A technicality? Yes. “Just” a technicality, no. Because, again, “technicality” doesn’t mean “unimportant.”
I define “factually guilty” as “they actually did the thing they’re accused of.” The law is the process by which we try to determine whether or not someone is factually guilty. When there’s a flaw in the process, and a guilty person goes free, it doesn’t change the facts of what he actually did, only our understanding of those fact. Such a person is technically innocent, but factually guilty.
The technicality is that he is incontrovertibly guilty of the crimes he was accused of, yet his conviction was overturned and he was released. This is not to say the PA Supreme Court decision was wrong, but it’s saying that it was based on a technical legal assessment of the circumstances of his conviction.
I’m curious what definition of “innocent” you’re using. It’s certainly not one found in any conventional dictionary of English.
Yes, I’m reading it in pieces when I get a chance. They do cite some PA cases but it is not 100% clear that they rest solely on their interpretation of the state constitution. Arguments could be made either way. Although, as a practical matter, this would be a crazy case for SCOTUS to take because of the unique circumstances.
I’m sorry, you reject what concept? That the courts sometimes come to conclusions that are incorrect? That no person has ever committed a crime, and been found innocent in a court of law?
So both the federal and state constitutions apply to a state prosecution, and the state guarantees are generally interpreted as providing the same protection as the federal guarantees. The Court may use 5th/14th analysis, but that is often shorthand for the state constitutional guarantees as well, rather than repeating it in full. Sure looks to me like the state constitutional guarantees were infringed, as well as the federal ones. On that basis, there is no point to a federal court review, because it wouldn’t change the outcome in this case.
And, the duty of fairness on state prosecutors appears to be a matter of state law, based on this passage which the majority quotes:
This wasn’t a plea bargain, but rather an assurance from the state prosecutor that charges would not be laid. The principle of the duty to honour assurances applies equally to that situation, according to the majority. That again looks like a ruling on state law, that the prosecutor in this case acted improperly.
So even if it did go to the federal courts, those courts would be bound by the finding by the state court that the prosecutor breached state law. That would likely undercut any argument that due process had been complied with under the federal Constitution.
Jury members must understand the legal definitions of the terms guilty, not guilty, and innocent, as well as beyond a reasonable doubt. While in lay usage the term ‘not guilty’ is often synonymous with ‘innocent,’ in American criminal jurisprudence they are not the same. ‘Not guilty’ is a legal finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof.
Usually it is only when a state court says that its constitution gives a higher protection that the federal constitution is it considered to operate on an independent state ground. When it is said that it is “co-extensive” then if SCOTUS says we don’t require that, then the state court gets a do over.
I’ll admit I haven’t read all the background articles because I have things I need to go out and do this afternoon. But one issue strikes me as critical; what was the communication between Cosby and the prosecutor?
… it seems [prosecutors] notified Cosby’s attorneys that they didn’t intend to prosecute criminally so he couldn’t take the 5th at his civil trial. Then they used that testimony when a later DA decided to prosecute him [at his criminal trial]. If that’s the basis for the decision … it seems reasonable.
In accordance with the advice his attorneys, Cosby relied upon D.A. Castor’s public announcement that he would not be prosecuted. His reliance was reasonable, and it resulted in the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right when he was compelled to furnished self-incriminating testimony.
These, to me, seem like two fundamentally different things. If Cosby and his attorneys were given some official statement from the prosecutors, then I agree and subsequent testimony that resulted from it should have been inadmissible. But if Cosby and his attorneys simply took some non-binding public statement by the prosecutor as a fact and then acted upon the assumption that it was binding, then I feel they were wrong in assuming Cosby had immunity.
He is “innocent” in the sense that legally, in a civilized country, one is innocent until they are proven guilty. Since the process by which Cosby was proven guilty has been rejected and is no longer valid, he returns to the state of being an innocent man in the eyes of the law until such time as another trial finds him guilty. We’re talking about a legal case, so I think the usage of the term “innocent” is pretty clear.
Do I think he’s a rapist? Yup. But legally, “I think he’s a rapist” doesn’t make him guilty.
Come on. I think the majority of people upon hearing that a defendent was “released on a technicality” would take that to mean a minor, procedural irregularity. The whole point of framing it that way is to contrast the miscarriage of justice in letting a clearly guilty perp walk over some trivial paperwork error.
The issue of uncharged offenses (I’m struggling with the legal terminology here) being admitted as testimony was brought up in at least Justice Thomas Saylor’s dissent:
… I have substantial reservations about the trial court’s decision to permit the Commonwealth to present testimony from other asserted victims of sexual assaults by Appellant, which allegedly occurred from between fifteen and twenty-two years in the past. Since under the majority’s approach the issue is moot, I merely take the opportunity to note that my present, tentative inclination would be to award a new trial grounded upon Appellant’s challenge to such evidence as being unduly prejudicial. See generally Commonwealth v. Hicks , 638 Pa. 444, 484-85, 156 A.3d 1114, 1138 (2017) (Saylor, C.J., concurring) (“I maintain concerns about the power of potentially inevitable character inferences associated with other-acts evidence, with requiring defendants to effectively defend mini-trials concerning collateral matters, and about the efficacy of jury instructions in this context.”)
To both of these comments, I refer you to the excellent guidance from the DOJ provided by @DavidNRockies in post #68, specifically this bit:
While in lay usage the term ‘not guilty’ is often synonymous with ‘innocent,’ in American criminal jurisprudence they are not the same. ‘Not guilty’ is a legal finding by the jury that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof.
IANAL, but I would argue that logically, “not guilty” would also be a legal finding that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof with admissible evidence, even if evidence deemed inadmissible – including the defendant’s own words – were a damning, overwhelming proof of guilt.
I might seem to be nitpicking, but to me, “innocent” is a moral judgment, not a legal one, and its use to describe a serial rapist is reprehensible.
Why do you need a term? Just explain what happened. “Got off on a technicality” is a pretty consistently used as a trope in fiction for a failed juditical system justifying vigilante justice.
I think it’s odd for some to be calling what the prosecutorS (more than one) did here dishonest or an abuse of office when this judicial opinion IMHO opens up greater possibilities of dishonesty and abuse of office. If one State’s Attorney or District Attorney promises her neighbor, cousin, or old school pal she won’t prosecute him, should the successor SA or DA be bound by that? If a Trumpist US Attorney said he wouldn’t prosecute Trumpist insurrectionists, should the next US Attorney be bound by that? IMHO, that would be “acting like turds.”
Promises not to prosecute like the one here are IMHO not the same as plea deals. In a plea deal, each side is getting something so it’s an enforceable contract. A prosecutor promising categorically and unilaterally not to prosecute a particular crime or person should not IMO bind his or her successors in office to his whim of gifting someone a freebie. I disagree with the characterization of such a promise as an agreement or deal that “the” prosecutor here broke by prosecuting Cosby.
That said, inducing someone to testify by promising you won’t charge them but then charging them and using the testimony criminally is improper but IMO the remedy should be suppressing the induced testimony rather than dismissing the criminal case altogether. I would vacate Cosby’s conviction, but I would send it back for a new trial where his civil testimony is not admitted into evidence.