Axis Strategy Victory Scenario in WWII - Possible?

[Little_Nemo]

A few points.

It’s Nemo not Nimo.

I’ll respond to MarcusF’s points if you direct me to which specific post I’m supposed to respond to.

I’ve provided real evidence of historical events to support what I’ve said. So I’m not going to respond to any accusations that I’m making things up based on Axis & Allies.

[DrDeth]

@Dissonance

Oh, I see. Since you are so familiar with events of this period and know how easily the Japanese could just ignore the tiny US squadron, sail in and land troops at Balikpapan and Tarakan you most certainly are familiar with the actual Battle of Balikpapan, right? The one where a US Destroyer Division sank half of the Japanese invasion force’s transports and only failed to completely prevent the Japanese capture of Balikpapan because they arrived 5 hours too late?
And we’ve been over this ground so often it’s tiresome as well. You have previously stated your belief that the Axis could have won is based upon your many years of wargaming, which when asked you clarified to mean Axis&Allies. Axis&Allies isn’t even a wargame, it’s a themed game of Risk. Calling it a wargame is like calling Monopoly an economic simulation. To yet again repeat this point to you that I’ve made god knows how many times: I do not consider wargames amateurish, however one thing that even the most complex wargames fail to model very well is logistics. If your wargame allows for actions that are patently impossible in the real world, the problem is your model, not the real world.

Umm yeah, 4 US Destroyers sank 4 transports and a patrol boat. So? Do you think the US Destroyers would have attacked if the USA was not yet at war with Imperial Japan? In out model the IJN could ignore the US navy there because the US presence was insignificant and NOT A BELLIGERENT. In any case- 4 transports and a patrol boat? Do note- the Japanese won the Battle of Balikpapan. And about 30 Dutch warplanes and a Dutch Sub helped out too.

Yes, I certainly do enjoy a game of A&A. But I have explained my more in depth wargame experience each time. You choose to ignore it so you can launch a *ad hominem * rather than debate the issues. So, I ask again, since you said “amateurish understanding”? Ah, so you have a professional understanding? Please link to your peer reviewed papers and publications.:dubious: You call me a amateur, which I am, but at least I have cites. However, generally when you call someone a amateur that means you’re a professional- which I doubt you are. But I’d be happy to read those papers if you are a pro.

[TokyoBayer]

@Little_Nemo

It’s Nemo not Nimo.

I’ll respond to MarcusF’s points if you direct me to which specific post I’m supposed to respond to.

I’ve provided real evidence of historical events to support what I’ve said. So I’m not going to respond to any accusations that I’m making things up based on Axis & Allies.

My apologies on your name, Little Nemo.

The specific post I’m making is as follows. He summaries many of the same points which I’ve made in response to discussions with you previously.

@MarcusF

This argument is logical but it is not how it looked in Tokyo in 1940/41. From the Japanese military’s perspective war with the United States should they take the Dutch East Indies was a certainty - maybe not immediately but at some point. At each stage Washington had made clear its resistance to Japanese expansion with deed as well as words - supporting Chiang Kai-shek, allying with the British and the Dutch, embargoing oil and scrap iron; and most importantly starting a massive naval expansion. In the mind set of the Japanese military leadership it was inconceivable that the United States would not ultimately use their military and naval power to achieve their aims - the containment and subordination of Japan (as they saw it). The more internationally minded may well have been aware of American isolationism and the Administration’s likely difficulty in declaring war but, as has been pointed out, that had not prevented the US Navy taking action in the Atlantic.

Once the idea that conflict with the US was inevitable was firmly established in the Japanese leadership’s mind set the logic was to fight the war under the most favourable conditions and, given the rapidly increasing US naval strength, that meant sooner rather than later. Assume Japan attacks the DEI and Malaya with out attacking any US territory, even if the United States does not get militarily involved immediately can you, as the Japanese leadership, afford to leave a rapidly re-arming United States sitting in an increasingly fortified Philippines on the long flank of your key shipping route? From their point of view the relative strengths were just going get worse so it was now or never to take the US out of the game. Yes, it was a stupid gamble, but that was the way the Japanese military operated. When one bet fails, double your stakes, as the alternative is unthinkable.

You have argued several times that Japan should have known that not attacking the PI would have resulted in the US not getting into the war. That argument is not supported by any legitimate historian I’ve read. It’s your conclusion, but a number of us don’t buy it. Whenever I’ve responded in the past, you are have not addressed my concerns. I don’t know if that is personal or not, so let’s see if you will at least address MarcusF’s points.

If it turns into another simple repeating of your talking point, then I’m not interested in retyping the same things again and again. We’re not getting anywhere and it’s a waste of electrons.

[TokyoBayer]

From the other thread in which I originally posted my alt-history, the following posts were made in response. I’ve copied them here.

@RickJay

No. There is no practical way to invade in the numbers needed without launching much of the attack from Poland.
Japan wasn’t bad at building things. Where they put their efforts, their weapons were top notch; look at how the Zero tore Allied planes to shreds earlier in the war. Japan simply did not have the resources to build weapons in the quantity AND quality to match the Allies, and had internal political rifts of the likes that no external advice was going to fix.

@lisiate

Take a look at a map of Europe in 1939 there’s no convenient way for Germany to attack the USSR other than through Poland. Japan was already in China (specifically Manchuria) before the Nazi’s came to power as well.

It would take a diplomatic genius to make all the alliances you’ve suggested (although to give Ribbentrop credit negotiating a non-aggression pact with the Soviets was a pretty sharp move).

More light tanks wouldn’t be particularly helpful, you’d just bounce even more ammo off the USSR’s better tanks (KV-1s and T-34s). The enormous number of soviet light tanks (BT series and over 10,000 T-26s) in 1941 didn’t help them very much in our timeline.

Pre-staging vast amounts of military equipment in other countries is sort of antithetical to conducting a surprise attack.

Leningrad was invested within 3 months of the launch of Barbarossa, yet despite the enormous losses inflicted on the Red Army was never captured. It’s hard to see how an alternate strategy could take it quickly while at the same time focusing on Moscow.

The gauge issue either requires massive infrastructure work to alter tracks or a huge conversion of rolling stock to be able to use wider track - either way it’s a big problem with no obvious solution.

All in all the invasion of the Soviet Union was about as successful as it could possibly be in our timeline, and still wasn’t enough to be complete.

@Bookkeeper

A problem with a lot of this is that it would have conflicted with the state capitalism part of Fascist ideology. Both German and Italian policies during the war often worked against military advantage if it would potentially interfere with the profits of German or Italian corporations. No equivalent of Lend-Lease, for example - if an ally wanted German tanks or aircraft they paid hard cash in advance and even then were usually given clapped-out combat survivors rather than new equipment, if they were lucky enough to be allowed to buy at all. If that meant the allied armies couldn’t fight well in combat, well, the Master Race didn’t *really *need them, anyway.

And forget about licensed production - the Nazi plan was that all post-war industrial production in Europe would be in Germany, and the occupied territories and remaining countries would only serve as resource sources for the massive German economy. They had no desire to encourage independent production by their (temporary) allies that would interfere with this goal. German superiority leading to an inevitable ultimate victory seemed to be an unquestioned assumption in much of their planning.

[DrDeth]

@TokyoBayer

This is at least the third time I’ve seen this from you, and I’ve responded, but it seems impossible to have a dialogue.

I could trot out my same responses, but instead, I’ll first ask you to address MarcusF’s points in detail. I’ve noticed you blew him off and continued repeating your talking points. That’s not a discussion.

No credible historian has stated that with the certainly which you claim. Address MarcusF’s points and then we can talk. Again, address MarcusF’s points, then let’s talk…

You are unable to make your own arguments? :dubious:Marcus makes some reasonable points about the mind set of the Japanese military leadership in 1940/41. But that mindset was not Inevitable. Read Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy by Eri Hotta , where he details the *slow *descent into that militaristic mindset and how many times it could have gone another way.

But that’s the thing about “what if?”. We don’t have to assume the same things occurring in the same timeline. Obviously if every thing happens just as it did- nothing changes.

The ultra- nationalistic military mindset of 1941 Japan was by no means Inevitable.

In any case- let’s argue *your *points. I have addressed MarcusF points and they have some degree of validity, but are not really helpful in a “what if” discussion. If the point is “every thing happens just as it did-” then yes, i agree- nothing changes. However, that not what the OP is for. If we’re discussing what really did occur as opposed to what COULD have occurred, then it is just a list of historical dates and incident,and not a debate at all.:dubious:

[DrDeth]

@TokyoBayer

I’m not so arrogant as to say that my posts are my cites, but I did live and do business in Japan for 25 years, dealing with the types of people who would be officer levels in WWII. I worked for a while as a consultant helping US companies learning how to navigate Japanese mindsets.

I watch Japanese documentaries on the war, dated a woman whose father was a Zero pilot and was friends with people who survived the atomic bombs.

I hope you can appreciate the frustration I feel when people attempt to place a Western, anachronistic view on Japanese leaders of the late 30s and early 40s.

My Dad was on the Staff of United States Army Pacific, in New Guinea and the Philippines, with the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal, the Philippine Defense Medal , the Philippine Liberation Medal the Philippine Independence Medal and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation. Not to mention a few others.

My Father-In-Law was part of the US Military Government of Okinawa.

I base many of my thoughts on the mindset of Imperial Japan based upon the works
of Eri Hotta, former research fellow at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, author of several well known books on the period, an independent scholar specializing in Japan international relations. Hotta was born in Tokyo. She received her BA in history from Princeton University, master and Ph.D. from Oxford. She taught at Oxford from 2001-2005.

[Little_Nemo]

@TokyoBayer

You have argued several times that Japan should have known that not attacking the PI would have resulted in the US not getting into the war. That argument is not supported by any legitimate historian I’ve read. It’s your conclusion, but a number of us don’t buy it. Whenever I’ve responded in the past, you are have not addressed my concerns. I don’t know if that is personal or not, so let’s see if you will at least address MarcusF’s points.

Oh, okay, I saw that post but I feel that MarcusF was addressing a separate issue. He is talking about why Japan declared war. I’ve been discussing the issue of whether the United States would have declared war.

And I feel I have responded to what MarcusF wrote. December 1941 was not the best time for Japan to go to war with the United States - which Japan itself acknowledged. The reason they were invading the Dutch East Indies is because they were facing a critical oil shortage which limited their ability to fight a war. So obviously it was a bad time for them to start a major war. If they had wanted to fight a war with the United States they should have invaded the DEI in December 1941, spent a year building up their oil reserve, and then bombed Pearl Harbor in December 1942.

My opinion is that domestic politics was a big factor in Japan’s decision to declare war on the United States in 1941. There was an intense rivalry between the Japanese army and navy. The army had been fighting a war in China for several years and was therefore able to claim it was doing something for Japan while the navy was just sitting around. Prestige and resources were flowing from the navy to the army. So the navy wanted to start a war in order to reclaim some glory. So they pushed for a strategy that would lead to a war with the United States because they knew that would be primarily a naval war.

[Dissonance]

@DrDeth

Umm yeah, 4 US Destroyers sank 4 transports and a patrol boat. So? Do you think the US Destroyers would have attacked if the USA was not yet at war with Imperial Japan? In out model the IJN could ignore the US navy there because the US presence was insignificant and NOT A BELLIGERENT. In any case- 4 transports and a patrol boat? Do note- the Japanese won the Battle of Balikpapan. And about 30 Dutch warplanes and a Dutch Sub helped out too.

You clearly are not familiar with the Battle of Balikpapan if you can’t even get it right after having an article about it linked for you. Japan lost 6 transports (not 4) out of a total of 12 and had the 59th Destroyer Division, only a part of what you called “the tiny US squadron the IJN could just ignore” arrived on scene but a few hours earlier they would have caught the transports loaded and ended the Japanese landing attempt at Balikpapan right then and there. You are also clearly unfamiliar with either the deployment of the IJN on Dec 7, 1941 or with the amazingly ad hoc manner in which their landing operations were conducted. The only difference between “our model” and actual events for the IJN is the carrier striking force isn’t sent to attack Pearl Harbor. The entire remainder of the IJN was available for and in fact was used to support their opening moves in the general direction of SE Asia. The US Asiatic Fleet was as insignificant in reality as you think it will be without an attack on Pearl; yet a fraction of this force that you seem to think incapable of doing anything nearly crushed the Japanese landing at Balikpapan. That the Japanese landing force was so poorly escorted that it had only 3 patrol boats assigned to it was indicative of the Japanese mindset and the ad hoc manner in which they conducted amphibious operations, not a lack of available escorts.

You are also clearly unfamiliar with the repeated war warning being issued to US forces in the Pacific if you feel US naval forces in Borneo could be ignored and Japan simply sail around them and debark troops because they were ‘insignificant’ and because ‘the US was not a belligerent’. Here are the full texts of War Warning Message from Chief of Naval Operations Nov. 27, 1941bolding mine:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department.

and Army Alert Sent by Chief of Naval Operations Nov. 28, 1941 again bolding mine:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measure should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message in being sent to G-2, Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Unquote. WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

@DrDeth

Yes, I certainly do enjoy a game of A&A. But I have explained my more in depth wargame experience each time. You choose to ignore it so you can launch a *ad hominem * rather than debate the issues. So, I ask again, since you said “amateurish understanding”? Ah, so you have a professional understanding? Please link to your peer reviewed papers and publications.:dubious: You call me a amateur, which I am, but at least I have cites.

You have never explained any more in depth wargame experience you possess before, and neither have you this time. You have only ever noted that military war colleges run wargames to try to back up the validity of your belief that the Axis could have won being based upon your many years playing Axis&Allies. Hell, I’ve explained my more in depth wargaming experience and said that while fun and useful in ways for understanding history, just because the rules in a wargame allow it to happen does not mean it was in any way plausible in the real world. And yes, your understanding of logistics is horribly amateurish if you think Japan could have invaded and conquered India through Burma in 1942 and then raced on to take the British Middle East. The terrain on the Indo-Burmese border is so rough and lacking in infrastructure and Japanese logistics in general was so poor that when Japan tried this in 1944 their troops starved to death. Your claim to have cites is rather amusing as well, considering that it was pulling teeth to get you to link where you were quoting from, and your idea of a cite for you incorrect assertion that Germany had 100 divisions on other fronts held back from Barbarossa was to start counting from 1 to 100.

[DrDeth]

@Dissonance

You clearly are not familiar with the Battle of Balikpapan if you can’t even get it right after having an article about it linked for you. Japan lost 6 transports (not 4) out of a total of 12 and had the 59th Destroyer Division, only a part of what you called “the tiny US squadron the IJN could just ignore” arrived on scene but a f… The only difference between “our model” and actual events for the IJN is the carrier striking force isn’t sent to attack Pearl Harbor. The entire remainder of the IJN was available for and in fact was used to support their opening moves in the general direction of SE Asia. The US Asiatic Fleet was as insignificant in reality as you think it will be without an attack on Pearl; yet a fraction of this force that you seem to think incapable of doing anything nearly crushed the Japanese landing at Balikpapan. That the Japanese landing force was so poorly escorted that it had only 3 patrol boats assigned to it was indicative of the Japanese mindset and the ad hoc manner in which they conducted amphibious operations, not a lack of available escorts.

You are also clearly unfamiliar with the repeated war warning being issued to US forces in the Pacific if you feel US naval forces in Borneo could be ignored and Japan simply sail around them and debark troops because they were ‘insignificant’ and because ‘the US was not a belligerent’. Here are the full texts of
You have never explained any more in depth wargame experience you possess before, and neither have you this time.

OK, let’s start with the First Battle of Balikpapan which was a insignificant minor action.
The IJN indeed lost 6 transports, but only four to the actions of the 4 US Destroyers. In any case, had Imperial Japan not attacked the USA, those four US destroyers would not have been part of the action at all. In any case- the Allies LOST that Battle, even with the four US Destroyers.

Yes, and that carrier striking force you blithely dismiss consisted of:
6 aircraft carriers
2 battleships
2 heavy cruisers
1 light cruiser
9 destroyers
8 tankers
23 fleet submarines
5 midget submarines
414 aircraft
You also forget about the IJN force sent to attack Guam which were:
4 heavy cruisers,
4 destroyers,
2 gunboats,
6 submarine chasers,
2 minesweepers,
2 tenders
and Wake Island (first try)
3 light cruisers
6 destroyers
2 patrol boats
And of course the forces sent to attack the Philippines.

Even a tithe of that would have served to blow those 4 destroyers out of the water, should they have tried to attack- which they wouldnt’. They were not belligerents. And yes, the IJN did ignore them- which is my point exactly, thank you for making it for me.

Yes, and the orders were to avoid making the first hostile act:

** If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.**

Just right here I detailed my other wargame experience "By Wargames I am not talking just about those which are published for entertainment, but large scale professional wargames, one run by the US Naval War college and another pitting two Universities against each other. "

Finally, I ask again for you to link to your Professional Historian published papers. Or admit you are also, indeed a amateur.

[Velocity]

@Boyo_Jim

There are claims (I don’t know whether they’ve been authoritatively confirmed or debunked) that The Soviets tried to do a peace treaty afterwords – specifically to give up the Ukraine in exchange for cessation of hostilities. Supposedly, when the offer came, Hitler bushed it aside, thinking he would be taking Moscow in another few weeks anyway.

If the stories are true, Hitler’s biggest mistake was not taking the offer.

Interesting; why didn’t Hitler sign the treaty, then betray the Soviets by continuing the invasion anyway? Although winter was looming.

[Boyo_Jim]

Since he didn’t sign a treaty, there’s not much point to discussing why he didn’t violate it – though he probably would have eventually. The same year or the next or the next.

… forgot to mention … I don’t know if it’s true but the legend is that the invasion was going so well at the time that Hitler saw no need for a truce. He thought he could get to Moscow and have it all without one.