In fact Mrs May has also forgotten that Botham once ran out Boycott purposely, since he was playing too slowly. Beefy then compared Boycott to a female anatomy part.
Even if this weren’t a crazy fantasy, she can’t dissolve Parliament. That prerogative was abolished in 2010. Parliament now dissolves automatically before an election, without her being involved at all.
What’s everyone’s take on the future viability of the Conservative Party? I’m skeptical, as modern parties seem incredibly durable and MPs loathe to be labelled the ones that destroyed a party, but it seems to be being threatened by some.
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This seems realistic. My ideal fantasy would be cancellation of the whole thing so we keep our opt-outs and rebate, as I’m pretty sure we’ll return to the EU in a decade’s time.
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But the trouble is that after going through all this process there will be little or no appetite in the 27 to accommodate any more special arrangements for us.
Useful piece in the Guardian this morning about how the various parliamentary factions on this issue add up:
One could speculate as to whether this is the ultimate issue that causes a refiguration of parties, but the ingrained habits of the system tend to mean that even if something splits one of the major parties (Corn Laws, Home Rule, 1931 and all that), in the end it’s reabsorbed back into a two-party dominance.
It is a very old party, dating from 1812, and it has seem schisms like this in the past. The Corn Laws, The Reform Act, Tariff Reform, The Irish Question. It seems to bounce back after these big splits. Brexit is just the same, it as been rumbling away since the 1970s when the UK changed from its old Commonealth trading pattern to one that engaged Continental Europe. Containing that Atlanticist versus European Community split is essential for a party leader. Sad to say, in that respect Cameron failed spectacularly with his ill conceived Brexit Referendum.
The Conservatives are a lot more resilient than the other UK parties such as Labour and the Liberals. However it does need modernising, its membership is very low and the average age of members is over sixty. Labour are ahead in that respect, but it has its own schism between Old and New Labour that shows no signs of going away.
Parties are institutions and by their nature are slow to adapt to a changing world. It takes a shock to shake them up. They will have to lose a couple of elections for that to happen. The party system is looking very old and tired in this smartphone, app happy social media obsessed world.
Errr…on the issue of The Irish Question. This damn process has brought it up again! :smack:
In 2000 years, Britain, its language, culture, common law and achievements will all be forgotten by all except some historians. The average person will however, still have heard of the Irish question.
The headlines saying This Deal or No Deal.
The Withdrawal Agreement is not going to be a ping pong ball bouncing back and forth between Westminster and Brussels. It goes to Brussels as it is. If they agree then it is a done deal. The only thing that will break the deal is if May loses out in a vote and it is not endorsed by the UK government.
She will also have to survive the challenge of a confidence vote if there enough letters from disgruntled Conservative MPs.
However, what choice does any successor have?
Crash out of the EU? Parliament will surely vote to support the deal and have to live with this the Withdrawal plan as it stands. The deal means several years of negotiating solutions to all outstanding issues and then negotiating a trade deal with the EU in detail…and maybe with some other countries.
It will be another couple of years of the same sort of wrangling, crises, deadlines and posturing. There will be no end to it.
The only other alternative is to have another Referendum.
At least this time, there would be something solid to read rather than the wild speculations that happened last time.
I have to disagree. Since the Good Friday Agreement, the Irish question, such as it is, has gotten much less attention. In two millennia I doubt it will be remembered by the average person.
The main beneficiary appears to be Frankfurt, followed by Paris and Luxembourg (and to some extent Berlin). A few firms are moving to Dublin but not very many.
And most companies aren’t moving out completely; they’re moving significant chunks of their workforce to the Continent but they’ll still have London offices. There will be empty floors in buildings and will slow down the current mad skyscraper building rush, which is one of the few benefits of the situation I’ve noted, but it’s not like the City is going to be a ghost town.
The very next morning Nigel Farage went on television and admitted that it wasn’t true and if it had been up to him they never would have used it on the buses he’d repeatedly been photographed standing in front of with nary an objection previously, and basically Leave admitted the whole thing was a blatant lie even though they’d sworn up and down it was true before the vote.
What was the book?
I think this is a fair summary of the current position (correct me where I’m wrong):
-
the Article 50 deadline date of the UK leaving the EU is fixed in law, at two years after invocation
- it is however extensible by agreement with the EU27
- an extension can be requested by any EU27 member eg Ireland, not just the UK
- it’s possible that the invocation can be unilaterally revoked by the UK, and there’s a court case
ongoing about this via a rather circuitous route involving the Scottish courts. The UK
government has opposed this at every stage, but the courts have not. - once the A50 date has been reached, then the Withdrawal Agreement kicks in
-
The Withdrawal Agreement is the current contentious issue before Parliament
- it is the transition arrangement that will govern UK/EU relations for several years until future relationship
terms are determined eg trade etc - it is the result of lots of work that both sides have negotiated, and it’s basically in its final form
with very little, if any, room for modification - it needs to be ratified by the UK Parliament and the EU27 to come into force
- the WA has provisions for the transition arrangements it contains to be extended (actually as
part of the text it can potentially extended to any date that fits the form 31st December 20XX) - the WA isn’t exactly “business as usual” but it’s not so wildly different
- part of the WA sets out the backstop
- it is the transition arrangement that will govern UK/EU relations for several years until future relationship
-
the backstop is the really contentious part
- it’s the part that safeguards the interests of the Republic of Ireland, an ongoing EU member
- it is the default agreement if it all goes tits-up
- this is the bit where various virtual borders might have to change if there’s no long-term
agreement
Fair?
Edit: Damn, that formatting looked better before it posted
Largely fair, except that the backdrop is as much to protect the interests of Northern Ireland. Leaving aside the issue of a possible return to violence, 34% of NI’s exports go to the Republic.
No special arrangements, just status quo ante. Yesterday Tusk indicated withdrawing Article 50 was possible. It would certainly be the simplest solution.
I broadly agree with the Baron’s summary, accepting the point about the backstop being in all of Ireland’s interests, and quibbling that theoretically it would be possible for a materially different withdrawal agreement, if only anyone had any bright ideas.
So what are the implications? In my opinion, the practicalities of process rule out a lot of hypothetical outcomes. Simplifying for the sake of brevity:
The UK will not crash out of the EU without a deal next spring. In practice, there is almost no scope for that to happen ‘by default’, and there is no scope for this Parliament (or the next) to have a majority of MPs who favour ‘no deal’.
While in theory, Parliament could decide to cancel Brexit before the Article 50 process ends, in practice it won’t. The committed Remainers who would have to work very hard to achieve this, will all conclude that it will be easier and more likely to cancel Brexit from the transitional period.
This withdrawal agreement gets passed. I think this is more likely than not. It’s a terrible deal, but probably as good as any other. No MP will be happy voting for it, but no one will propose a better alternative, and few MPs will be willing to accept responsibility for no deal. Which leads neatly on to the fourth possibility.
Brexit day is delayed - that is the Article 50 period is extended. If Parliament won’t accept this withdrawal agreement, won’t propose another, and won’t accept ‘no deal’, then the EU will graciously allow the period to run on. Ultimately, Parliament will have to accept a withdrawal agreement, most likely the one on the table now. The EU won’t throw Britain out unless Parliament rallies around a cunning plan to exploit the delay to Britain’s advantage. But if Parliament reaches a consensus then there wiould be no need to delay.
So at some point, probably next spring, the UK will enter a transitional period much like the one Theresa May has single handedly negotiated. (I seem to be in the tiny minority who considers her to be a politician of exceptional character and ability.)
When the transitional period ends, I think the outcomes for Great Britain are, in descending order of probability:
Brexit in name only
Remain on previous terms
Canada style free trade agreement
Remain on new terms.
The fourth appears as a possible (if unlikely) outcome for the first time. It involves UK adherence to all EU social legislation, membership of the euro, membership of Schengen, sensible financial contributions. A boy can dream… 
The likely outcomes for Northern Ireland are:
Effective Reunification while maintaining the pretence of the Union
Explicit Reunification
A hard border with civil unrest
A hard border with the recommencement of the armed struggle
The first being a relatively small development of the status quo ante - all the current bluster about the integrity of the UK seems to me to overlook the reality of the last few decades.
All in my humble opinion!
I disagree. The majority of the Northern Irish do not wish union with Southern Ireland. The simple solution is to let NI and SI sort out the border issue themselves.
Not being a cricket fan, the only thing I know Geoffrey Boycott for is old-school paternalistic racism. So probably a suitable Brexit role-model, thinking about it.
Simple as in the simplistic solution.
the entities sub-national can not decide on the national border issues, if they do, then they in effect are becoming national sovereigns.
And that seems to be a political problem for your sovereign and the peace agreements.
but if you wish to reignite a civil war, it is probably an excellent approach.
No, just simple.
The EU has the principle of subsidiarity and the two would be negotiating on behalf of the rest.
What exactly do you disagree with me about? 
Bearing in mind that:
1 Northern Ireland is currently in a political union with the Republic and seems happier than it has ever been
2 the majority in NI voted decisively in the 2016 referendum to stay in that union
3 left to themselves to ‘sort out’ the border issue, the Irish would presumably agree that the UK would stay in the EU, thus resolving the ‘Irish’ border issue. Is that the solution you are proposing (if so you have my full support)?
You’ll also note that my suggestion for the most likely outcome for NI is in line with the proposed withdrawal agreement now placed before Parliament by a government comprised, if I remember correctly, by the party you support?