As I recall Hitler had delusions he could force a political settlement with the west with that maneuver.
I understood this much better when I thought about the fact that the German military was mostly a product of the Prussian military tradition. Prussia, for centuries, made a major export industry of being a source of advisors for every king or nobleman in Europe who wanted to be taken seriously, militarily. And I realized, that like any consultant, their most important skillset was not actually giving good advice, but rather being able to describe after the fact how good their advice was (and how the person getting the advice was the one who screwed it all up). And they’ve had generations of practice in it.
Yes, but as the link shows: “film stars Tom Cruise as Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg,”. Tom Cruise did not try to kill Hitler, von Stauffenberg did. We try to fight ignorance, not spread it.
Wow, some people have no sense of humor.
Of course the plan didn’t work - Tom Cruise - :dubious::dubious: please. Chuck Norris would have succeeded without firing a shot, just a stare.
Aren’t "jokes’ supposed to be funny? Or did you just not know who to spell Stauffenberg? 
Which is pretty much what the Germans DID do after the Battle of the Bulge.
The whole idea was predicated on the notion that if they could cut off the forces north of the attack, and take Antwerp, they’d basically have cut off the British forces, and taken out a big chunk of American ones, and in the bargain, cut off the only big port the Allies had taken.
This would have meant that the US forces would have to be supplied through the Normandy beaches until they could either retake Antwerp, or basically rebuild/expand one of the other Channel ports to serve.
The hope was that if an entire British Army was destroyed along with an American one, it might cause irreparable damage to the alliance.
Ultimately though, even had it been wildly successful, I suspect that what would have happened is that the Russians might have conquered more of Germany, and/or a German city might have been on the receiving end of Little Boy instead of Hiroshima.
It was indeed exaggerated by Hitler’s generals postwar (particularly exaggerated was individual generals’ actual willingness to defy Hitler to his face), but it is not by any means wholly a myth.
Hitler’s distrust of his generals late in the war is fully explicable - given that there were, indeed, conspiracies afoot among his generals to kill him. Hitler knew his generals were capable of toadying to his face while plotting to have him killed - not exactly a great basis for mutual trust.
Hitler was fully aware that he was forcing his generals to go against their inclinations, particularly against their inclinations to not commit suicide, leading him to favor “stand fast” orders that were easy for him to verify for compliance. The military effectiveness of such orders was questionable, to put it mildly; the point was to ensure that Hitler retained effective overall command.
The thought that Germany could have effected the war’s outcome at all by have more success in the Battle of the Bulge was sheer fantasy. Put another way one might say it was just… plain…nuts.
See,* that* was a little funny.
Boo. 
Take a look at these maps one from the middle of January: Timeline of World War II (1945–1991) - Wikipedia
And one from the middle of February: File:1945-02-15GerWW2BattlefrontAtlas.jpg - Wikipedia
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(Both from Timeline of World War II (1945–1991) - Wikipedia )
You can see the end of the Battle of the Bulge, as well as the early 1945 Soviet offensives. The Western Allies were not going to engage in any major offensive operations in this time frame even if the Germans had not launched the Bulge, the plan was to sort out the supply lines (fixing ports and rail) and stockpile supplies for offensives in good weather. Moving all of the Bulge forces to face the Soviets was unlikely to slow them down much, they might not have ended up quite as close to Berlin but weren’t going to be far off.
But by the time of that second map, the Yalta Conference had happened and the occupation zones had been agreed upon - the borders had nothing to do with position of the forces on the ground, as very few forces were inside of Germany proper at the time. The Western Allies wanted the German armies crushed and Germany forced into a complete, no terms unconditional surrender, anything less would be regarded as abject failure likely to turn into another world war a few decades later. The Western Allies also wanted the Soviets to stay in the war and assist with the invasion of Japan, as no one knew that atomic bombs would be ready, and no one knows if they would have been sufficient to force a surrender. Screwing the Soviets over by denying them a real occupation zone in Germany was not something remotely considered as an option.
Maybe a fuller quote is more interesting:
In the acclaimed television series Band of Brothers the Webster character abuses a column of German prisoners of war,
“Say hello to Ford, and General fuckin’ Motors. You stupid fascist pigs. Look at you. You have horses. What were you thinking?”
In The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, a recent and controversial book Adam Tooze, senior lecturer in economic history at Cambridge, sets out what the Germans were thinking. He has provided an exhaustive account of the economics of the Third Reich.
Pretty sure everyone else understood it was a joke.
I think there were some hopes that they might be able to negotiate what was essentially a repeat of what happened in 1918; agree to withdraw back inside Germany and give up all occupied territories - but be allowed to stay in power in Germany itself.
Ironically, the fact that they were fighting a second war was one of the main reasons this was impossible. Germany’s opponents now felt that it had been a major mistake to allow Germany some degree of autonomy in 1918 - it fostered the belief in Germany that they hadn’t really lost the war and should try again. This time the terms were going to be complete and unconditional surrender with an occupation of Germany.
I really wanted to post “Lighten up, Francis” when I first saw that reaction. I coulda been the very next post. 
But I couldn’t remember the damn line! :smack: :smack:
Hmm, it was “something, something Francis”. Hmm “Chill out Francis”. No, that’s not it. “Ease up, Francis”. No, still not right, AAArrgh!!!
It finally came to me just now; 7 hours late. Oh well.
(post shortened)
Looking at it from a practical side, Hitler knew that he would be hanged if the Allies won. He’d be lucky to escape with just being hanged if the Russians captured him. Why not play a longshot and hope it comes in? Of course it would have been best for Hitler to kill himself but he didn’t think of the German people.
Hitler may have seen himself as blessed by fortune and destined to follow in Frederick the Great’s footsteps. In the Seven Years War, Prussia was getting whipped by Russia and her allies and Berlin was under siege in 1762 . Then Czarina Elizabeth died and her nephew Peter III took over. Peter was a Prussianphile and immediately made peace with Prussia. That and other things ended up costing Peter his throne and life when his not-so-loving wife Catherine and her traditional overthrow Peter.
That’s kind of a different issue though. You’re explaining the reasons why Hitler and his regime wanted to keep fighting as long as possible. But I believe the OP was asking why an offensive against the Americans was chosen as the means to keep fighting.
If Hitler’s goal was to keep the war going as long as possible, his best plan in late 1944 would probably have been to build up a fortified defensive area in the Alps and fall back into it. This was the possibility that Eisenhower was most worried about. If it had been done competently, the Nazis could probably have held out for another year.
Wow! Either seriously whooshed or humour deficient.
ETA: maybe both