What you say is correct relatively speaking. That is to say, relative to an event that can be positively proven not to have occurred, an event that might have occurred and cannot be proven not to have occurred is more likely to have occurred. But the important point to note is that this logic says nothing at all in absolute terms about whether or not the latter event is at all likely to have occurred.
Which is more likely, that there is a pink, fire breathing, pipe smoking 16 foot elephant with bad breath in my office right at this moment or that there is a pink, fire breathing, pipe smoking 16 foot elephant with bad breath in my bedroom at home at the moment? The answer, relatively speaking, has to be the latter, because I am absolutely certain that there is no such elephant in my office (which is where I am) right now, and I have no way of checking on my bedroom right at the moment. Does that mean that it is valid to suggest that the latter is at all believable or likely or proven? No of course not.
Because we expect less evidence to be available, we are less easily able to disprove their existence from the lack of that evidence. This makes the Greek gods more plausible than something for which we reasonably expect certain evidence, but do not find it. That sounds absurd, until one realises that this logic does not mean that Greek gods are significantly plausible, at all.
Refer to my elephant example. Since we EXPECT less evidence of the pink elephant in my bedroom (because I am not at home and can’t see any evidence at all) it is more plausible than the pink elephant in my office.
No, you are generalising way beyond anything I have ever said. Believability is a function of the evidence available, not the lapse of time. However, the lapse of time may have an effect upon the inferences that can be made from evidence or lack thereof.
This may lead to a situation in which a lack of evidence for a long ago event means little, while the lack of evidence for a recent event means much. That may mean that a long ago event is harder to disprove than a recent one. In turn, that may mean that the long ago event is more believable than the recent one. That is not to say that you able to generalise to say that the long ago event is always going to be more believable Nor are you able to infer that the more long ago event is significantly believable at all.
You are not comparing like with like, so it is hard to say. It depends on all the available evidence. I suspect that there are aspects of Greek myth themselves (whch are pretty wild and vague tales) that make them less believable than the miracles of Jesus for other reasons, beyond the simple question of lack of historical corroboration, which is why what you say sounds absurd.
Agreed, but I’m not sure that anyone was ever saying that (I certainly wasn’t). The point is not that NT miracles are bunk (as I believe them to be). The point is that Smith’s miracles are obvious bunk.
Finally, emarkp, my understanding is that the witnesses who became estranged from Smith subsequently revealed that all they witnessed was something under a cloth, and/or that they only “saw” the plates in faith, not physically. If you have a cite to the contrary, let me know.
(I’ll bet you’re a trial lawyer, at that). Anyway, I’ve enjoyed debating with you; you certainly make some very persuasive arguments.