pervert: And you’d be [led] to some odd anarchistic philosophy whith little merit. Which means it could “be shrugged off as obviously immoral”
Only if you’ve already assumed that anarchistic philosophy is immoral.
Don’t you see, perv, I’m not saying I disagree with you substantially about which choices we should consider moral. I’m just saying that we should recognize that these moral differences do stem from choices that we make.
Most of the rest of what you said sounded confused to me, or else I just didn’t get it, so I’ll let it go unless you want to repeat and clarify any particular point.
If we believe in a freedom of action (which I think we can).
What is “freedom of action”? Freedom of which actions? You’ve already made it clear that you’re not in favor of certain actions such as stealing and murder, and that you don’t support freedom to perform them.
If we believe that one should be free to benifit from such actions (which I also think we can).
You’re saying a bunch of very vague and open-ended things here, and you seem to be assuming that they’re obvious and easily acceptable. I think you need to refine your terms a lot before you assume that we’re on the same page with them.
Then we can formulate a concept of property based on those freedoms.
Clear up your premises first, please, and then we’ll see what conclusions we can draw from them about “concepts of property”.
All I am suggesting is that the free market is not some social construct which produces wealth leaving us to decide how to divy up that bounty.
I’m not at all sure I understand this, but I think that what you’re getting at is that the operation of markets involves certain natural laws which don’t depend solely (or even primarily) on how we might relativistically choose to define “freedom”. I’d agree with that.
Let me assume that I accept that freedom is completely nuetral.
Well, freedom per se is neutral; once we define it as a social goal, we’ve got it all loaded up with moral values and ideological choices. Which I think is a good thing, by the way.
*How then does this lead to the idea that free markets should be restricted? If you postulate that there is a freedom to particpate in the market, how do you then suggest that this freedom by its very nature necessitates a restriction of that same freedom? *
Well, consider my example of discrimination in a place of business. If I assume a freedom to participate at will in the market, then, say, a racial minority may want to exercise that freedom by purchasing a meal at a lunch counter. A racist lunch counter owner may want to exercise that freedom by refusing to sell that meal to that customer. In each case, one person’s desired freedom of choice about his market actions will restrict the other person’s.
If on the other hand, you are suggesting that there is some sort of freedom of outcomes like “freedom to a living wage”, then are you not denying the freedom of the free market?
I don’t understand this question. What I’m denying is John’s assertion that a “free market” automatically has to be lumped in with things like “free speech” or “free press” as something that’s inherently good just because it’s “free”.
In my opinion, “free speech” and “free association” and so forth are good because they’re part of what we’ve morally chosen as our social ideal of freedom. The “free market” doesn’t necessarily belong in that category, or at least, not to the same extent: it’s supposed to serve a particular social goal—producing what we consider the best economy—and we wouldn’t be at all morally obligated to go on supporting it if it didn’t serve that goal.