Forgive me if any of this is repetitive of other posters’ arguments; I’ve only been able to skim the thread past the post quoted immediately below.
Yeah, it’s sloppy drafting, and this particular result was almost certainly not intended by the New Jersey legislature. But for those judges who are chary to impute legislative intent beyond the plain meaning of the statutory text, this is an easy one: his firearm was seized pursuant to the act, it wasn’t returned, and so he doesn’t get a firearms card. Scalia would say that if the legislature thinks that this is an absurd result, then they’re perfectly free to revise the statute, but that he’s not going to stand in their shoes and do it for them, and that this isn’t so facially absurd an outcome as to countenance judicial intervention. At least, I hope he would.
Now, there are other judges – including the one I clerked for, who, while Republican-appointed and personally conservative, adopted a generally common-sense approach to statutory interpretation in the face of possible ambiguity – who would say something like:
“Look, it’s a badly worded statute, and like any other statute, its terms should be applied to the specific facts of the case before the court. Here [and I’m going to assume for our purposes, Bricker, that there aren’t any salient portions of the record that have not been laid out in this thread], because the confiscated firearms have been sold, they cannot be returned to M. by the state. It’s perfectly possible that the state would have returned the firearms to M. had they not been sold, but we can never know. The statute thus requires M., through no fault of his own, fulfill an impossible condition in order to obtain a firearms card. Whatever the legislative intent, it’s not in the interests of justice or public policy to interpret statutory text in this sort of way when there is a plausible alternative reading. Thus, M. should not be foreclosed from applying for a firearms card on the basis of this provision. On the other hand [and again, in the absence of contrary statutory language not laid out in this thread], in considering M.'s application for the card, the state is perfectly free to take into account whatever legitimate factors relating to the circumstances of M.'s 1997 domestic violence charge as it wishes, in order to assess whether he meets all statutory and regulatory criteria for the issuance of a firearms permit. If, having considered the evidence available to it in connection with M.'s application, the state denies the application and refuses to issue M. a firearms card on some basis other than the statutory provision discussed above, then M. is free to seek review of that decision through whatever judicial or administrative channels are available to him, as prescribed by the laws and regulations of New Jersey and the Constitution of the United States.”
Something like that. 
And, of course, there are potential federal constitutional questions about a state’s ability to permanently deprive its citizens of the ability to own a gun simply for being accused of a crime. But that gets into substantive due process, so… 