Can USA lunch nukes without the president ?

From what i read in the Russian system it is possible to for a rouge commander to give order to launch and bypass chain of command. Is that posible in US system ?

No, but I’ve checked thei diary, and they could probably slip us in as a breakfast appointment appointment without Prsidential approval.

Until somebody with specific knowledge shows up:

Obviously, contingency plans exist for simply everything - I can’t imagine the US being unable to defend itself if the President were incapacitated, however briefly.

any NORAD and/or SAC folks around?

Of course! It’s “Plan R,” An “emergency war plan in which a lower echelon commander may order nuclear retaliation after a sneak attack if the normal chain of command has been disrupted.”

Hey, it’s not fair to condemn the entire program just because of a single slipup…:smiley:

Rouge commanders? I thought it was “don’t ask, don’t tell”.

Ranchoth, so, do you think that the OP is trying to sap your purity of essence?

Bah, in any case, yes, it is possible for there to be a nuclear launch from the US against our hostile targets worldwide without the CinC. It only takes the CinC’s death, the VP and another carded member of the National Security Council. Each member of the NSC has ‘launch codes’ and it goes through the ‘chain of command’ as to who would order the launch. It would typically be something like President So-and-So is dead and the Soviets have their birds airborne. Time to strike back. Mr. Vice President and Secretary of Defense, Mr. Defense-guy, please read the third lines on your cards. Codes are verified and the order goes out. Or Mr. Vice and the National Security Adviser, or the Speaker of the House, or Senate President Pro-Tem, or whomever is the next NSC member.

As far as the old Soviet model, unlike ours which had layer after freakin’ layer of bureaucracy to get our birds airborne, the Soviets had truck mounted weapons (specifically the SS-11, by NATO designation) which needed only the vehicle commander to actually launch.

Does the Prez have to specifically authorize each and every tactical nuke, or just strategic?

And, should the House chamber be vaporized during the State of the Union address, would we really be unable to launch until all the second stringers had entered their codes? The contintent could be a cinder by the time each was tracked down (at least before the communication revolution of the last 20 years).

p.s. - are we here for factual answers, or really lame one-liners? Groucho is dead, folks, and cheap imitations don’t wash.

Ah come on - rouge commanders lunching nukes? That’s hilarious. Anyway, as the posting guidelines state:

Joke quality is in the eye of the beholder.

Ah. Reds under the bed, again.

quote:

Originally posted by Extraneous
p.s. - are we here for factual answers, or really lame one-liners? Groucho is dead, folks, and cheap imitations don’t wash.

BOTH.

If the Prez dies, the Veep becomes Prez/CinC, so by this scenario the order is being given on the authority of the CinC.

That puts a whole new meaning on the old insult, “Pinko”!! :slight_smile:

According to my Hubby, he who spent far too much of his life in a missile silo…

The President is part of the National Command Authority, along with the Secretary of Defense. The NCA is the only authorized releaser of nuclear weapons BUT release authority can be granted to subcommanders, like the war theater commander, in special circumstances. For example, during the first Gulf War, Schwartzkoff was given the approval to use nuclear weapons, under the “If they use WMD against us, we will respond in kind” clause.

But dont the lunch codes the once that activate the warheads and they reside inside the football the president allways has by his side ? So president has to actively perticipate no matter the case.

During my NCB classes, we were taught that while the US military uses a lot of safety checks and cross-verifications, very few of these were tied into the actual electronic systems themselves. In other words, beyond the launch keys of the silo operators themselves, the system relies mostly on the individuals in the chain of command honouring the requirements. Perhaps someone who has more detailed knowledge of the actual mechanisms involved can weigh in on the veracity of that.

Certainly, platforms like ballastic subs are capable of, and designed to, operate independantly should the ‘need’ arise.

During my NCB classes, we were taught that while the US military uses a lot of safety checks and cross-verifications, very few of these were tied into the actual electronic systems themselves. In other words, beyond the launch keys of the silo operators themselves, the system relies mostly on the individuals in the chain of command honouring the requirements. Perhaps someone who has more detailed knowledge of the actual mechanisms involved can weigh in on the veracity of that.

Certainly, platforms like ballastic subs are capable of, and designed to, operate independantly should the ‘need’ arise.

I admit the human element seems to have failed us here…

Actually, in a thread which arose a long time ago, we learned that a lone Soviet soldier actually prevented a launch of nuclear weapons by refusing to act when the alarms went off (and he was of course rewarded with an investigation into his conduct). evilhanz provided us a link to this very scary story.

An earlier thread about nuclear attacks should help.

Most of the stuff I read on launch procedures is about the Soviet system and how broken it is. The American system seems to be shrouded in secrecy almost no information is available. I think probably some codes need to entered into some computer so that the missle is activated or else it would be useless. Just using the two keys is not enough (which russians still use) because it opens up to the possibility of missuse.

So here is the scenerio if some sub commander lost communication even if he looked out the hatch and saw nuclear fallout he still should not be able to launch anything because he doesn’t have the authority to. To the people with the clearances this may be taken as a fact or not but to us there is no prove of this being true.