Cold War Dopers - how scared were you?

[colonial]

@Stranger_On_A_Train

In this statement, you seem to misunderstand the entire point of deterrence theory (as opposed to theories of combat tactics and strategy); Assured Deterrence (or MAD, or whatever moniker you prefer to apply) is intended to present to an opponent the scenario that no matter how unexpected, massive, or devastating an attack, the subsequent and unstoppable reprisal will result in the complete annihilation of the attack, and thus, prevent such an attack being rationally conceivable.

My emphasis above-- you meant attacker in the second of your three uses of the word “attack”, right? Otherwise yes, that is the point of MAD.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

If missiles start flying for whatever reason, the theory has failed as a deterrent by definion.

Let us substitute the word “strategy” for the word “theory”, please, but whatever you call it, then why yes, it certainly would have failed! However, it did not fail, and is therefore not subject to criticism on the basis of historical fact.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

As both the United States and the Soviet Union employed contingency measures to provide a degree of survivability from a nuclear exchange, and conceived and practiced scenarios of limited exchange, it is clear that neither power uniformly embraced Assured Destruction (or MAD).

“A degree of survivability”? What does that mean? One reason for the 1949-1991 nuclear peace was that both sides knew damn well that no contingency measure could produce decent odds against 10s of millions dead blast victims with millions more to die as the result of destruction of infrastructure, shelter and other facilities.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

And until the deployment of the R-36M heavy ICBM with large MIRV capabiltiy (8-10 RVs) in the mid-'Seventies the Soviet Union did not enjoy parity with the United States in terms of delivery systems and responsiveness, a fact well known to US military strategists and administrations prior to that point despite the campaign harping by Kennedy about the mythological “missile gap”. (It was, in fact, that spurred development of the MX/Peacekeeper and Mobile Minuteman/SICBM programs.)

The USSR did not need parity to impose deterrence. So 90% of their throw-weight fails to get through, and their ICBMs can only reach the Eastern 25% of the US? Well, that 10% of theirs that does get through is far too much.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

Up to that point, US strategists believed a nuclear exchange would be destructive but winnable by the NATO forces, and frankly, they were probably correct (although Europe would have been devestated).

Sorry, but MAD is still in play here. The essence MAD is imposition of an unacceptable degree of risk. “Destructive but winnable” does not mean the same thing as “worth the risk”. “Europe would have been devestated” is not a risk-worthy event either.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

It was only at this point that sufficient parity of forces and total destructive capability existed such as destruction of both sides could be “assured”,

Addressed above.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

and at least some Soviet studies (rightly or otherwise) projected survivability of the Soviet Union from even the most blistering US attack.

Ridiculous. Remember we had several bombs for every Soviet city with a population of 50,000.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

So, while American deterrence theory at that time may be credited with having some elements of Assured Deterrence (but still planning for a post-exchange response or a limited exchange), Soviet strategic theory did not.

See below.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

After the Soviet buildup of ICBMs and readily launchable SLBMs in the mid-'Seventies, the converse was true; American strategic thinking shifted from deterrence to limiting the damage in an exchange and providing for greater capability to respond in a protracted exchange, while Soviet planning focused on systemic disruption to elimination US and NATO response.

You are contradicted by Schultz et al, who depict MAD as paramount for the duration.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

It may seem to you that “I do not see how a rational Cold War Soviet leadership could avoid relying on MAD,” but this speaks more to your own philosophical prejudices than Soviet doctrine, of which both what was known at that time and later available after the fall of the Soviet Union indicates that their primary objectives were not deterrence but survivability and disruption of the NATO response.

Let me put it this way: regardless of anyone’s philosophical prejudices, including that of the Politburo, USSR behavior inevitably produced a deterrent effect on the US, and the USSR was inevitably deterred by the US. Nor could this have been any minor background detail. It was foremost in the minds of the people on both sides who knew the lives of 100s of millions were at stake. Also, the Politburo might have saved itself, but it could not rationally believe it could save the country. Even if the entire population survived WMD no more than a stopgap amount of food and medicine could survive with it, and then there is the Russian winter never more than a few months away.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

As you seem wedded to your opinion and find my statements to be incoherent"

Your writing was in fact grammatically incoherent at that point. Read it again.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

and “bullshit”

I have noticed excellent scientific commentary by you in other threads—as good as I have ever read, really, and I hope to read more from you in that area.

However, when you wander off into historical subjects you are completely hopeless. I urge you to make an effort to restrain yourself from entering historical discussion, and to stick to what you are good at.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

there seems to be little point in continuing this discussion.

Take off.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

But a study of strategic doctrine during the Cold War indicates that the buildup of large arsenals had less to do with pure deterrence that a simplistic application of a “MAD”-type concept would suggest, and certainly the deployment of the nuclear triad in the US arsenal was less aobut having independent and assured response

It is 100% a priori given that the nuclear triad made our ability to attack and counterattack more “assured” of getting through to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.

@Stranger_On_A_Train

than vying within the military establishment for authority and budget.

Infighting over authority and budget is a constant of the subset human nature of military leaders.