The other thread pointed me to this very good article by Bricker, but I do have one quibble.
The last paragraph reads, in part, thus:
While, strictly speaking, this is true, it mischaracterizes the “risk.”
You cite the leading case in the area, Vance v. Terrazas. This case stands for the proposition that, in proceedings for loss of nationality, the government carries the burden to prove (by preponderance) that the person lost his citizenship both voluntarily and intentionally. And the “intent” portion of that proof may not be proved circumstantially. In Vance, an American citizen naturalized in Mexico (probably to avoid the draft), and in the course of doing so, made an explicit oath that he renounced his American citizenship. The Supreme Court held that this could be insufficient evidence to prove the “intent” requirement, although it did note that it would be sufficient to prove the “voluntariness” requirement. (See also Marshall, J., concurring, who felt that a “clear and convincing” would be more appropriate.)
Vance is substantially more complex than that, but the important part here is that the burden is on the government, not the citizen, to prove intent. And the contents of the oath are insufficient proof.
Ten years after Vance, the State Department adopted a new statement of evidentiary standards to be applied in expatriation cases. The new standard is even friendlier to dual citizenship than the Vance decision was. Under the new standard, if it comes to the attention of a U.S. consular officer that a U.S. citizen has performed a potentially expatriating act (under INA § 349), the consular officer will simply ask the citizen if there was intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship. If the answer is no, the officer will not pursue it any further. The only times that intent to retain citizenship is not assumed are now: [ol] when you formally renounce it to a U.S. consular officer [§349(a)(5)], when you take a policy-level position for a foreign state [§349(a)(4)(B); Kahane v. Shultz, 653 F.Supp. 1486 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)], when you’re convicted of treason [§349(a)(7)], and when you’ve done some unusually compelling behavior (not codified - never used)[/ol]In a nutshell, Bricker, I’m saying that you made dual citizenship seem scarier than it really is. It’s not “an obviously risky move.”