving you can count to 100 in your head. Again, it is horseshit that the German army had 100 divisions on other fronts that it held back from Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Actually, here, I’ll save you the trouble: Number of German divisions by front in World War II. Note the divisional assignments in June and July of 1941; a number of divisions listed in Germany or elsewhere in June 1941 were slated to head east when Barbarossa started, thus the sudden dip in the numbers located in those places and the rise in the number listed under Eastern Front from June to July 1941. You’ll notice there are 145 divisions assigned to the Eastern Front in July 1941 and a grand total of 64 divisions in all other areas (including 4 in Finland, which was simply the northern end of the Eastern Front).
Which, again, has exactly nothing to do with either the Soviets stopping the German’s advance or launching a successful counteroffensive against the Germans in December 1941 when US lend-lease aid to the USSR didn’t even begin until November 1941.
Pssst, hey those links are in the very post you are replying to here. And you know, you can likely look up a Wikipedia page on your own.
Yes, the USSR breifly stopped one prong of the German Offensive in the winter of '41/42. That does mean they didnt desperately need Lend-lease which was your original point. Even* Stalin* admitted that.
It’s certainly my opinion, formed over 30 years’ amateur study of this war. The (inevitable IMO) failure of the 1941 campaign to take out Russia, or foment an overthrow of Stalin, or even take any of the major targets of the '41 campaign (Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad) meant that it was, for all intents and purposes, over.
Yes it took the Russians 4 years to take back what the Germans took in 6 months, but it was never going to end any other way. Absent Allied supplies (which did not arrive in any meaningful quantity until 1942, after the failure of Barbarossa to achieve its goals) just means it takes 6-12 months longer. The Russians had more of every significant resource, and the Germans had no way of stopping them deploying those resources. No amount of tactical victories can compensate for the strategic imbalance.
While having searched, I can’t think offhand of any significant history expert who has addressed the question.
Why yes, they are in this post for the first time since you’ve been using cut and paste quotes out of wiki without bothering to inform us which page of wiki you’ve cut and pasted from because I asked you to kindly link it. It’s funny how that works.
You’ve got a very creative way of remembering things; luckily what was actually said is out there forever and can’t be edited away since this was not of course my original point at all. Let’s see what my point was that you quoted in your first reply to my post:
Saying the USSR briefly stopped one prong of the German offensive in the winter of '41/42 is entirely absurd and demonstrates complete ignorance of the subject matter. The entire German army was put on the defensive along the entire length of the Eastern front and they lost large amounts of important ground to the Soviets. Here again is a map of the territory regained by the Soviets during the winter, notably the German loss of Rostov isn’t seen on this map as the map covers 5 Dec 1941 to 5 May 1942, and the Germans had already retreated from Rostov during fighting from 27 November to 2 December. German losses were so severe during the winter counteroffensive that come summer 1942 offensive operations were only to take place in Army Group South’s sector; Army Groups North and Center had to remain on the defensive during the summer of 1942 and in fact never resumed offensive operations again for the remainder of the war apart from Army Group Center’s contribution to the failed offensive at Kursk in 1943. So much for briefly stopping one prong of the German offensive.
It wasn’t a technical problem, it was the that Japanese gained distance by sacrificing armor and other trade-offs. Once the US pilots learned to take on the Zero, they started to get some impressive results.
That’s a lot of R&D, training and diverting resources all for very questionable payback, even if they could succeed.
The Japanese managed to pull the surprise attack on the Repulse and Prince of Wales because the RN was not aware of their aircraft capabilities. That would not have happened againt the Germans.
It’s good that you aren’t staking your life on it because it would be a sad waste of a Doper. As you noted, the US and Germany were already engaged in an undeclared naval war and German’s timely entry won them the Second Happy Time in which Axis subs sank 3.1 million tons of shipping over a nine-month period. In contrast, the US sank 4.8 million tons of Japanese shipping over the entire war.
All this is pretty much meaningless. the IJN could not afford to linger offshore in the hopes of getting carriers. They lacked sufficient fuel in addition to the danger of getting spotted.
It would not have mattered if they hadn’t attacked PH, they need to attack the Philippines in order to protect their shipping lanes.
They could not have avoided the war in China any more than Germany could have not gone to war against the Soviets. The only reason they were at war was because of the political system which had the ultra rightwing fanatical IJA in real political power. Had they managed to stay out of China, they wouldn’t have gotten into the war.
They already had Taiwan before the war started. It was a colony of Japan, as was Korea.
Japanese did not have the financial resources to have built an atomic bomb.
Nope. With the US rabidly militarizing the Philippines and overseas possessions anticipating the war breaking out in spring of '42, it would have been even more suicidal to not attack when they did. Had the US retained PI, Wake Il. and Guam, and with the massive naval build-up already in place, the war would have been over much sooner.
The alt histories don’t take into considerations of logistics. It was all Japan could do to launch the PH attack. They simply could not have launch a serious attack on Hawaii. The entire point of the US marching closer and closer to Japan was in order to obtain bases close enough to provide support for an attack on the homeland.
But not the cash to develop the uranium processing methodology.
I’m obviously not qualified to arbitrate Eastern front assessments, but still want to quote this post:
The size of U.S. itemized $11 billion aid to U.S.S.R. is impressive. (What’s that in 2014 dollars?) Did U.S. get anything in return?
In addition to U.S. factories, I think the British Royal Navy came in handy – the goods had to cross the seas. Decrypting the German Naval Enigma code was also extremely useful and far from a sure thing. It might not have happened at all without the fortuitous presence of Alan Turing and his ingenious algorithms.
Go on a total war footing right away
Capture the BEF at Dunkirk
Destroy the RAF
Britain sues for peace
Ignore Italy / yugslavia / n Africa
Persuade Japan to attack ussr not ISS
Postpone the brutality in the east until the wars won
USSR falls
Not as important as you might think. The Arctic Route convoys are the ones best remembered because they were the most dangerous. It was also the least used route for just this reason; only 23% of lend-lease aid arrived via the Arctic Route. 27% went through the Persian Corridor after the USSR and Britain jointly invaded Iran in August 1941. The remaining 50% went through the Pacific Route which used either Russian merchants or (more often) US merchant ships given to and reflagged as Russian. Japan was quite anxious not to antagonize the USSR and did nothing to stop them.
While Hitler’s stop order is usually blamed for the failure to prevent the Dunkirk evacuation, it should be noted that the army command was not adverse to stopping. From their point of view, the British were trapped with their back to the sea, and the Germans could afford to stop for a bit to let the supply lines catch up with them and carry out necessary repairs and resupply. The British couldn’t go anywhere and might even come to realize their desperate situation and surrender without any need for further fighting.
It took almost a week after Operation Dynamo ended for the German command to realize that large numbers of the British and French troops had actually escaped by sea. Their intelligence estimates initially gave a figure of about 10% of the actual number as the *high *end of the possible evacuation result.
The German army had a very continental, land-based view of warfare that saw the sea as a barrier rather than an open highway. This both blinkered them at Dunkirk and created a view of the invasion of Britain as a larger-scale river crossing, rather than a different type of operation requiring its own special equipment and training. Mention has been made above of the use of river barges for the crossing. Not only did this have basic disadvantages for the voyage, but for large numbers it was to be a one-way trip - they were to be unloaded at the British end by running them aground and blowing holes in the sides.
In my opinion, the greatest problem both Germany and Japan had was a focus on short-term goals with only a vague idea of an ultimate strategic purpose and no clear plan of how the sort-term would advance the long term. The goal is to gain lebensraum in the East, so let’s attack in the West. We’re at war with Britain and France? Let’s attack Norway and the Netherlands! We want to conquer China? Attack Pearl Harbor! Losing the war was inevitable because they had no plan for winning the war, only for winning the next battle.
They both did have ultimate strategic goals, which was lebensraum for the Germans and an empire in Asia for the Japanese. However, both countries failed to fully grasp the realities of the situation, which forced them to make these abrupt directions in change. Both countries believed they were the master races and seemed to believe their ethnicity would prevail.
Hitler’s moves after Poland and up to Barbarossa were reactions which came from misreading France and Britain. There are some historians who believe that there could have been a chance for the Germans to have gotten to Moscow. I’m working on a wild and crazy alt history scenario which have Germany avoid war with Poland, thus not getting into a war with the France and Britain, and they successfully capture Moscow and the industrial base there.
Japan was busy building its empire in Manchuria, but failed to see that the Chinese wouldn’t be so happy about it. They had soundly defeated them almost 50 years prior and believed they would do so again. Crazy generals on the ground elected to start a ever widening war which brought about the sanctions from the West and which forced them to gain resources through conquest or give up their empire. Faced with that, they gambled and attacked.
With four different Axis decisions, we could be looking at a completely different world today.
If Japan hadn’t bombed Pearl Harbor, the United States may have little reason to get involved in the Pacific.
If Japan and Germany had put maximum effort towards developing nukes, and gotten nuclear arsenals before the United States, all bets are off. Who knows how history would have unfolded had that been the case.
If Germany avoids a two-front war and charges headlong towards Moscow while trying its best to win over the Ukrainian and Slavic populace, America and Britain would feel less reason to go to war against Germany (Go to war against Germany, because of a German attack on Russia?), and Barbarossa might have succeeded.
If Japan stays out of China and simply, slowly consolidates its holdings in the Pacific, then Japan might have a smaller empire that could last longer.
It all hinges on keeping America out of the war.
I thought the reason the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Wake was to buy themselves 6 months with no American interference to solidify their “Empire” into something the US could not attack.
I find it more interesting to think of ways the allies could have won even quicker.
Example:
Norway being prepared for a German invasion with fully equipped military forces at each airport and landing zone. Germany without Norwegian bases would make it easier for British convoys.
Poland fully mobilizing it’s 1.2 million man army and issuing its 10,000 anti-tank rifles which were sitting in a warehouse.
The Americans in the Philippines not getting caught with their pants down and the B17’s there not being blown up on the ground and using them to take out the Japanese invasion fleet.
Pearl Harbor listening to the radar operators and putting up a substantial fighter umbrella over the harbor and having anti aircraft batteries ready.
France holding back mobile forces and anticipating the invasion thru Belgium. Germany was not prepared for a long drawn out war at this point and if they would have held out for the whole of 1940 Germany would have lost much earlier.
