Can a united Korea still be a threat to us? To China?
And, would China try to reassert it’s pre-WWII claims to the penninsula?
We are all cheering reunification talks now, but it took 25 years for Viet Nam to settle down after their war.
Reunification would mean powerful landowners and controllers of resources on both sides of the border would have much to lose. They will foment unrest, if they can, to retain personal power and priviledge.
Well, on the other hand, the re-unification of Germany went swiftly and with only minor plagues of locusts; it’s quite possible that a re-unification of Korea could go just as well, with industrialists in the South just chomping at the bit to bring jobs and machinery to the North.
As for China- they have publicly applauded the latest progress by the two countries in their negotiations. Quite frankly, I think China sees North Korea as more of a liability than an asset- N.K. is unstable in government, in populace, and developing more and more of a reputation as a rogue nation; why should China- which is trying to portray itself as the Great Hope for former colonies of European powers- want such a dangerous country as a team-mate? Better to help the Koreas integrate, be seen as a good friend to other Oriental nations, and slowly convince Korea and Japan that the “Western” system will never work, and to instead follow their friendly, benevolent “Eastern” lead.
A united Korea would probably just give us an ever stronger presence in asia. South Korea is doing rather well so I seriously doubt that they'll want to be anything like North Korea. North Korea will probably have to adopt the Souther Korean way of life if they want unification.
Marc
Germany is still not up to speed (If I understand) even now after reunification. I think that NK would just have to scrap its government and adopt the SK way in order to stave off mass starvation, rampant unemployment, et al. I think in the short term, things would bog down for SK with the job of intergrating the then former NK’ers into the system.
After a few years of that, things would pick up, with some griping and complaining by small parties on both sides, with the majority liking what unification has done. And it would remove NK as a rogue nuclear power. 
A hijack, but a little historical irony. When Korea was divided in 1945, many people complained that the division was biased in favor of the North. The reason was that, in 1945, almost all of Korea’s industry was in the northern half of the country and the economy of the southern half was mostly agricultural. It was felt that the North’s industrial strength would allow it to economically dominate the South.
That’s the spirit of it, more or less. With Russia, everyone always had MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction] to ‘keep the commies in line.’ But here’s this little nation of maybe 15 million people with a dozen or so nukes. You put four each on say, Guangzhou, Beijing, Shanghai. China stands to lose at least 50 million people, where as what can North Korea lose? Not too much. They could be, for all intents and purposes, international terrorists.
It’s definetly in China’s interests to let the calmer south Korea have a share in the over all decision making process.
Moreover, I strongly beelive that, though its transition won’t be quite as smooth as Germany’s, Korea will not follow the course of Vietnam. The South is a highly organized industrial nation, and the north is a slowly decaying old communist bastion. It seems more likely to mirror Germany than the junglish Vietnam.
I lived in South Korea from 1993 to 1999, and while the Koreans on both sides of the border would like to see reunification in theory, the reality would be very messy.
For one thing, there are significant cultural and linguistic differences between North and South. South Koreans use a plethora of loan words from English and Chinese, while the Juche philosophy of the North has made them use only words of pure Korean. As a result, the two halves are divided by a common language, to crib from George Bernard Shaw. Additionally, the unsophisticated North Koreans would be exploited by the South Koreans as cheap labor. The South Koreans are hustlers and entrepreneurs nonpareil, while the Northerners have no clue about surviving in a market economy.
The economic costs of reunification would bankrupt South Korea, and most Koreans know it. The disparities between North and South Korea are far greater thsn those between East and West Germany. The entire North Korean infrastructure must be rebuilt from the ground up.
MGibson wrote:
[quote]
Can a united Korea still be a threat to us? To China? And, would China try to reassert it’s pre-WWII claims to the penninsula?[/quote}
China has never had any claims to Korean territory. Traditionally, Korea has looked up to China as the Elder Brother Country from the time of Unified Shilla in the 7th century CE. During the Hermit Kingdom period in the Chosun dynasty, China was the only country Chosun had ties with. But China has never claimed Korean territory.
Japan, on the other hand, colonized Korea in 1910, initiating a 35-year period of bloodshed and brutality.
Because the Koreans are a feisty, independent bunch, I believe that a unified Korea would attempt to play the US against China for their own benefit.
A unified Korea under Korean leadership would not be a military threat to anyone in the region.
The concerns about the unification of Korea and its effects on the region, broadly speaking, can be broken down into two general areas: political leadership and economic concerns.
While North Korea and China periodically demand/urge withdrawal of US troops, such claims really shouldn’t be taken at face value. What is of greater concern to those two states is the influence the US has had in South Korea’s foreign affairs. Up until about 1971 or so, the US virtually ran ROK’s foreign policy, but things started to change with ROK’s ‘nordpolitik’ strategy to gain favor with the Soviets and Chinese to urge an opening up of relations with the DPRK. Since that time, ROK has been taking more and more initiative with its foreign policy, including establishing relations with China and the Soviets at the beginning of the 1990s.
So what does US troops have to do with ROK’s foreign policy? For a long time, and to a degree at present, the US has been seen as a moderator in DPRK-ROK relations. Recall at the end of the Korean War, Syngman Rhee quite wanted the war to continue and made several attempts to undermine the American interest in the cease-fire. The commitment of troops to Korea is to China and the DPRK an assurance that the ROK leadership wouldn’t try anything sneaky… which they wouldn’t likely do anyway, but the American presence assures that.
On the other hand, there is no chance whatsoever that the US could expect its troops to have a presence along the Yalu River in the advent of a united Korea. Furthermore, it can be said with extreme confidence that if the DPRK has nukes right now, very quickly after unification they would become the second former nuclear power in the world.
So, if a unified Korea is no longer directly a US client, it would certainly vault into a much greater status in the region, adding another challenger to the China-Japan struggle for wresting the basic order of the region away from the US. Yes, there is a chance for conflict here, but the US would almost certainly maintain a commitment to counter any aggression on the penninsula, so the chances of it escalating to arms are slight.
As far as economic issues go, the ROK’s expansion of trade ties has been enourmously beneficial to regional politics. ROK-China trade has been constantly expanding over the past decade, and Beijing loves it. Don’t get the idea that China has the same designs on Korea as it did in the “pre-WW2” era (more like, the 19th century). ROK’s economy is an outstanding benefit to China, and they wouldn’t do a thing to change that unless actually threatened with military force… which is about as likely as seeing me on Monday Nitro taking on all comers.
However, Japan would face a serious challenge in trade a few decades after unification. Hence, some reservations on their part, but their concerns would certainly take a back seat to the basic legitimacy of unification.
The most important economic factor is the costs of reunification. Like a few mentioned, the German experience has scared the heck out of South Koreans. We’re talking a HELL of a lot of money to prepare the North for any kind of economic development. The South has pretty much openly said that there is no way they are going to bear that huge a burden, especially after the shocks that the Asian financial crisis delivered to the ROK.
Conclusion: Things look exceptionally good at the moment. Kim of the North has had talks with Beijing and Moscow in the last few weeks. Kim of the South will shortly be meeting with Albright, and she will visit Beijing soon after. But because of the extreme costs of unification, any progess is almost certainly subject to an extended period of adjustment for both states, both for economic reasons and for the comfort of the US, China, Japan, and Russia as well.