I know that it takes tens of thousands of spores to actually infect someone. I know that a continuous exposure to hundreds of spores (like wool sorters get, apparently) isn’t good enough. I know that anthrax is found in “the wild”, just in dirt.
I’m looking at recent events and wondering what the “background” level of anthrax is. Is it zero? If we called in a HAZMAT team to a yurt in Mongolia, or on Ford’s Theater in 1865, or someplace “clean”, would anything be detected? Would a nasal swab done on a random farmer somewhere show up with a couple of spores?
I don’t have an exact answer, but since it’s mainly spread by animals, I’d guess that a yurt in Mongolia would have a much higher background level of spores than a suburban shopping mall or a factory floor.
I’d expect Ford’s Theater in 1865 to have a much higher level of spores than a 21st century shopping mall, because people overall lived closer to animals back then.
The reason why they authorities didn’t push the panic button when the first guy in Florida came down with anthrax was that he was an “outdoorsman” and it was possible he’d been exposed simply by being “outdoors”, around animals like deer, which can also get anthrax. So the general background level of spores must be higher than “zero”, outdoors.
The First World has long had effective anthrax vaccination programs, so a First World farmer might not test positive for anthrax spores via a nasal swab, but I wouldn’t be surprised if he did.
I’ve been thinking along the same lines, though. Let’s say we took an office building where we knew anthrax had not been intentionally introduced and performed an environmental and exposure survey. How often would we get a positive? I think the public assumption is never or at least almost never, but my experience with biomedical assays makes me somewhat circumspect regarding this assumption.
Firstly, as asrivkin points out, there is a background level of spore contamination. An if there is a background rate of environmental contamination, there should be a corresponding rate of nasal contamination.
Secondly, all biomedical assays have a definable false positive (and false negative) rate. The false positive rate is the proportion of negative samples tested that yield a positive result. This varies with the nature of the assay, the nature of the material to be tested, and often with the skill of the individual performing the assay.
An important aspect of the error rate of these types of assays is that if applied in a situation where true positives are rare, the majority of positive results will be false positives. See this page for a basic description of relevant epidemiological concepts.
I’d like to know the nature of the field anthrax tests (anti-capsular antibody, anti-toxin antibody, anti-spore protein, rDNA hybridization???) And what are they using for confirmatory testing (they may be culturing, but maybe there is an rDNA hybridization or PCR based assay). And what I’d most like to know is has there ever been a wide scale test of the anthrax test (during a time when positives were not expected) and how did the test perform?
Wow. I think this is the first time I’ve started a thread and had more than one reply.
It seems to me that this is the missing piece of information (though Duck Duck Goose and Squink point to qualitative but wholly satisfactory answers) that they should be showing on CNN and the relevant health authorities should be giving out. If we knew that 5% (or whatever) of people chosen randomly would give a positive (not a false positive-- I’m thinking of people who would have really been exposed, but exposed to a very small level through random chance spending time in a bad environment), that might relax people.