Just to quickly deal with this one: how is Germany going to invade the USSR without going through Poland, thus leading to a war with Britain? And the problem with Germany doing its best to win over the Ukrainian and Slavic population is that requires the Nazis to not be the Nazis, and if the Nazis are not running Germany in 1941, there is no reason for Germany to be invading the USSR. Under Nazi ideology the Slavic peoples were untermensch barely above Jews who were to be exterminated, driven into Siberia or enslaved, and the land they happened to be living on was German’s lebensraum. See Generalplan Ost.
They actually thought that if they hit us hard enough, we’d realize they were a powerful foe, and come to a negotiated peace. :dubious::rolleyes:
The Nazis did ally with some of the Cossacks, so it’s not impossible they could have “liberated” the Ukraine.
I think the quickest way the war could have ended would have been if the French had launched a serious offensive in 1939. Germany had basically stripped its western defenses and sent everything to Poland. They were counting on France staying on the defense behind its fortifications.
The Axis powers all made the same mistake. They were dictatorships and held democratic governments in contempt. They felt that they were “strong” and democracies were “weak” so the democracies would cave in once the fighting got hard.
It was a ridiculous notion. Britain and France had been democracies throughout WWI without giving in during the hard fighting. Democratic Britain had fought against Napoleonic France for over fifteen years. Two democratic governments in America had fought a bitter civil war to the end. There was no reason to think a democracy couldn’t fight a long war. But the dictators deluded themselves.
We’ve been over most of these.
How do they get Malayan rubber and Indonesian oil (their war goals) without going to war with the US? The IJN and IJA are not going to put up with a fully militarised Philippines sitting behind their left flank.
Not sure where Japan gets nuclear materials from. And the Germans were so far off even at the end of the war, I don’t believe there was any such realistic chance. Even if they get atomic bombs, the US/UK still do too, maybe even earlier than they did historically …
How do the Germans avoid a two-front war while still attacking the USSR?
The Nazis were never going to be nice to the untermenschen under any circumstances, even briefly. Their entire war goal was to conquer land to their east and empty it out for German colonisation, which they started on pretty much immediately they conquered anywhere.
In any case I’m not convinced that would have turned the tide.
But Japan invaded China in 1936, triggering the oil sanctions that triggered the war with the US and the invasion of SE Asia. Without the China invasion you don’t have a war in the Pacific at all.
That question can only be resolved by answering another. Could Japan have waged was against the British and the Dutch in the Pacific without also going to war against the US? The Japanese bet “no”, and I tend to agree. OTOH, the Germans had managed it.
They could have largely avoided this problem had they delayed the attack on the East until knocking out England. Personally I think this was achievable, but Hitler seemed to believe that he could negotiate a truce with England, and he never really seriously planned and prepared for an invasion. Also, the German economy was extremely slow in gearing up for total war. For example, German women were NEVER mobilized in a large scale in war production.
It’s already been mentioned that Stalin made an offer to cede the Ukraine if the Wehrmacht would stop heading toward Moscow.
Also, I don’t believe that either Hitler or the SS were so kill-crazy that they simply couldn’t resist killing the locals and in particular local Jews. They held off mass killings of German Jews for a number of years. Personally, I think the mass killings started when Hitler got overconfident about the progress of Barbarossa and decided that treating civilians decently wasn’t a worthwhile policy.
But Hitler was a spur of the moment kind of guy, and probably the worst strategic thinker of all the major leaders. IMO, had he been more calculating, or a little more willing to listen to his own generals at certain moments, the war might have turned out differently.
Just ignore it. Like they ignored a fully militarized Russia on their North.
Far from ignored, their largest army was kept in Manchuria for the whole war.
But you may have heard that the Russian army was a tab busy elsewhere around the end of 1941. The American army, not so much.
But few facing the Russkies.
The American Army was nothing to worry about. The Navy, otoh…
No they hadn’t. They only had in the sense that the US and Germany were not formally at war with each other; however the US Navy was in an undeclared war with Germany from the late summer of 1941, bolding mine:
The US Navy was escorting convoys of a belligerent in a war with orders to shoot on sight at any forces belonging to the belligerents on the other side. This is a large part of why Hitler really had nothing to lose by declaring war on the US after Japan attacked; the US and Germany were already unofficially at war and by taking the gloves off the U-boats were able to inflict tremendous damage on the US merchant fleet starting with Operation Drumbeat, again bolding mine:
This is simply untrue. The mass killings were planned before Barbarossa and began the day Barbarossa started; the Einsatzgruppen followed right on the heels of the advancing German troops:
The Commissar Order which stated that captured Soviet political commissars were to be immediately executed had been given to the German Army on June 6th, before Barbarossa which began on June 22nd.
The Germans employed far more than some Cossacks; they did not “ally” with them. Like almost everything in Germany under the Nazis it was full of contradictions, Hiwis and Osttruppen were being employed in the German Army in numbers into the hundreds of thousands before Hitler was even aware of it. They weren’t doing so out of nationalism or anti-communist zeal though; they were doing it to stay alive. The options were starvation in German POW camps which was being conducted as a deliberate policy (Soviet POWs were the second largest group of victims of the Holocaust) or serving as auxiliaries in the German Army.
Complete nonsense. As Askance said, the largest Japanese Army was in Manchuria for the whole war. The Kwantung Army was 700,000 strong in 1941, growing to 1,320,000 in 1945. Only a very small fraction of the IJA was involved in Japan’s expansion into the Pacific in 1941, the size of the force that conquered Malaya was only 70,000 for example.
Again, not true. The Philippines campaign lasted much longer and required the diversion of far more forces than the IJA expected or liked. Resistance didn’t end until May 6th, 1942, the day before the Battle of the Coral Sea began. General Homma, ‘winner’ of the campaign was removed from command after the Battle of Corregidor and forced into retirement in 1943.
A completely apples to oranges comparison.
The Soviets and the Japanese had a mutually beneficial nonaggression pact in place, since the USSR was busy on the other side of their nation and Japan needed to concentrate on fighting in the Pacific.
The entire reason that Japan needed to invade the DEI was because the US had lead the sanctions against Japan in response to the Japanese invasion and occupation of China and then Indochina. The US was started to fortify it’s positions in the Pacific and had moved the fleet to PH.
US warships were planned to be in Dutch and British colonial waters. Etc. Etc.
You know, I think we’ve already been through this before.
I’ve said this before: Japan should have avoided war with the United States in 1941. It was a poor strategy in the short term not just the long term.
Japan had no need to fight the United States. What it wanted was the resources of China and SE Asia, which were not American territory. All Japan needed from the United States was continued neutrality.
The fact that the American Navy was a potential threat to Japanese shipping was meaningless if the United States and Japan weren’t at war. The Japanese could have sailed their freighters and tankers through the San Bernardino Strait and waved to the American warships as they did so.
The only danger was the possibility the United States would declare war on Japan. And would that have happened? I say no. The American public was isolationist. And to the degree they cared about foreign policy at all, they were anti-imperialist. The idea that Congress would have declared war to defend European colonies in Asia is ridiculous.
Congress had not declared war when China was invaded. Congress had not declared war when French Indo-China was invaded. Congress had also not declared war when France or the Netherlands or Belgium or Norway or Poland was invaded. There’s no reason why Congress would have decided the Dutch East Indies was a line in the sand.
Japan could have invaded and occupied South East Asia and the United States would have protested and slapped more economic sanctions on Japan. But the United States wouldn’t have gone beyond protests and sanctions. There would not have been an American declaration of war.
Sinking American ships in Dutch ports wouldn’t have caused a war either. Japan and Germany had sank American ships already. And Congress had not declared war in response.
The only thing Japan could have done that would have started a war with the United States was a direct attack on American territory.
This argument is logical but it is not how it looked in Tokyo in 1940/41. From the Japanese military’s perspective war with the United States should they take the Dutch East Indies was a certainty - maybe not immediately but at some point. At each stage Washington had made clear its resistance to Japanese expansion with deed as well as words - supporting Chiang Kai-shek, allying with the British and the Dutch, embargoing oil and scrap iron; and most importantly starting a massive naval expansion. In the mind set of the Japanese military leadership it was inconceivable that the United States would not ultimately use their military and naval power to achieve their aims - the containment and subordination of Japan (as they saw it). The more internationally minded may well have been aware of American isolationism and the Administration’s likely difficulty in declaring war but, as has been pointed out, that had not prevented the US Navy taking action in the Atlantic.
Once the idea that conflict with the US was inevitable was firmly established in the Japanese leadership’s mind set the logic was to fight the war under the most favourable conditions and, given the rapidly increasing US naval strength, that meant sooner rather than later. Assume Japan attacks the DEI and Malaya with out attacking any US territory, even if the United States does not get militarily involved immediately can you, as the Japanese leadership, afford to leave a rapidly re-arming United States sitting in an increasingly fortified Philippines on the long flank of your key shipping route? From their point of view the relative strengths were just going get worse so it was now or never to take the US out of the game. Yes, it was a stupid gamble, but that was the way the Japanese military operated. When one bet fails, double your stakes, as the alternative is unthinkable.
The Japanese war in China and expansion into SE Asia was the cause of enormous friction between the two countries, leading to the US arming China, placing crippling embargoes on Japan and the formation of the American Volunteer Group. If Japan wanted to avoid war with the US, it should never have invaded China. Once it had invaded both sides continued to raise the stakes rather than back down.
You are comparing three very, very different situations. The sinking of the river gunboat Panay in 1937 caused a huge anti-Japanese uproar that was only calmed by Japan’s immediate and repeated official apologies for the accidental attack (though there is reason to believe it was an act of Gekokujō), taking full responsibility for it and agreeing to pay an indemnity. German sinkings of American warships were occurring in the course of an undeclared war. American warships were depth charging German U-boats in turn and had been since before the first US destroyer was torpedoed; it was only due to luck and the greater difficulty of sinking submarines that no U-boats had been sunk. America’s actions - escorting the convoys of a belligerent in a war, firing on the forces of the other belligerent, declaring that Axis vessels entered the neutrality zone at their own risk - were all acts of war, declared or not. Warships of the United States Navy being suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan in Dutch ports while the United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific wouldn’t be remotely comparable to the accidental sinking of a river gunboat followed by immediate, repeated apologies from Japan.
Right, we completely agree on this. But the Imperial Japanese completely misread and misunderstood the Americans. To be fair, we did the same.
But yes, they could have got away with it. They didnt think so, but they did think they could cow the USA into suing for peace if they whupped us hard enough. On both counts they were completely wrong.
Mind you, both the USA and the Imperial Japanese blundered disastrously and blindly during diplomatic efforts during the pre-war period due to this basic mis-understanding.
Maybe. But in any case, they didnt need to. As pointed out the US only had a few ships in the DEI,they werent in the same harbor as the rather tiny Koninklijke Marine, the Koninklijke Marine was not a threat in any way shape or form, so not need for a sneak attack, and finally, legally- the USN would have to leave part once hostilities were declared. The IJN didnt need to do a “Pearl” on the Koninklijke Marine, they would just pick off the two light cruisers etc when they sallied.
Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. If war between Japan and America was inevitable, it was apparently still a drawn-out process.
December 1941 was a really bad time for Japan to decide to declare war. The whole reason for their occupation of SE Asia was their critical shortage of supplies. Why start a war when you’re short on supplies?
The smarter thing would have been to invade and occupy SE Asia in 1941 but leave the United States alone. Then while America protested, Japan could have stockpiled up oil and other supplies from its new territories. A year or so later, when they had build up a reserve, they could have declared war on America if they still felt the need to do so.
TokyoBayer, Dissonance- so, then how do *you *think the Axis could have won?
And, no saying “they couldnt have”. You have to come up with the most likely way they could have done it. Just bashing other peoples theories doesnt cut it.
How about me, can I say “they couldn’t have”? Because in any remotely plausible alt-history, they couldn’t have.