I agree with this. It would be such a boon to stem cell research for someone powerful enough to influence these decisions to have an accident and land in a wheelchair, or for one of his immediate family to do so. Not that I’m wishing that fate on anyone.
Permit me to stir the pot a little.
Neither first trimester fetuses or stem cells have capacity for hopes and dreams as outlined by Apos. Unlike a calf.
As such, neither has intrinsic moral worth. [sup]1[/sup]
Comments?
An anti-abortionist could take issue with the first factual claim regarding fetuses but probably not stem cells.
More likely though, an anti-abortionist would focus on the conclusion.
Fetuses, he might say, have the potential for human hopes and dreams.
To that I answer that while it is in my current interest that my Father not go on a business trip on the evening of my conception, it is difficult to argue that it would have been in my interest on the afternoon preceding. Also, arguments based on potential human life appear to lead to an absurd and continuous mandate to reproduce.
Fetuses, the anti-abortionist might say, are certainly human; and lots are extinguished annually.
Human hair, I respond, has human DNA, but I don’t have any problem going to a barber.
Fetuses have beating hearts…
… but not functioning brains.
Perhaps this thread should be taken to GD.
[sup]1[/sup]They may have extrinsic moral worth. But we should take our arguments one at a time.
I agree. As I see it, it is perfectly arbitrary to argue that a fertilized egg’s potential for personhood mandates protection, but the potential for personhood of an unfertilized egg in the body of a woman with access to the sperm in the body of a nearby man does not mandate protection.
I believe we can safely discard almost all potentiality arguments (I say “almost” because there might be some potentiality arguments worth keeping, and the potential of their existence is enough to persuade me not to be absolutist).
Daniel
Not to be a picker of nits but how the hell do YOU know that they have “feelings”?
You mind-meld with cows? Is that where your posts come from?
:rolleyes:
There is nothing anthromorphic about it. Many animals (and most that are relevant here), like us, have psycholigcal feelings (things like fear, pleasure, suffering, etc.). This is certianly not surprising, since our brains and their brains are all built on roughly the same design. They are not anywhere near as complex, and no, they are not like ours in the way grandma believes her cats to love her and enjoy being called mr. snookiekins. But they are like ours in enough relevant ways to tie into the very same reasons that generally underlie our moral considerations for each other. We don’t consider it right to deliver pain to each other because we can empathize with what it feels like and how much we hate it, and hence understand that another being of similar capacities must feel the same way.
Well, there’s always the scientific consensus, which is that while animals do not have human-like feelings, i.e. complex personalities based around a sense of self-identity, they do have general feeling responses that basically match up to ours in terms of their brain activity, external response, and so on. There is a very extensive field devoted to animal psychology, and of course animals have a wide wide range of capacity for feelings, from primates, which are troublingly like us in many respects, to lizards or fish, which are fairly alien to us in their responses.
But then, there’s an simpler response, which is that I can tell they do the same way I can tell you do, which is to say no better or worse than I can tell in your case. I can cause both you and an animal pain, and cause both you and an animal suffering, and both your responses demonstrate to me that you have feelings in basically the same manner: you experience sensations that you don’t like, and your disposition becomes altered over time with trauma. Sure, both of you could be, inside, completely insensible machines. But that’s a metaphysical quandry that’s the same for both of you, not particular to animals.
Obviously, that second quote was from noted dickwad, Xploder. And obviously, this is staying in the pit.
Certain unicellular creatures will swim away from saline water. In some sense, they experience pain. I wouldn’t say they suffer though: evolutionarily speaking, suffering follows only if the animal needs to convey its pain to another. It’s like whining (except it hurts). That is, I am dubious about the extent of suffering in nonsocial animals.[sup]1[/sup]
Ignoring primates, I am unaware of this research, at least as it applies to alleged animal suffering (as opposed to distress). A cite would be in order, if you have it. (I’m not trying to be difficult: it’s just that I’ve wondered about this topic).
[sup]1[/sup]This is basically my WAG, btw.
Do you mind-meld with people? Do you know if they suffer?
I’m wondering if we can all agree that assigning the capacity for suffering to other beings beside ourselves ought to come from three sources:
- The other being must display behavior which is relevantly similar to the behavior that we ourselves display when we are suffering;
- The other being’s physiology has traits similar to those traits in our own physiology that account for our own capacity for suffering; and
- There’s no simpler explanation for the being’s behavior.
Can everyone agree with these three criteria? Number three is a little weird; I put it in there mainly to guard against the “computer game guy programmed to scream in pain” argument, which is really guarded against by #2, but I wanted to emphasize the point.
Daniel
You don’t need to mind-meld with people, because they posess language and can articulate their feelings. Cows don’t have language, and can’t articulate whatever feelings, if any, the posess beyond the most basic and simple.
Nope. I don’t think “similiar traits” justify leaping to the conclusion that an animal experiences feelings like human feelings.
I’ll concede that animals can experience limited kinds of suffering. However, the reason I’ll happily chomp down on a savory piece of veal is because I don’t think animals are capable of experiencing suffering to the same degree that people do. They’re obviously capable of experiencing physical suffering, but physical suffering is just a relatively small facet of human suffering; more significant are feelings of anxiety, humiliation, despair, etc.–all of which require a capacity for reason and thought that I don’t think other animals possess.
Ultimately, the animal rights movement is like the colisseum scene in Monty Python’s “The Life of Brian” where they agree that they’ll fight for the right of Reg to have babies, even though he’s incapable of having them. Fighting for animal “rights” is stupid because they’re not capable of excercising them.
I’ve already made these arguments before, and I don’t want to have another drawn out animal rights debate, so this is primarily a drive by to lend some support to Measure for Measure, This Year’s Model, et. al., and the others fighting the good fight.
Nor can infants, but I believe infants can suffer. If a man from Moscow starts speaking to me, he cannot articulate his feelings to me, but I still believe he can suffer. Surely language isn’t all that?
That’s just not accurate. If a right is understood as a negative duty, then an animal’s right to life simply inflicts a duty on me not to kill that animal. To say that a cow cannot exercise that right is meaningless.
Daniel
I should have asked a follow-up question. Metacom, if you reject my standards for deciding who can experience the relevant feelings, what standards would you use? For whatever standards you come up with, I encourage you to consider the difficult scenarios in advance–the dude from Moscow, the profoundly mentally retarded, the infant, the stroke victim.
Daniel
Correction: Cows don’t have verbal language. They have vocal language and body language, as do other animals. Anyone who’s familiar with the body language of, say, a cat or dog (to pick just two animals whose behavior is readily observable) can easily tell the animal’s emotional state. Anyone who claims that a purr and a yowl, a tail wag and a growl don’t communicate any meaning is, bluntly, an idiot.
Not to the same degree as humans? Granted. But animals are indeed capable of suffering psychological abuse. I’ve observed instances of it: A horse arriving at the boarding barn where mine are kept, friendly, willing, easy to handle. Given affection alternating with (to the horse) inexplicable bouts of verbal and phsyical abuse by its owner. Within a few months, a horse who reacts to all humans with fear and defiance, and whose body language at all times expresses misery.
No, I don’t think animals are fur people. I don’t believe they think, feel, reason, anticipate the way we do – although they do have a time sense and do anticipate things they care about, such as feeding time.
A good animal handler (for whatever species) will in fact be keenly cognizant of how animals’ intelligence and instincts work differently from the human, and not try to make animals respond in human terms, but will use the animal’s innate psychology and, as far as possible, its body language to communicate the handler’s wishes. For example, I’ve kept a furiously charging dog from actually attacking me by dropping into the canine submission crouch, eyes averted, my body language telling the dog that I wasn’t a threat.
And anyone who doesn’t actually bother to read the post they’re responding to is a fucking moron:
I never stated that they couldn’t communicate anything, just that they couldn’t use communicate feelings “beyond the most basic and simple.” Yowls, tail wags, and growls communicate simple, basic emotional states, like “That hurt!,” “I’m happy!”, “Fuck off!”.
And yes, they have “body language” but they don’t have language, meanings 1 and 2.
Then it sounds like we agree.
Right, but if we’re discussing suffering, isn’t it the ability to communicate, “that hurt!” that’s relevant, not the ability to communicate, “I attempted to derive the square root of 2 by approximation, but was unable to remember my high-school math well enough to get much closer than about one and a half”?
The communication of “That hurt!” is what I consider relevant, and that’s why I put behavioral similarities in item #1 of my reasons for concluding that other beings suffer.
Daniel
I’ve already conceeded that they can experience physical suffering, so the ability to communicate “that hurt!” is not relevant.
So then what’s the deal? Even if you think even the highest of the animals we torture for pleasure is only experiencing the crudest, rudest and most simple sensation of pain, that’s a lot more than a stem cell can experience. Doesn’t that make my point?
Read my very first post in this thread, Apos.
You said you disagreed with the means by which I assign the capacity for suffering to other beings. Can you lay out the means by which you assign that capacity to other beings?
Daniel
Doh!
Actually, read my second post in this thread. 