The history of legal wiretapping in the United States started in 1968, when Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1969 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(9)). Title III of the act contained comprehensive federal legislation regarding electronic surveillance. It established strict procedures conducting "interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication.
In 1986, the earlier wire-tapping law was updated to included electronic communications. ECPA protects electronic communications from point-to-point, that is while it travels through “cyberspace.”
Unfortunately, ten years later, with concerns about the difficulty of performing legal wiretaps on digital circuits the FBI pushed for something called the Digital Telephony Act, which was passed by Congress. This act requires telecommunications carriers to design their systems to be tappable for the convenience of law enforcement.
Now if I understand this correctly the FBI is limited to jurisdiction only within the borders of the United Stated of America. The FBI now has the technical ability required to wiretap certain technologies, such as analog voice communications carried over public networks’ copper wire. However, since 1986, the FBI has become increasingly aware of the potential loss of wiretapping capability due to the rapid deployment of new technologies, such as cellular and integrated voice and data services, and the emergence of new technologies such as Personal Communication Services, satellites, and Personal Communication Numbers.
There are six current or imminent telecommunications technologies that the FBI needs to be able to wiretap. These are (1) analog and digital using copper wire transport, (2) analog and digital using fiber optic transport, (3) Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), (4) Private Branch Exchange (PBX), (5) broadband, and (6) cellular. There are also three future technologies for which wiretapping capabilities need to be addressed: (1) satellite switches, (2) Personal Communication Services (PCS), and (3) Personal Communication Number (PCN).
Finding the balance between the interests of law enforcement and the costs associated with the bill – among them,invasion of privacy, potential impediment of new technologies, and huge sums of money – amounts to performing a cost-benefit analysis. We, the ones affected by the bill, need to decide what the correct balance is: whether our privacy and our money are more important to us than the FBI’s ability to conduct electronic surveillance.
Independent of what the correct balance is, the Digital Telephony Bill sets a precedent by establishing a particular distribution of costs and benefits. The bill itself is just another stage in the on-going privacy debate. Today, this debate is centered around the bill; tomorrow, it will be the Clipper Chip; after that, the focus will shift to the laws of Cyberspace. At every stage, we need to be careful as a society to establish precedents that will lead us toward the correct balance.
Regardless of the legalities surrounding the rights and laws of those who will tap your computer, according to the Carnivore FAQ “According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, business records (including computer records) are considered “hearsay” (and not admissible in court) because there is no firsthand proof that they are accurate, reliable, or trustworthy.”