Bush Republicans...what does it take to give up on Bush ?

Too much of a hijack. Sorry. I’ll make it a thread.

Sam:

A minor quibble; I suspect that the results of the latest poll come as a surprise to you because you dismiss most of the news you read as partisan spin. For me, this latest poll doesn’t reveal a steep “slope of discontent,” but merely reflects what things are like on the ground more accurately than the previous one did. Of course, in my “version” of Iraq, the bad news is under-reported, not over-reported.

However, since I’m not an expert in polling methods, I cannot honestly say that I can judge the methodology of either poll as necessarily sound or unsound. So I tend to skepticism when it comes to poll results, usually.

I think there’s some truth to that, but I suspect that this intersection has already occurred. Well, actually, I think the US went into this situation with it’s eyes closed, believing that they would be greeted as liberators, and that the transition to democracy would be relatively unproblematic. And I disagree with your assessment that there’s little specific support for the uprising among your average Iraqi – on the contrary.

Shisenski’s estimate, scoffed at by Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, looks a lot more reasonable these days, doesn’t it? If I’m not mistaken, W&R predicted that a year after the invasion our troop strength would be reduced to about 30,000 men (because we would be loved by the Iraqi people as liberators).

Those of us who were against warned that this optimistic scenario might not pan out. If it doesn’t, I wonder, what are we going to do? Do you have a plan B, Sam?

Ah.

Slowly but surely, the light bulb goes on.

Unfortunately, currently, I’ve not the urge to much more than fix the coding. I’ll get back w/ y’all later. Sorry.
Here’re some of the notes for my footnotes.

Originally posted by poster from other MB:
[FONT=Georgia]
The Guardian, Feb 6, 1999 printed “Saddam Hussein’s regime has opened talks with Osama bin Laden, bringing closer the threat of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.” But as Ahmed Allawi, a senior INC official, advised, that it is not new, “There is a long history of contacts between the Mukhabarat [Iraqi secret service] and Osama bin
Ladin.”

Originally posted by simonX on another MB:
[size=2]Here’s the link to that story.[/size]

First, let me say that the Guardian, IMHO, is often sort of sensationalist, (example).

Second, the snippet of the article reproduced here and on the website where I found the link leaves out some other interesting bits. Common Cause kind of Dowdified it. To wit:

Vincent Cannistraro, former chief of CIA counter-terrorist operations, said: “Hijazi went to Afghanistan in December and met with Osama, with the knowledge of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. We are sure about that. What is the source of some speculation is what transpired.”
An acting US counter-intelligence official confirmed the report. “Our understanding over what happened matches your account, but there’s no one here who is going to comment on it.”
[AND]
Analysts believe that Mr Hijazi offered Mr bin Laden asylum in Iraq, most likely in return for co-operation in launching attacks on US and Saudi targets. Iraqi agents are believed to have made a similar offer to the Saudi maverick leader in the early 1990s when he was based in Sudan.

Although he rejected the offer then, Mamoun Fandy, a professor of Middle East politics at Georgetown University, said Bin Laden’s position in Afghanistan is no longer secure after the Saudi monarchy cut off diplomatic relations with, and funding for, the Taleban militia movement, which controls most of the country.

Mr Fandy said senior members of the Saudi royal family told him in recent weeks [1999] that they had received assurances from the Taleban leader, Mullah Mohamed Omar, that once the radical Islamist movement secured control over Afghan territory, Bin Laden would be forced to leave. “It’s a matter of time now for Osama.” He said Bin Laden would have a strong ideological aversion to accepting Iraqi hospitality, but might have little choice

So, apparently, what happened is that the Hijazi met with bin Laden and the details of the meeting are unknown. A member of the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi national Congress’s intelligence chief, Ahmed Allawi, said that “There is a long history of contacts…” In the past, when similar meetings took place bin Laden rejected Iraqi offers. And bin Laden is purported to have a "strong ideological aversion to accepting Iraqi hospitality."

This hardly seems like a report of anything substantial as far as an Iraq - al Qaida alliance goes. From here in my armchair, right now, it really seems more like another example of the Guardian’s peculiar style of reporting.

Oddly enough, despite what “senior members of the Saudi royal family” told Mr. Fandy, I don’t think that Mullah Omar ever got around to asking bin Laden to leave.[/FONT]

Originally posted by simonX:
Next on the list of sources cited by the Common Cause footnotes page I mentioned earlier is
The Western nightmare: Saddam and Bin Laden versus the world, February 6, 2002, Guardian Unlimited
(note: I fixed the link. CC has theirs linked to the previous story in the Guardian. I searched a bit and found what they were trying to link to. And the date of the story is incorrectly reported as 2002 when in fact it is 1999.)

From this story, the CC extracts this:

[FONT=Georgia]link
Palestinian born Director of External Operations for Iraqi Intelligence, the new Ambassador to Turkey, Farouk Hijazi, traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan in December, 1998 and met with Osama Bin Laden.
[AND]
Ahmed Allawi, a senior INC official, advised, that it is not new, “There is a long history of contacts between the Mukhabarat [Iraqi secret service] and Osama bin Ladin.”
Actually, I guess there’s nothing new that they used from that article that that didn’t also get from the previous one. I’ve padded a bibliography or two in my time in school as well.
There are, however a few more details, (but no additional insight), in the second story than in the first. I’ll share some here.
This was not the first time that President Saddam had offered Mr Bin Laden a partnership. At least one approach is believed to have been made during the Saudi dissident’s sojourn in Sudan from 1990 to 1996. On that occasion, the guerrilla leader turned the emissaries away, out of a pious man’s contempt for President Saddam’s secular Ba’athist regime.

Even before the embassy bombings in Africa, US special forces had been rehearsing daring ‘grab raids’ aimed at fighting their way into Mr Bin Laden’s mountain lair in Afghanistan and either abducting or assassinating him.

There has been at least one assassination attempt [on bin Laden] in recent months, carried out by Saudi intelligence.
But Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of CIA counter-terrorist operations, who maintains close contact with US and Middle Eastern intelligence networks, said an assassination bid did indeed take place.
‘The Saudis hired someone among his followers to poison him, probably in November. He suffered kidney failure but recovered, at least partially,’ Mr Cannistraro said.
Whether as a result of the assassination attempt or not, Mr Bin Laden is unwell, said Mr Cannistraro.[/font]

I think that the quotes from Richard Perle, and about the CTEG that I’ve already provided demonstrate what sort of a connection they’ve been talking about here.
Further, given that the intelligence community held that an attack on the US by Iraq even by proxy was of a low probability, and that al Qaeda was determined to attack the US it’s inappropriate to conflate the two threats.
IIRC, in no small part, the threat from Hussein consisted of the relatively improbable possibility that he’d transfer the WMDs to a terrorist organization like al Qaeda, (and then face “national obliteration,” according to Dr. Rice).
The connection to aQ was essential for removing deterrence from the options for dealing with Hussein. Without the aQ connection, we’d’ve been left with analyses like those of Dr. Rice’s that I linked to and assessments like Powell’s that Hussein had “not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors”

To use the series of failed negotiations between the two, Hussein and UbL, as a basis for some sort of a meaningful, threatening connection is fundamentally dishonest. It counts as an example of something with a technically correct denotation, but with a false connotation.

Sam:

I had hoped to receive a more substance reply from you regarding the difference in the way the left and the right construct the “facts” coming out of Iraq. I think the topic is worth considering in-depth, and I’m still interested in your views on the matter.

In the meantime, since you seem to like polls, I thought I would share this one. Note in particular, regarding al-Sadr’s supporters:

Again, all three of the polls cited in this thread seem to have been taken in more-or-less the same time frame, but as you see, they also reveal significant differences in some issues. As a non-specialist I would guess that those differences are a reflection of variations in polling techniques and analysis, rather than an actual reflection of differences within the Iraqi population.

Sam:

A new poll published in the Financial Times (subscription required) contradicts the conclusions of the Oxford poll you cited earlier:

I don’t have direct access to the article since I don’t have a subscription to the FT, unfortunately.

Cole also has this to say about the issue at hand:

However, regarding your accusations that Cole is “partisan,” it should also be noted that his comparison between Wolfowitz and Hussein (above) has generated a certain amount of controversy in the blogosphere. See in particular Andrew Sullivan, who notes:

Followed by:

Speaking for myself, I take exception to Sullivan’s characterization of Wolfowitz as a “decent and honorable man.”

On the other hand, Cole’s analyses sometimes strike me as rather alarmist, and I agree with Sullivan (to a certain extent) that Cole is bitterly cynical when it comes to Bush and other important players in his administration. Perhaps overly cynical.

Of course, on the other hand again, there are good reasons for cynicism when it comes to the current administration, in my opinion.

In the hope that you might finally deign to reply to these epistles,

I remain,

Your Humble Servant,

Svinlesha nDelavesha,

KSFSTPW (Keeper, Sacred Flashing Star Trek Paperweight)

Well, it’s pretty hard for me to comment on a poll I can’t read. For instance, you say this:

But don’t say which respondents. Where was the poll taken? In all Shiite areas? Just in Najaf? Sadr City in Baghdad? Without knowing more, it’s pretty tough to say one way or the other.

I will say this… The situation over there is in tremendous flux, and conditions on the ground may be swinging public opinion wildly. For example, was this poll taken after the prison abuse scandal? al-Sadr gave a bit speech on that a few days ago - perhaps the swing in support was due to that. I have no idea. Maybe the new numbers reflect the new reality in the area. I don’t know. At this point, we have some wildly conflicting data. I don’t know what to make of it.

However, I can offer you this: Senior clerics of Najaf respond to Hassan Nasrallah, in which the senior clerics of the Hawza Al-Ilmiyyah of Najaf and Karbala seem to place the blame for all the fighting squarely on al-Sadr and largely absolve the coalition of any blame. They point out that when the coalition was ‘storming through the region’ on the way to Baghdad they were careful to stay clear of holy sites. They also place the blame on al-Sadr for violating the sanctity of the holy sites in the first place. And they further blame him for the bullet holes in the dome of the shrine of Imam Ali, and seem to accuse him of attempting to kill Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, and of intimidating the population.

Since this letter carries with it the approval of al-Sistani, I would say this may be another of those events on the ground that could swing opinion back the other way. But I’ve stopped trying to guess how Iraqis will respond to these events.

Perv quote " Personally, I’m more interested in this concept of a “not-lie”. I’m intrigued by the possibility that information can be conveyed that is not in the statement in question. I’m just weird that way"

Maybe i can illustrate that this technique is neither new or rare. I think its called " discursive practices". Imagine:

Youre watching the news. A reporter is doing a piece about a zoo refurb. He interviews the zoo director who is waxing lyrical about the new facilities for the animals. The camera shows new animal houses and the like.

The reporter then asks about the happiness of the animals in his zoo. During the reply - in which the director highlights the comforts and support the animals have and that they are all very happy - we get a shot of a insert cute animal here banging its head off a wall, marching around in circles, and generally looking distressed.

Now then. The report (er) has not said ANYTHING that could be regarded as accusing the zoo director of mistreating his animals. The editor of the program will say "we just took some footage of the zoo and edited it together - no way was this a deliberate attempt to accuse the zoo of mistreatment " Howerver the information regarding the new facilities in the zoo will be forever linked to the images of dirtressed animals.

See … information conveyed whilst not actually being the subject of the report ( read: statement in question ).

Note the “link” between the two bits of data, is now a subconcious one, and the interpretation is the viewers. How can the editor be responsible for what his viewer thinks about an issue? But we know he is.

Hope im not patonising anyone here - its just media studies. No zoos were involved in the creation of this metaphore.

Although this is a very interesting thread, Pervert - you dont seem to be taking on board the well documented and explained posts by the people you are debating with. You ask a question, get a very detailed answer with cites, links and explanations written in clear english. Your reply is to just ask another one on a slightly different point.

From here it looks like you are getting crucified in the debate, mate… however i thanks you for keeping going, as reading this thread is much more interesting than doing any work !

Sin

I always think of what kids might do.

Dad: Johny, didn’t I tell yu that you couldn’t go over to Jimmy’s and play video games all afternoon when you had English homework to do?
Johny: Don’t worry Dad, I didn’t.
Johny only didn’t because he either went over to davids house to play video games all afternoon or because he didn’t have english homework, it was math homework.

And yes, it is a very old idea. I just don’t know the proper nomenclature

It’s the kind of thing that the Devil/Djinn/elf/witch would do in the old fairy tales. Following the letter of the agreement so closely that the spirit of the agreement was meaningless.
It’s related to, but not exactly a:

negative pregnant’-‘Such form of negative expression, in pleading, as may imply or carry within it an affirmative.’

negative pregnant
n. a denial of an allegation in which a person actually admits more than he/she denies by denying only a part of the alleged fact. Example: Plaintiff alleges Defendant “misused more than a hundred thousand dollars placed in his trust in 1994.” Defendant denies the amount was more than a hundred thousand, and denies it was given to him in 1994. Thus, he did not deny the misuse, just the amount and the date.

A Googling of ‘negative pregnant