Bush Republicans...what does it take to give up on Bush ?

Great Debates
301

Not much time today… but I’ll try.

Why would Bush want to disuade Americans of the Saddam - AQ link ? He profits from this distortion. He should be clear about the reasons to invade Iraq: Geo Strategic or forceful submission of Arabs… whatever but not terrorism.

Also I started paying more attention to Bush’s speeches after some of the discussions last month… and he keeps talking about Iraq as a fight against terrorism… as the front of the war against terrorism. He has always said that in older speeches too. So he clearly sees Iraq as part of terrorism… and from what we’ve seen the links are tenous at best… non existant at worse.

302

Perhaps the problem then, is that you do not understand what President Bush means by Terrorism? Is it possible that he means something closer to “international threat” while you are hearing a more “classical” definition?

303

I think I’ve got it sussed. I’ve heard Bush’s philosophy discussed in terms of Lysenkoism, but I think what pervert is slyly promoting is actually the more general case of dialectical materialism:

And maybe a new term is needed, because while it may have been the official philosophy of the Stalinists, it’s not really a communist philosophy, it’s really a fascist philosophy.

Everything must be interpreted according to the Bushist worldview. Whatever the fuck that may be.

This is perhaps what I’ve unconsciously loathed about pervert’s posts all along.

304

No, not at all. I’m not suggesting that Saddam might be reasonably linked with Al-Qaeda simply on the grounds that they both operate from the same part of the world. Neither am I suggestiong that they can be reasonably linked within the context of the war on terror due to some racial or cultural linkages either. Also, unless someone has been posting in my name, I’m almost positive I have never mentioned whether or not they have similar control over the “means of production”. I can’t see a single aspect of what you suggest in what I have posted.

Once again. Thank you very much.

305

Ok, but if the “not-lie” part of the statement is not actually in the statement, how can you attribute it to the statement?

I’m having difficulty asking this question, because I suspect there is some aspect of the “not-lie” that I do not get. We said before that “A not-lie is a statement that is technically true, even though it in fact promulgates false information.” And I suppose that whay you mean in the quote above is that the promulgated information is the part which is false. The question I have is what principle do we apply to statements to determine this other information. If the statement is true, where does the false information hide?

Right. The false information is imparted not from the statement as written, but from some interpretation of the statement on the listeners part. So, the distinguishing feature of a “not-lie” as opposed to a misunderstanding is that the speaker intends that the false impression be left in the mind of the listener. I’ve been assuming an intention on the part of the “not-lier”. Have I missed something?
BTW, I was under the impression that you did nor really want to parse through some of the examples of Administration juxtaposition of Iraq and Al-Qaeda. I thought you guys had done this enough in other threads. My last post was not intended as evidence or an attempt to change your mind. I really just wanted to politely end the conversation about evidence rehashing. If you really would like me to take a stab at going over Schlesinger’s statement or any others, I am willing. If not, that’s fine too. We can wait for another thread. Meanwhile I do appreciate your willingness to repeat some of the arguments made in other threads. I did not pay much attention to them then. I appreciate the opportunity to go over them here. (I, of course, include SimonX in this)

306

perv,
How’s this?

Vice President Cheney said on January 22, 2004:

“There’s overwhelming evidence there was a connection between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. I am very confident that there was an established relationship there."
cribbed

Iraqi Who Might Have Met With 9/11 Hijacker Is Captured
By Vernon Loeb and John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, July 9, 2003; Page A11

Richard Perle, a member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board who has contended al Qaeda and Iraq are linked, said he is hopeful al-Ani’s capture will lead to a corroboration of his stance.

"Of course, a lot depends on who is doing the interrogating," said Perle, adding he fears that if it were the CIA, it could skew the interrogation so as to play down evidence that the alleged meeting with Atta occurred.

CIA spokesman Bill Harlow described Perle’s charge as “absurd.”

“His comments do a disservice to all the men and women of the CIA who every day call it as they see it, not as some wish it to be,” Harlow said.
“We’re open to the possibility that they met, but we need to be presented with something more than Mr. Perle’s suspicions,” the official said. “Rather than us being predisposed, it sounds like he is. He’s just shopping around for an interrogator who will cook the books to his liking.”

*© 2003 The Washington Post Company
supplemental link *

Cheney’s quote alone would clear the hurdle of being more than merely “Saddam and Al Qaeda… mentioned near each other whenever the Administration talks about security threats around the world,” yes?

307

Remarks by President Bush September 25, 2002

Q Mr. President, do you believe that Saddam Hussein is a bigger threat to the United States than al Qaeda?

PRESIDENT BUSH: <snip>
They’re both risks, they’re both dangerous. The difference, of course, is that al Qaeda likes to hijack governments. Saddam Hussein is a dictator of a government. Al Qaeda hides, Saddam doesn’t, but the danger is, is that they work in concert. **The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness ** and his hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world.

Both of them need to be dealt with. The war on terror, you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. And so it’s a comparison that is – I can’t make because I can’t distinguish between the two, because they’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.

Remarks by the President September 17, 2003

Q Mr. President, Dr. Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld both said yesterday that they have seen no evidence that Iraq had anything to do with September 11th. Yet, on Meet the Press, Sunday, the Vice President said Iraq was a geographic base for the terrorists and he also said, I don’t know, or we don’t know, when asked if there was any involvement. Your critics say that this is some effort – deliberate effort to blur the line and confuse people. How would you answer that?

THE PRESIDENT: We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th. What the Vice President said was, is that he has been involved with al Qaeda. And al Zarqawi, al Qaeda operative, was in Baghdad. He’s the guy that ordered the killing of a U.S. diplomat. He’s a man who is still running loose, involved with the poisons network, involved with Ansar al-Islam. There’s no question that Saddam Hussein had al Qaeda ties.

I hope that I’ve been able to satisfactorily show that various members of the Bush Admin, from the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group, to the former chairman of the Defense Policy Advisory Board, to the VPotUSA and PotUSA themselves, have all presented the connection between Hussein and al Qaeda as more than a mere juxtaposition in conversation.

If I have, then comes the questions of how much of what did the Admin knew when they were saying these things.

It’s easy to show that the Admin, (especially certain members in particular), had a duty to know the most up-to-date facts and conditions re Iraq, al Qaeda, etc. It’s also demonstrable that information contrary to the Admin’s presentation was available, (in some cases made available), to the Admin.

Of course, the underlying crux of the biscuit is the nature of motives of the members of the Admin.
However, the theory that ascribes a desire to knowingly conflate the threats from Hussein, al Qaeda, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons, etc., cannot be tested by the presence or lack of a confession as it is a theory about intenional wrong-doing. Those who’re accused of intentional wrong-doing are rarely expected to confirm the charges. So the lack of confirmation through admission/confession by the Admin cannot be taken as evidence either for or against the validity of the charges.
So, all that can be reasonably done in these sorts cases where denial of wrong-doing is expected, (and even where denial of wrong-doing’s somewhat a part of the charges), is to establish a verifiable pattern of behavior and from this pattern divine a motive.
How much of what did the Admin knew when they were saying these things?
Compare and contrast the above and former with humble snippets like these:

Congressional Record
October 9, 2002
[Excerpts of a letter from John McLaughlin for DCI Tenet, to Bob Graham (former) Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence]

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of 4 October 2002, we have made unclassified material available…

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States.

Saddam might decide that the **extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States ** would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

…we can declassify the following dialogue [from 02/10/02 SSCI closed hearing]:

Senator Levin: . . . If (Saddam) didn’t feel threatened, did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?
Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would be that the probability of him initiating an attack–let me put a time frame on it–in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low.

Senator Levin: Now if he did initiate an attack you’ve . . . indicated he would probably attempt clandestine attacks against us . . . But what about his use of weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what’s the likelihood in response to our attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.

In the above dialogue, the witness’s qualifications–“in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now”–were intended to underscore that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds.

Regarding Senator Bayh’s question of Iraqi links to al- Qa’ida, Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions:

Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al- Qa’ida is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.
We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa’ida going back a decade. [sup]1[/sup] ******
Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa’ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression. [sup]2[/sup] ******
Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa’ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad. [sup]2[/sup] ******
We have credible reporting that al-Qa’ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa’ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. [sup]3[/sup] ******
Iraq’s increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al- Qa’ida, suggest that Baghdad’s links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action. [sup]4[/sup] ******

CIA Finds No Evidence Hussein Sought to Arm Terrorists

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, November 16, 2003; Page A20

The CIA’s search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq has found no evidence that former president Saddam Hussein tried to transfer chemical or biological technology or weapons to terrorists, according to a military and intelligence expert.

Anthony Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, provided new details about the weapons search and Iraqi insurgency in a report released Friday. It was based on briefings over the past two weeks in Iraq from David Kay, the CIA representative who is directing the search for unconventional weapons in Iraq; L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. civil administrator there; and military officials.

“No evidence of any Iraqi effort to transfer weapons of mass destruction or weapons to terrorists,” Cordesman wrote of Kay’s briefing. “Only possibility was Saddam’s Fedayeen [his son’s irregular terrorist force] and talk only.”

© 2003 The Washington Post Company
Are the Admin’s pattern of behaviors just the an unfortunate Rorshach like result projected by many Americans? If so, what obligations does a Presidential Admin to keep the electorate well informed, (besides the SotU)?

Are the Admin’s pattern of behaviors just the result of poorly informed or poorly formed judgements on the parts of various members of the Admin?

Or are the patterns deliberate, from intention? (The ends of the intentions don’t matter at this point. We can get to that later).
*****A handful of sig lines or some such something to be negotiated later for anyone who can finid either/and/or the identities of these defectors, who found them, specifically if they’re associated with the The Iraqi National Congress’s Intelligence Collection Program
******notes to follow soon if all the lightning do let up, (cuz I know that someone’ll want to discuss these)

308

Fine, thank you.

Certainly. They have claimed a “relationship” quite a bit. This of course is not the same as claiming an Iraq connection to 9-11. And, it is not necessarily mistaken.

Well, not so fast, friend. :wink:

First comes an attempt to define or understand the sort of link that the Administration is alleging. Perhaps before that, however, we should understand your belief on the matter. Are you contending that there is no connection whatsoever? Or are you simply contending that there have been no joint operations between Iraq and Al Qaeda? I assume your belief is closer to the second?

If we can agree on what the Administration was saying (or on what they said meant) and on the facts on the ground, then we have a chance to decide if naughty things were done. I agree entirely that you cannot wait for a confession. But when you have an allegation, you also have to decide if a crime was committed before you can issue an indictment.

I’m not really sure you want me to parse all of the quotes you gave. But let me give you a flavor for what I am talking about.

When you have Cheney say “There’s overwhelming evidence there was a connection between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. I am very confident that there was an established relationship there.” And then “*Tenet said he “did not agree with the way the data was characterized” in the document to which Cheney referred. *” You have to be sure that they are refering to the characterization in the same way. For instance, “*Asked specifically whether he thinks policy makers misrepresented the intelligence facts to justify the war, Tenet said: “No sir, I don’t.” *”

Cheney’s statement surely alleges a link. But what sort? Is he really suggesting that Iraq had something to do with 9-11 or any other terrorist attack against the United States? The president seems to discount this in his statement on September 17th 2003. Is it possible that he is merely suggesting that there were operators in contact and that this constitutes a severe danger?

When the President says “[…]you can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.” Is he really saying that Al Qaeda and Saddam are existentially identical? Surely not. Especially when he described one essential difference in the previous paragraph. Is it possible that he is simply saying that they are both parts (theaters if you will) of the war on terror? If that is possible, is that really unreasonable?

Now, if you accept (I’m just saying if, I’m not contending that you do) that the administration is conflating Iraq and Al Qaeda in the sense that they are both threats, and if you allow that possible links were in fact possible or were being forged, then you have the possibility that Al Qaeda might begin to work in concert. As in the President’s statement “The danger is, is that al Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness.” Note the future tense.

So, what did the administration mean (or what did their statements mean)? Mr. Svinlesha this effects your challenge to me as well. If we can define what “Saddam Hussein gave substantial support to al-Qaida” means it will make it easier to meet your challenge.

BTW, do you really want to go over all of the quotes you have with another right wing nut (me)? I truly appreciate your willingness to dredge them up again. I also understand that you have done this a couple times. If you’d rather not go over them in detail again, I’ll understand.

Personally, I’m more interested in this concept of a “not-lie”. I’m intrigued by the possibility that information can be conveyed that is not in the statement in question. I’m just weird that way. :wink:

309

Simon X:

Thanks, Simon. Excellent point, as usual.

At best we can only infer motive/intent. But judging from the record, I find it hard to believe anyone can seriously doubt that this administration has been involved in an extensive, systematic attempt to deceive the American public.
perv:

Well, not exactly. The statement does contain false or misleading information. But the “not-lie” is constructed so as to channel the listener towards a specific interpretation, and to conceal the fact that the information is false or misleading. For example: when the US president stands up in front of Congress, and the world, and claims he has access to evidence that Iraq sought to purchase yellowcake, one naturally expects this claim to be well-grounded in fact. The central point of the statement is the accusation of attempted purchase, not the source of that accusation, and that is where the listener’s focus lies.

It was well-known within the US intelligence community that this accusation was false. This information had also been repeatedly relayed to the White House over the course of several months. You therefore have to ask yourself why Bush would chose to employ it in the SOTU. But Bush is able to avoid these accusations of outright lying because his speechwriter had formulated the sentence in such a way that responsibility for the information is shifted to the British government. This statement then, while technically true, nevertheless promulgates information known to be false. Hence the term not-lie: a lie that isn’t technically a lie.

Or consider the rhetorical deployment of the initials “WMD.” It would not be at all difficult to specify which sort of “WMD” one is talking of when one accuses Iraq of possessing “WMDs.” The administration could have clearly stated, for example, that they believed Iraq possessed chemical weapons but not nuclear ones. Instead, they simply and repeatedly charged that “Iraq has WMDs,” thus conflating in the mind of the listener the relatively insignificant possibility that Iraq possessed some stocks of battlefield chemical munitions with the extremely significant possibility that it possessed a nuclear weapon. The underlying strategy here is to be as vague as one possibly can in outlining exactly what sort of threat Iraq posed, and to imply within that vagueness that it is more dangerous than it really is, without coming right out and lying about it.

Hallelujah! By Jove, I think you’ve got it! Since these sentences are so carefully constructed, it seems almost banal to point out that they are almost certainly motivated by an intent to mislead or deceive.

Again with the flies, perv?

The alleged link is spelled out quite clearly in Simon’s post. To reiterate:[ul]
[li]We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa’ida going back a decade.[/li][li]Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa’ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression. [/li][li]Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa’ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad. [/li][li]We have credible reporting that al-Qa’ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa’ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs. [/li][li]Iraq’s increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al- Qa’ida, suggest that Baghdad’s links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action.[/ul][/li]
Now, this ain’t exactly rocket science, and your constant hair-splitting is beginning to make me wonder about your sincerity in this discussion. Are you being artfully disingenuous on purpose – or is it possible that you simply don’t know what words mean?

Not to answer for Simon, but my guess is that he means the first. I certainly do. To spell it out: there exists no credible evidence to date of any operational cooperation between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida. The asserted connections are merely associational (they’re both evil) or coincidental (they’re both active in the Middle East).

First off, I’d just like to point out that you’re once again employing that debating tactic that I (and others) have complained about previously – to wit, you merely suggest here the existence of another possible interpretation of Cheney’s statement, without providing any reason whatsoever as to why that alternative is superior. This tactic is not particularly clever, nor does it lead to any real insight, so please give it a rest. If the only objection you have is, “Well, he could, of course, maybe, have meant something else,” then perhaps you should just close up shop.

Secondly, I submit that Cheney’s statement OBVIOUSLY implies an OPERATIONAL LINK. (Don’t you dare ask me, “Yes, but what sort of operational link?” Do so and I’ll seriously discombobulate on your ass.) If you disagree with this claim, PRESENT YOUR ARGUMENT AS TO WHY, and stop beating around the Bush (hey! A pun!) with a bunch rhetorical questions.

Why do you dismiss that possibility? It is almost certain that 90 to 95% of his listeners understand him as asserting this existential link. Record wrote an entire report repudiating the factual existence of this identification, so he must surely have thought so.

Depends on how you view it, but many administration critics (most notably, Richard Clarke) would indeed argue that making such a claim is unreasonable. (Clarke, you may recall, believes the Iraq invasion is a “distraction” from the war on terrorism.)

Important operational support in reality. Guns, money, (lawyers), intelligence sharing, etc. I have the feeling I’ve already mentioned this once.

And I’m still waiting for you to meet that challenge.

What are you talking about?

The information is in the statement. It just happens to be false information, presented as true.

310

This seems to be a good place to add this…

Remember the ‘Uranium from Niger’ flap? If not, let me reiterate: The Bush administration said that there was credible evidence that Iraq was seeking to buy Uranium from Africa. Joseph Wilson was then sent to Niger, and he reported no credible evidence that Iraq had made any attempts to purchase Uranium whatsoever.

This created a huge controversy. The U.S. position was based on British intelligence. British intelligence refused to back down on its claim, and pointed out that Wilson had only mentioned Niger, and they said “Africa”. This distinction was overlooked by everyone, and the ‘Niger Uranium hoax" became a cause celebre’ among the anti-war crowd. It was on the news every night.

Well, Joseph Wilson has a new book out, and it seems he has changed his tune:

Well, how about that? Baghdad Bob himself, trying to buy enriched yellowcake for Saddam. The Bush administration was right. It also begs the question: Why would Iraq be trying to buy enriched uranium if it had no nuclear program?

311

Well, you can’t get any more solid than that, now can you? Boy, is my face red! That clearly nails it, the official “saw it as a possible effort”. Man, talk about a smoking gun! Put that together with several pieces of a centrifuge, buried under a rose bush, and you’ve got a nuclear program that could, concievably, be a genuine threat sometime in the 23rd Century! Gasp!

Restore my faith, Sam, and tell you me you realize that this is perfectly ridiculous. Besides, Canadians look silly doing the Victory Boogie. Not as silly as when putting mayonaisse on Freedom Fries, but still…

312

Excuse me, Sam – Comical Ali is now revealed as the protagonist of the fairy tale that Wilson debunked, and that makes the story more credible to you? Tell me you’re not serious.

313

Not to mention **Sam ** declaring an “important distinction” between “Niger” and “Africa” without ever mentioning any other country than Niger. You gonna explain *why * that’s important, big guy?

The odds-on favorite for the reason for Bush saying “Africa” in that speech: The risk his handlers saw that he’d make a very embarrassing mispronunciation on TV if the word on the Teleprompter were “Niger”.

Sheesh - Baghdad Bob is now being used as a cite. The loyalist position really has come to that now, hasn’t it?

314

Did you guys bother reading the link? This is not the word of ‘Baghdad Bob’.

315

Yes, I did read the link. Now I’m curious how carefully you’ve read it.

What I’ve gathered - to summarize fairly briefly - is:

a) in 2002 there were ‘rumours’ that Iraq had tried to obtain uranium ore from Niger
b) Wilson traveled to Niger to investigate this, where he learned that,
c) An “unnamed businessman” had maybe perhaps made a sorta inquiry about uranium.
d) Wilson had deemed the claimant of this as unreliable. Translation: that person was probably making shit up.
e) It now comes to light that the “unnamed businessman” was supposedly Mohammed Saeed Sahhaf. Wilson says he found out that this was the “rest of the story” recently.

I’m failing to see how this revelation either discredits Wilson or credits the widely-believe-to-be-bogus yellowcake theory. Nor how this is a demonstation of Wilson “changing his tune”.

Perhaps you could elaborate?

May I also suggest to you that the appearance of Baghdad Bob in an already fanciful tale will probably not make it less fanciful to most observers. Just my opinion.

316

The not-lie stuff first.

But this is not a banal inference. I’m sorry, I understand you are convinced. I also understand that you are passionately convinced. But your passion does not relieve you of the burden of providing evidence. If the primary difference between a not-lie and a lie is the intent of the speaker, then you have to provide evidence of this intent. Proposing the argument that the not-lie is also evidence of intent is somewhat circular is it not?

And yet it is technically true? How can a true statement contain false information?

But false information presented as true is a lie. we don’t need a new term for it.

[deleted 6 ro 7 paragraphs in response to flies, closing up shop and threats to discombobulate on me] :wink:

Let’s see if I have to close up shop. I’ll just address one point because it seems to be a prime example. Evaluate it and let me know.

I assume you aretalking about this statement culled from SimonX’s excellent post: "*There’s overwhelming evidence there was a connection between al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. I am very confident that there was an established relationship there.“I respectfully disagree. I am sorry to produce a fly, but it seems pretty clear to me (if you can say OBVIOUSLY with no evidence, I can say pretty clear under the same standard ;)) after reading the link that SimonX provided to Jan Schakowski’s site that Cheney was talking about the same relationship that is mentioned at the end of that page thus "Concluded the senior U.S. official: “Did Saddam tolerate terrorists? Yes. Was there any evidence Saddam was involved with 9/11? No.” * and "“Were there meetings? Yes, of course there were meetings. But what resulted? Nothing,” said one senior U.S. official.”

I grant you that Cheney’s statement does not seem to mean that Iraq and Al Qaeda are simply both MENA threats nor that their relationship is simply one of enemies. He is clearly implying that they know each other. But an operational link means that they have undertaken operations in concert. I do not think that Cheney is alleging this. He says only that there is a relationship and that it goes back a long time. I read this as just what he says. That there was a relationship and that it went back many years. I don’t infer from this that Al Qaeda helped Iraq (or the other way around) on any particular operation. Nor do I infer that any specific materials were transfered between the two. I do infer that the relationship could develop along these lines. I do infer that this relationship constitutes a threat. But only in the sense that two enemies of the United States, both of whom have shown their willingness to use international violence against America, its allies and others, are talking and could one day cooperate.

If I may, go and look at the definition of operational support you gave. What in Cheney’s statement implies “Guns, money, (lawyers), intelligence sharing, etc.”.

I hope I have done so. (And a good pun, BTW)

You did ask some questions, so I’d like to answer them.

Well, I said existentially identical, not existentially linked. I’m not sure what existetially linked would mean. I meant that the President is not asserting that there is no difference at all between Al Qaeda and Iraq. My reason is that in the previous paragraph of his statment he listed on essential difference.

If you did, I’m sorry, I only remember you saying “significant”, “substantial” ,“operational” or some such term.

Understood, work and all that.

317

Sam:

(This reply is a continuation from post # 300 [last post on page 6], in case you missed it for some reason).

We are in the middle of a back-and-forth regarding the use of the term “popular uprising,” and debating each other about the size of al-Sadr’s following. I’m just going to skip over the rest of that particular discussion for the time being, since I’m not sure either one of us really knows what we’re talking about.

:slight_smile:

Instead, I want to address one of the themes that was quite prevalent a couple of pages ago, and that seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle; namely, your observation about how the pro-war and the anti-war side don’t even seem to be able to agree on the basic “facts” of the Iraqi situation. To exemplify you note:

Touché!

Actually, to begin with, I welcome a critical inspection of Juan Cole’s claims. And it’s good that you point this blind spot out – that’s why I get into these debates! So if you have solid evidence that Cole’s estimate is wrong, I’d be glad to review it.

I admit I was myself surprised when I saw his figure, since it seemed to contradict most of the reports I had read about al-Sadr. But then I saw the depth of the April uprising: “coalition” forces fought running battles in Karbala, Nasiriyah, Kufa, and Amara. They lost control of East Baghdad. The Mahdi Army expelled Ukranian forces in Kut and took control of the city. In Basra, the Mahdi Army took over the governor’s mansion. They took complete control of Najaf, including the Shrine of Imam Ali – one of the holiest of all Shiite sites – and they still control it. It seems to me that’s a pretty big uprising for a guy who represents a mere 1% of the Iraqi population. As Juan Cole noted at the time:

But I also want to comment on your observation that I’m “parsing the positive data with a microscope, trying to deconstruct it away.” There’s some truth to that, because you have me on the ropes, in a manner of speaking.

As always, Sam, I’m dazzled by your rhetorical brilliance. In this instance, you’ve successfully reduced me to picking at the details of your poll numbers, although I confess there is some method to my madness. But before getting into that, I want to relate how this situation came to pass. It began when annaplurabelle responded to your statement, ”Slowly but surely, the U…S. is building allies in the middle east,” by posting links to three newspaper articles that seemed at least to gainsay this assessment. (This was way back on page 2, post # 98). Your response (post # 106, page 3) was masterful:

Fantastic! In two short sentences you 1) utterly reject anna’s newspaper reports as unreliable, anecdotal, “sucky” evidence, and 2) assert that you possess the real, incontrovertible facts of the matter. After that it was simply a matter of posting the poll. End of discussion. Can anyone reasonably doubt the poll you produced was more accurate than all those sucky, anecdotal newspaper stories? As usual, you effortlessly ascend to the rhetorical high ground.

It’s no secret, Sam, that you constantly seek to frame the accomplishments of the CPA in their best light, always. You’ve posted a string of threads specifically designed to further this project. “Thousands march in Baghdad in support of democracy,” you exclaim, specifically intending to demonstrate that the US media consistently downplays good news coming from Iraq. “Could the Zarqawi letter be proof that the coalition is winning the war in Iraq?” you wonder with wide-eyed innocence. (No hidden agenda here!) “Look at all the wonderful projects completed by the CPA in the last six months!” you shout.

(Regarding the Zarqawi letter, by the way: only if it’s real, of course. Naturally, you seem to have forgotten that the authenticity of the letter is still in question, when you reply to me in this thread:

Ahem.)

In addition to these topics we find a long series of posts, in dozens of threads, wherein you reject the accuracy of the reporting coming out of Iraq. Reporters never leave their hotels, you say, and so they don’t really know what’s going down on the street. They get their news from the occupation forces, and only see the hot spots. They never report about the good things that happen, or report the CPA’s many happy successes. Look all the schools they’ve painted! All the police they’ve trained! And so on. A typical example:

How unfair we are, us big bad lefties, picking on the poor innocent CPA like that! Shame on us!

It’s just that – and I kinda hate to be the one to have to tell you this, Sammy, but – well, you don’t really have a monopoly on the “reasonable” interpretation of events. Nor do you, in truth, “own” the facts of the matters which we debate. I have my view as well, and as luck would have it, it just so happens that my view seems “reasonable” to me, too.

Let’s take your poll: what can we reasonably say about it? Is it reasonable to assume that the results of this one poll utterly and completely repudiate all the negative press that’s been coming out of Iraq over the last few months? To be honest, I don’t think so. But in order to demonstrate that, I have to begin with a critique of the poll. How accurate is it, really? A poll is like a snapshot of a certain set of attitudes within a given population at a certain point in time. No, scratch that. Really, it’s more like a painting. Utilizing a specific set of tools, the poll paints a picture of what things are like among the people out there. It relies on sophisticated statistical correlations and complex corrective mathematical analyses. It assumes that it can extrapolate from the 2,737 Iraqis who have been interviewed to a general view of what the Iraqi population believes, feels, or thinks as a whole. But in fact, a poll isn’t the “truth,” the “facts,” such that its results must simply be accepted without critical scrutiny. (For example, I’ve seen surveys that provide solid statistical evidence that group TM meditation can produce a calming effect on a larger geographical area – like, for example, Israel.)

If the tools employed by the poll are misleading or inappropriate, the resulting picture painted by the poll is skewed. Thus it is really unreasonable to accept the results of any poll at face value without taking out the time to investigate the methodology employed by the pollsters.

At the same time, it’s fairly unreasonable to dismiss all the negative media coverage Iraq has received over the last year as sucky, anecdotal evidence, at least to my way of thinking.

So, okay, then, back to the question of “facts.” The thing is, you and I tend to perceive different sets of “facts.” The pro-war side disagrees with the anti-war side about what the “facts” are. Was the fighting in April indicative of the beginnings of a “popular uprising,” or was it ”almost completely contained within the small group of al-Sadr’s followers”, as you claim? The answer to this question is non-trivial, and being a “realist” (as opposed to a postmodernist), I believe that it does have an answer. But I don’t believe that we can get to that answer by simply wishing it, or by rhetorically emphasizing the results of one poll while rhetorically downplaying all the “anecdotal stories” that have been streaming out of Iraq from hundreds, maybe thousands, of sources. And in fact, a second poll, taken in almost the same time frame as the one you cite above, paints a significantly different picture of the situation in Iraq:

So, which poll shall we choose now? Before we get started, may I predict that you will unhesitatingly select that poll which best supports your point of view, while dismissing the one furthest from your prejudices? And that you will frame that choice as “the most reasonable” one?

At another level, this is also a battle of perceptions. Perceptions of “facts.” Whoever establishes interpretive hegemony determines the policies that will be subsequently pursued. They are also the ones who get to write the “true” history.

And that’s the real reason why people with different political agendas support their views by a careful selection of relevant “facts,” and why this debate over “facts” is so important. Once we agree to a certain set of facts – a given “version” of what’s going on in Iraq – then this version constrains the debate over what policies might reasonably be pursued there.

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Well, now I guess I get to surprise you again. Because I’ve looked at the recent poll data, and the methodology behind it, and I have to accept its results. And they aren’t pretty.

And since the methodology of the previous poll I was quoting was also sound and showed significantly more acceptance of the occupation, this latest one is even more troubling, because it appears that the ‘slope of discontent’ is quite steep. Bad, bad news.

A few messages ago I said that the uprising was not a ‘popular’ one - that it was being led by ex-Saddam Baathists, foreign fighters, and al-Sadr’s small militia. But I also warned that dissatisfaction with the occupation was rising, and at some point there would be an intersection between the two and then it WOULD become a popular uprising and a very difficult situation.

We are now very close to that. While the average Iraqi is not ready to pick up arms and fight the coalition, and while there is still very little specific support for the uprising in Fallujah and in Najaf, the plain fact is that there is an alarming increase in anti-American sentiment in that country, other than in the Kurdish areas. And unfortunately, the despicable behaviour of a handful of military guards in that Baghdad prison is going to inflame the situation beyond belief.

The administration and CPA have pretty much used up their allotment of screw-ups. They have to get it right, consistently, from now until next January. And quite frankly, I don’t know what to make of the latest decisions, which appear to give the Sunnis much more power again. Putting an ex-Republican Guard general in charge in Fallujah may turn out to be brilliant - or a disaster. Turning the formation of an interim government over to Brahimi may turn out to be the thing that gives the new government legitimacy - or it may signal to Iraqis that the U.S. is willing to turn Iraq over to the desires of other Arab states, since Brahimi is closely associated with them. At this point, I don’t know what to make of it - it all depends on the Iraqi mindset, and I have no idea where that is today.

The sole remaining good news is that the Kurdish areas are incredibly supportive of the U.S. So much so that any even remotely negative perceptions of the invasion and the U.S in general are within the margin of error of the polls. It truly is amazing to see numbers like 97%, 98% favorable. I think the Kurds like the U.S. more than Americans do, at this point.

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Wow, a Sam Stone post on Iraq I largely agree with. :eek:

Just a few observations on my part:

A “popular uprising” needn’t really be all that popular, strictly speaking. There need only be a very small percentage of the populace willing to actually take up arms, so long as a somewhat larger group is sufficiently sympathetic to cooperate logistically (hide ammunition in the pantry, actively mislead occupying forces when they come round asking about insurgents, etc), and only a small minority is willing to rat insurgents out to the occupiers. I think the numbers as they stand currently already make this a popular uprising, though it could, and probably will, get a lot worse.

The Kurdish situation is something of a mixed blessing. It’s of course helpful that there’s at least one area in the country without too much unrest (though remember that there are significant Arab populations in the north - it’s not like you can draw a line on the map and say ‘north of here, it’s all Kurds’). But their extremely different point of view may ultimately doom the sort of moderate federalist government that would seem to be the preferred outcome. Much as the Sunni and Shiite Arabs dislike each other, my suspicion is that it will take the Kurds to trigger an out and out civil war, should one come to pass. My current nightmare scenario is the Americans bailing a la Saigon, a strongman seizing control by main force, resulting in a declaration of Kurdish independence followed by the inevitably resulting Turkish invasion. I wish I could see a way out of it, but I fear the battle for hearts and minds has already been lost, and without the hearts and minds, the CPA has no chance at ultimately succeeding in their goals.

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I share your dread, Sam. Even more so, with the latest horrible revelations about American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners. Whatever the truth of the situation, it simply couldn’t be worse for us, in the “hearts and minds” context.

It may be time to think the unthinkable. I have been supporting Kerry’s line, which is very similar to Bush’s in many respects. But it may be that they are both wrong. Kerry contends that we can finish the job with international support. I would very much like to believe that, I would very much like to believe that a respectable outcome can be salvaged from this debacle.

But I fear that the only way this is feasible is for the US to absent itself from the picture entirely. Mind you, I am not convinced, and would dearly love to think otherwise. But success depends entirely on the will and opinion of the Iraqi people, and that cannot be held to be anything but Fucked Up Beyond All Recognition.

What can we possibly do? We can make loud bluster about how we will sternly punish the troops responsible, but we know we really won’t. They’re our people. Remember Rusty Calley? We as much as convicted him of murder, and he did…what?..something like a year of house arrest. Certainly we are not willing to punish them to the extent that would satisfy even Iraqi moderates, never mind changing the minds of the ones who already hate out guts. (Nor do I suggest that I would be willing to make such a sacrifice. They are ours, after all.)

At least if we chuck this into the UN’s lap and run like hell, we can maybe pretend that they screwed it up.

Niether of our candidates has broached this question yet, and I certainly share thier reluctance: this would be or will be humiliation on a massive scale. Unthinkable. Until now.

I will cheerfully entertain opposing arguments, because, believe me, I want to be wrong. But I don’t really think that I am.