I’m not sure that is entirely true - you can come up with different actions and strategies that could, conceivably, result in an Axis victory (several were proposed early in this thread); the trouble is most of them require Hitler not to be Hitler and the Japanese military leadership not to be the Japanese military leadership. In other words it needs actions by Axis leaders that were directly contrary to their existing belief system. Don’t invade Russia in 1941, withdraw your troops from China and appease the US, etc, etc, they make more logical sense for the long term interests of Germany and Japan but they were not in the nature of the beast(s).
We’ve been over this ground so many times that it’s frankly tiresome. US Navy vessels were at Balikpapan and Tarakan, both of which are ports that serviced very large parts of the oil leaving Borneo, the oil being the reason Japan attacked the DEI in the first place. You are also conveniently ignoring that a squadron of destroyers was being escorted by a tender and laying over on its way to join British Force Z which was patrolling the coast of Malaya looking for the Japanese invasion fleet when it was attacked and sunk by Japanese land based twin-engined torpedo bombers. Finally, you have repeatedly made this patently absurd claim that legally the USN would have to leave port once hostilities were declared and have never produced so much as a whit of evidence to back it up; the only thing you’ve tried to use was the example of the Graf Spee having to leave Montevideo, Uruguay within 72 hours of making port, which is completely absurd to consider as a remotely comparable example. The Graf Spee was the warship of a belligerent power seeking harbor in the port of a neutral country. Uruguay as a neutral party to the conflict could only grant 72 hours, after which it would have to leave harbor or be interned, by force if necessary, for the duration of the war.
Yet again, Askance puts it rather well. They couldn’t have. Just because you want to believe they could have does not mean it was in any way, shape or form possible without the intervention of alien space bats. The onus is on you to prove it was possible for them to have done so, not on me to prove a point that you can’t even prove. Considering that you derive your amateurish understanding of logistics from the Milton Bradley game Axis&Allies and have stated that in the past that Japan should have invaded India via Burma in 1942 and headed towards the British Middle East, it is little wonder that you think the Axis could have won, when you continue to cling to such fantastical notions even after having it pointed out to you that when the Japanese Army actually tried to invade India via Burma in 1944 most of their troops either died or were crippled by starvation.
Manchuria had a long history of dispute between Russia and Japan, unlike China proper which the US had long maintained an open door policy on. The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 drew an immediate escalation in US-Japanese relations. I’ll also note that Manchuria was one of the first tests of the League of Nations, which demanded Japan leave Manchuria. Japan instead left the League of Nations.
To be able to continue what they considered the real war, the one with China. A huge part of Japan’s policy under the ultranationalists and government by assassination was that Japan needed to possess the resources with which to sustain a total war, which is why they invaded China in the first place. The irony is that in trying to make themselves self sufficient for total war, they went about causing one.
The much smarter thing to do would have been to not antagonize the US, or better yet not to have invaded China in the first place. Unfortunately smart decisions were few and far between in Imperial Japan in this era, and the leadership itself wasn’t fully in control. I had mentioned earlier that there is evidence that the attack on the Panay was an instance of Gekokujō, an act taken independantly by lower ranking officers to deliberately draw the US into the conflict in China in 1937. The Manchurian Incident was itself an example of Gekokujō; the Kwantung Army set about ham handedly creating the incident to justify the occupation of Manchuria in defiance of the wishes of the Japanese government. From wiki on it:
What wiki doesn’t note is that Major General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, rather than flying made sure the instructions he had been given were made known to Itagaki and Ishiwara and proceeded to leisurely make the crossing on a ship so that they could act before he arrived and had to carry out his instructions.
If a multiple choice question tells you to pick the best answer and the question is ;
“What is 2+2?”
and the choices are :
A- 17
B- 3.999999
C- 1 million
D- a bunch
the correct answer is B, like it or not.
But in any case- if the Brits hadnt picked Churchill and sued for peace, then Stalin’s mental collapse continued and he no longer could give any leadership, and the Imperial Japanese decide to not attack America- then the Axis win.
Note that the leadership of Imperial Japan was not set in stone. Early on, there was a much more moderate party. Read Japan 1941 for a excellent analysis of the political maneuverings. So, altho Hitler *was *Hitler, the leadership of Japan in 1941 was different than say 1937.
What ships where those? The Houston was at Panay, outside the Dutch harbor, and sailing for Darwin. The Marblehead was indeed at Tarakan, but not anchored in the same are as the Koninklijke Marine. In any case, the Koninklijke Marine was not a threat in any way shape or form, so not need for a sneak attack. The IJN didnt need to do a “Pearl” on the Koninklijke Marine, they would just pick off the two light cruisers etc when they sallied.
The IJN could just ignore the tiny US squadron- there was no need to attack it. One decent Hv Cruiser, one obsolete light cruiser, and a few old destroyers. The IJN had a dozen battleships, aircraft carriers, some forty cruisers, etc.
The Battle of the Java Sea showed how quickly even a modest IJN squadron of 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers & 14 destroyers could blast the combined ABDA squadron (which had the whole Koninklijke Marine in the area, the US squadron and a couple of RN ships) out of the water without even breaking a sweat.
The IJN would just wait until the Koninklijke Marine sallied and sink them.
You have some odd idea that having a US ship in a neutral port is some sort of 100% protection.
“amateurish understanding”? :dubious: Ah, so you have a professional understanding? Please link to your peer reviewed papers and publications.:dubious:
Altho I enjoy Axis&Allies- it’s a great game, and warmly regarded by military experts, I base my “amateurish understanding” by reading hundreds of books on the period written by processional historians- and indeed playing several Wargames. You seem to think that Wargames are “amateurish” but the US navy- and in fact all the great navies of the word- use them constantly. By Wargames I am not talking just about those which are published for entertainment, but large scale professional wargames, one run by the US Naval War college and another pitting two Universities against each other.
Yes, but that’s the point. The Japanese leadership in 1941 were not moderates, they were the survivors of the Darwinian process that selected for more extremism and less willingness to compromise. It was their mindset that saw no alternative but a pre-emptive strike whatever the ultimate consequences.
Sure there would have been an “escalation in US-Japanese relations”. I’ve said that all along. But that’s not the point we disagree on. The question is whether the United States would have declared war on Japan?
Did the United States declare war on Japan when Japan invaded Manchuria? No.
Did the United States declare war on Japan when Japan invaded China? No.
Did the United States declare war on Japan when Japan invaded the Soviet Union? No.
Did the United States declare war on Japan when Japan invaded French Indochina? No.
So the question is whether the United States would have declared war on Japan when Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies. I look at the above pattern and say no.
"Was it over when the Germans bombed Pearl Harbor? "
(Ps Japan never invaded the Soviet Union) But yes, you are basically correct.
Interestingly it was wargames undertaken by the IJN in 1940 that led them to conclude that a move south would inevitably lead to war with America.
(From Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices, (London, Allen Lane, 2007), p113 which in turn references the Japanese sources for this.)
Ye, but as I said, the Imperial Japanese constantly misread how the USA would react. It’s, it’s like we were two totally different cultures or something.
Yup :dubious: The point being wargames generally reflect the mind of the people setting them up - the Japanese believed the US would respond as they would and, surprise, surprise, the wargames in 1940 showed that the Americans would attack Japan. They’re not an exact science.
I found a interesting quote from Roosevelt " *Roosevelt’s view was:
"At least as early as October 8, 1940, …affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan. … ‘that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.’ … ".[5][6]*
So, the President himself said that if “the Japanese attacked … the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war”.
When you sent your troops across a border and they fight against the troops in that country, it’s pretty much an invasion. A small invasion, perhaps, but the Sino-Japanese war started out as a small invasion as well.
Yep. "The Japanese also assumed they had little chance of winning a protracted war with the United States but hoped they could force the Americans into a murderous, island-by-island slog across the Central and Southwestern Pacific that would eventually exhaust American will to fight on to total victory. The Japanese believed they were racially and spiritually superior to the Americans, whom they regarded as an effete, creature-comforted people divided by political factionalism and racial and class strife…U.S. attempts to deter Japanese expansion into the Southwestern Pacific via the imposition of harsh economic sanctions, redeployment of the U.S. Fleet from southern California to Pearl Harbor, and the dispatch of B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines all failed because the United States insisted that Japan evacuate both Indochina and China as the price for a restoration of U.S. trade. The United States demanded, in effect, that Japan abandon its empire, and by extension its aspiration to become a great power, and submit to the economic dominion of the United States–something no self-respecting Japanese leader could accept."
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=905
What’s interesting is that Imperial Japan thought the USA was demanding they evacuate all of China, but apparently, the USA did not consider the puppet state of Manchukuo to be “China”. Neither side ever clarified this critical point during Pre-war negotiations. And, the USA would have likely accepted some sort of Puppet state for French Indochina being as Vichy France was a Nazi puppet state.
What few “what if” pundits consider is what Imperial Japan could have gained if they had joined the Allies as they did in WWI! Likely some sort of protectorate over both the DEI and French Indochina*, recognition of Manchukuo maybe, and other concessions. It worked in WWI- quite a few gains for little cost.
- French Indochina was still part of Vichy France. Of course the Dutch would not be expected to actually give up the DEI, but I am sure Churchill would have persuaded them to sell Japan all the oil they wanted at favorable prices. DEI independence after the war would likely be on the table.
Surely the key phrase is: “At least as early as October 8, 1940, …affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan”
Good point.
FDR thought “*sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.’ *”. This is a definite possibility. And, that mistake could have been a attack on US warships in Dutch waters.
But FDR thought the same about Hitler and that mistake didnt come until the Japanese attacked us and Hitler joined in, more than two years later.
We’ve been over this many, many, many times before. Destroyer Division 58 was located at Tarakan, Destroyer Division 57 was located at Balikpapan, as was the tender Black Hawk which was located there because
Oh, I see. Since you are so familiar with events of this period and know how easily the Japanese could just ignore the tiny US squadron, sail in and land troops at Balikpapan and Tarakan you most certainly are familiar with the actual Battle of Balikpapan, right? The one where a US Destroyer Division sank half of the Japanese invasion force’s transports and only failed to completely prevent the Japanese capture of Balikpapan because they arrived 5 hours too late?
And we’ve been over this ground so often it’s tiresome as well. You have previously stated your belief that the Axis could have won is based upon your many years of wargaming, which when asked you clarified to mean Axis&Allies. Axis&Allies isn’t even a wargame, it’s a themed game of Risk. Calling it a wargame is like calling Monopoly an economic simulation. To yet again repeat this point to you that I’ve made god knows how many times: I do not consider wargames amateurish, however one thing that even the most complex wargames fail to model very well is logistics. If your wargame allows for actions that are patently impossible in the real world, the problem is your model, not the real world.
This is at least the third time I’ve seen this from you, and I’ve responded, but it seems impossible to have a dialogue.
I could trot out my same responses, but instead, I’ll first ask you to address MarcusF’s points in detail. I’ve noticed you blew him off and continued repeating your talking points. That’s not a discussion.
No credible historian has stated that with the certainly which you claim. Address MarcusF’s points and then we can talk.
my emphasis.
This really is an excellent summary and I agree 100%. Well, one minor quibble is that from their perspective it wasn’t necessarily stupid. The IJA was stupid, but the IJN got a lot of things right. Not everything, but the US had a worse track record at the beginning. The IJN tradition was born in the Russo-Japan War, and their learned their lesson too well, but this is the same for all countries. (I’m looking at America, too.)
The flag admirals were young officers during the Russo-Japan War, and this was their navy.
Other point which is commonly overlooked is that many military leaders recognized it was a gamble, but one they felt forced into. There were US leaders who were warning Roosevelt that the sanctions were pushing Japan into a course of war by attempting to force them into a course of action which would cause a level of embarrassment which even the US would not tolerate.
I disagree with the first point as being “completely wrong” simply because the certainty you and Little Nimo are arguing do not address the concerns we have repeatedly pointed out. Again, address MarcusF’s points, then let’s talk.
I have a fun alt-history scenario which I’ve developed. It’s as unrealistic as any other alt-history because it relies too much on Monday morning quarterbacking. I actually mistakenly posted it on the other thread, so I’ll copy it here.
The point is that if someone had gone back in time to 1935 and told Hitler what was up (or that they had some super genius who could have understood things to a level not really possible) there is a way for them to win. It also neglects the financial condition of Germany, which may have made it impossible.
The overall strategy is for Germany and Japan to decide to work together in 1935 to specifically fight the Soviets, without getting the West involved. Needless to say would not be trivial.
Here’s some points:
This is done in a light-hearted manner, so don’t feel bad about ripping it to shreds. Realistically, it would have required a crystal ball, and I haven’t researched the availability of them in the mid '30s, but have at.
Dissonance, the idea comes from combinedfleet.com and their table of war material capacity. German and the USSR each has a roughly equal amount, while Japan had a smaller share. However, if there were ways to enlist countries to get into the war, then for the German to get enough tanks, troops and supplies to Moscow via rail cars on a suicide attack, while launching an all out fight with a greater number of soldiers, the Germans way have been able to either capture Soviet industries or destroying them before they were able to move them east to safety. As I said, my expertise, if I have one, is the Pacific, so I’m not claiming this would work.
DrDeth and Little Nimo, I do have further responses to your points, which I can address, but don’t just blow of the ones out there now.
I’m not so arrogant as to say that my posts are my cites, but I did live and do business in Japan for 25 years, dealing with the types of people who would be officer levels in WWII. I worked for a while as a consultant helping US companies learning how to navigate Japanese mindsets.
I watch Japanese documentaries on the war, dated a woman whose father was a Zero pilot and was friends with people who survived the atomic bombs.
I hope you can appreciate the frustration I feel when people attempt to place a Western, anachronistic view on Japanese leaders of the late 30s and early 40s.