I figured that the Quirin case would come up. That case involved a party of German army personnel put ashore from a submarine with the assignment of blowing up shipyards, disrupting rail traffic and the like. They were a pretty standard raiding party of the sort the British were running into France at about the same time. The big difference was that the Germans were not in uniform. This is where they ran afoul of the customary law of war and is the reason they caught it in the neck.
Using Quirin as the base for the argument, you would think that step one on disposing of the men at Gitmo before a military tribunal would be some basis for a conclusion that there had been a violation of the customary law of war. There should not be much argument that highjacking a civilian airliner departing a civilian airport, filled with civilians and crashing it into a privately occupied building filled with civilians would count as a violation of the law of war.
I see some problems, however. The first and most obvious one is that someone is going to have to show that these particular people were some how complicit in 9/11. Not that he thought it was a good idea, but that the particular guy before the tribunal was some how an accomplice to the bad acts. While the facts on the people characterized as “unlawful combatants” are pretty scarce, I have not heard anything about them other than they are fervent supporters of the Taliban government. I’m not at all sure that turns them into accomplices.
As far as uniforms and not being members of the regular Afghan military establishment are concerned, as to the extent that is claimed to be a violation of the customary law of war, this seems like a pretty flexible rule when you apply it to a place like Afghanistan as it existed under the Taliban. The United States certainly didn’t have any trouble regarding Vietnamese guerillas as members of an organized armed force, the lack of a distinctive uniform notwithstanding. I would hate to see this sort of decision made based on the quality of military tailors used by the Taliban militia.
The point is this, in the WWII German saboteur cases there were members of a recognized armed force in the service of a recognized government. They violated the customary law of war by engaging in a military operation in an unlawful manner-by conceding their membership in the armed force. In the case of the people at Gitmo, the information is that they were members of an armed force that had a factual existence recognized by their own government and, like it or not, that government was in effective control of the country. So far as I know, none of those people were accomplices to the 9/11 outrages. The basis for denying POW status to those people seems to be based on (1) their government’s harboring the people who ran the 9/11 operation, and (2) they lack a spiffy uniform. That, if true, seems pretty feeble to me. I can’t think that serving a government that does bad things in an army that has no tradition of a distinctive uniform is a serious violation of the customary law of war, especially when there is no showing of a substantive violation of the customary law of war.