Can anyone tell me why many in Washington at the time had the "comic opera" views of the Falklands Crisis?

You wouldn’t reach that conclusion after reading the results of these contemporary British surveys.

https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/falklands-war-panel-survey

Thank you for the great surveys.

I think it was this. I remember there being some incredulity and borderline amusement at the time frame. There was also the perception that a whole fleet of battleships was going to sail across the Atlantic for three weeks to reclaim some…rocks. The Bloom County comic strip had a whole bit about it.

It was a “comic opera” situation—an allusion to Gilbert and Sullivan, I would think—because it was a war over an absolutely insignificant matter. Why would anyone risk lives over the goddamn Falkland islands? It was also a comic opera situation because on the Argentinian side, you had a bankrupt authoritarian regime trying to prop up its popularity by starting an international crisis with a ridiculously weak military against one of the world’s most advanced military powers.

Rocks with a fair number of residents who were forcibly told they now belonged to another country and its laws and customs. Suppose Cuba had invaded Key West (and then there was Grenada)?

But I wouldn’t blame the Junta for misreading potential British reactions: there had been on-off discussions about possible compromises for years, the whole Suez debacle and its consequences in the Middle East, the dismantling of the Empire and so on had left an impression of a lack of independent capability and resolve - if you chose to look at it that way.

And if we’re talking about liberating rocks, way back there had been the Rockall incident, which had been met with some levity in the UK:

USA has the policy to prevent European countries being involved in the Americans, their 1823 Monroe Doctrine… Indeed the Falkland Islands was claimed by the British in 1833, which means they breached the Monroe Doctrine ?

The USA might have acted against the British in 1833 under the Monroe Doctrine… ( but they had a conflict of interest, it also benefited USA to have the Falklands as a commercial non-militant port… not subject to the politics of latin america. )

So it seems a part of it is that the USA people are proud of their Monroe Doctrine, and didnt like to support the UK breaching it just for just one little island groups… When the brits have many islands , in their possession ,or accessible to the UK because they are possessions of Australia, NZ …

Its not that anyone didn’t think the UK would get the islands back, of course they knew the UK had a fleet of warships ,aircraft and cargo ships far far in excess of the requirement, but the modus operandi could make it very expensive ?? If they minimised the deaths of their military personnel , the operation would take a while, tying up many ships and crew from going about the commercial activity the ships would otherwise do, and also put civilians at risk , eg of sickness or starving in a siege situation.

Grandstanding… haig said " he had no “American-approved solutions in my kit bag.”.
I’d change that to serious style. Serious demeanour, but toothless. For example, no threat to apply the Arms Export Control Act … ?? ( The UK being allowed to defend itself from acts of War, but Argentina not allowed to start a War ? … the legitimacy of their claim isn’t relevant. )

For Haig expressing his toothless tiger status, see Haig seeks to mediate Falklands crisis, April 9, 1982 - POLITICO

Is there any official numbers on how many people died in the Falklands war? Any civilians? I barely remember it, i was just a young teenager at the time. I hope the death toll wasnt too big, such a useless war. Tatcher really was a bad person.

The British captured some 11,400 Argentine prisoners during the war, all of whom were released afterward. Argentina announced that about 650 lives had been lost—about half of them in the sinking of the General Belgrano —while Britain lost 255.

In total, 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Falkland Islanders died during the hostilities.

Even in Britain there was a feeling, primarily on the Left (but not exclusively) that the whole thing was too silly for words, that the inhabitants should be bluntly told that Britain wasn’t going to write them an open check for the next fifty-sixty-seventy years, and they should be told to make the best accommodation with Argentina that they could, or just get out. I remember there was some discussion in the New Statesman as to whether the UN policy on decolonisation meant that independence should be thrust on them, whether they wanted it or not.
It should be emphasised that this was very much a minority view, but it wasnt unspoken.

The lesson learned was that the arms race wasn’t so much to dominate the other side in the cold war, but so the major powers could stay ahead of the lesser powers. This lesson was repeated in situations like the Gulf War, where what would have been strong Iraqi defenses against any other foe (i.e. Iran, 1980-1990) was totally ineffectual against the American arms.

Britain, even in “decline” had long-range bombers that could attack from St. Helena, they had a naval fleet that could sustain an attack against the Falklands thousands of miles from home, and the wherewithal to supply sufficient force; the Argentinian air force had barely enough fuel for one dogfight over the Falklands before they had to return to base, minimal naval power and had difficulty supplying the troops it did have in play.

The difficulties for Britain in putting even a token bombing raid on the islands were formidable (and the damage caused trivial) and calm analysis suggests it was of little military value.
It should be emphasised just how touch-and-go the retaking operation was, nearly all the ships suffered action damage to varying degrees, and most of those that didn’t arrived in the last week of the war. If Argentina waited a bit longer (though their timetable was dictated by domestic considerations) Invincible would have been sold to the Australians and the whole thing would have been impossible.

As a Hispanic that lived once under one of the many military dictatorships of Latin America, I do remember that there was a lot of the authoritarian countries openly supporting the effort of Argentina taking the Falklands by force.

It was also the time when the US was helping military dictatorships in Latin America just because they told the US that if they did not support them that then the “commies” would take over. Never mind that they were mostly killing intellectuals, teachers, working leaders, priests, etc. That just dared to oppose those regimes.

The fact that it was revealed later that the US did help the UK with intelligence and other moves, and the defeat of the Argentinian army, led to 3 very important results (although not planned by the US and the UK)

  1. It showed many in Latin America that the US was not guaranteeing that they would always support the military assholes.

  2. It showed the people in Argentina how stupid the military in power was, and that lesson arrived eventually to the rest of Latin America.

  3. It started to show the US how dumb it was to ignore that military dictatorships can lead to destroyed alliances or be harmful to its allies.

It took time, but to me, the British recovering a colonial asset (for once) got the ball rolling towards the demilitarization of the governments in Latin America.

Thats literally never happened in British history… :roll_eyes:

Ah, no. And that was the shock. The vulnerability of Royal Navy ships to (by the standards of the time) old ass A4’s was something that stunned NATO. 5 ships were sunk and several more were hit by UXB;s, if some of those had gone off…

Not only old-ass A-4s, but old-ass A-4s carrying unguided bombs. I mean despite the media coverage, I don’t think anyone in the know was terribly surprised that a Super Etendard firing an Exocet was successful, but 1960s era A-4 dropping 1000 lb dumb bombs actually sinking modern NATO ships? Nobody expected that at all.