I wish I had Dio’s expert opinion the last time I did a sleeping beauty trial.
No, actually, that’s not true. I really wouldn’t want to have his expert opinion, because he is no expert, and his opinion is utter rubbish with respect to Canadian law.
Our law (Criminal Code of Canada s. 265) is that “A person commits an assault when (a) with the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; . . . .” When it comes to consenting to sexual assault, s. 273.1(2)(b) and (e) sets out, et ali, that “No consent is obtained . . . where . . . the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; . . . or the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.”
At para. 41 through 43 of the judgment, the Chief Justice, for the majority, interprets the above to mean that a person must consciously consent to each and every sexual act, must be able to withdraw her consent at any time, and can not be capable of withdrawing consent if unconscious. At para. 57, she notes that the common law defences to assault do not apply to sexual assault (e.g. consenting to handshakes or hockey contact). At para. 59, she notes that a person being one’s partner is not a defence if one kisses one’s partner when that partner is asleep. She concludes at para 66.: “The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance. Any sexual activity with an individual who is incapable of consciously evaluating whether she is consenting is therefore not consensual within the meaning of the Criminal Code.” The only crack in the door that the Court leaves open is de minimus (at para. 63), but even then the Chief Justice notes that even mild non-consensual sexual touching can have profound implications, which indicates that the de minimus crack is itself very minimal.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the majority’s decision, the simple fact remains that Dio’s all important difference between being asleep or unconscious is utterly immaterial to Canadian sexual assault law.
What this binding precedent is about is whether or not prior consent to sexual contact still holds once a person no longer has the ability to withdraw that consent. The Court has found that it does not. That leaves us with the problem of a law which intends to protect sexual assault victims being so broad as to apply to a range of conduct that might not have been considered by Parliament when making the law, be it kissing one’s sleeping spouse or kissing one’s Alzheimer’s stricken spouse (a defendant would have to defend based on the kiss being non-sexual), to a mutually drunk couple having sex after a heavy night on the town (a defendant would have to argue lack of mens rea", to the erotic asphyxiation followed by anal penetration in the case at hand.