Good column about an incident which has long fascinated me (although Cecil is more sanguine about the risk of the near-extinction of humanity in October 1962 than I am).
For those interested in reading more, I recommend Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision (a classic on Cold War crisis management), Lawrence Freedman’s Kennedy’s Wars (a British historian’s perspective on JFK’s steep learning curve but eventual mastery of military and diplomatic policy), and Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days (a very engaging insider’s view by the President’s brother, advisor and the Attorney General at the time).
Robert S. Norris, senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists, wrote a short order of battle for nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for a talk given in October 2012. It’s interesting reading, mainly as I wasn’t fully aware of the great disparity in U.S. vs Soviet strategic weapon amounts at the time. Basically, the U.S. was pointing ~150 ICBMs; 8 SSBNs, each with 16 Polaris SLBMs; and about 1450 bombers, both B-47 and B-52, and each carrying multiple nuclear bombs and missiles. Against this were ~45 Soviet ICBMs, plus the 6-8 operational MRBMs in Cuba; ~150 bombers; and no submarines realistically capable of striking the U.S. Norris writes that
Richard Rhodes makes the claim towards the end of his book, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, that this was the only time that Soviet decision makers ever delegated nuclear use authority to local commanders. Robert McNamara later concluded that the Soviets on scene would have used those tactical nuclear weapons rather than lose them to the sort of immediate preemptive strike (e.g., Operation Raincoat) advocated by General Thomas Power, General Curtis LeMay’s successor. The National Security Archive at George Washington University is a great place to easily find additional primary documents such as the Operation Raincoat memo. Here’s an interesting article from Air and Space Magazine, providing a bit more detail into the airborne alert and SAC plans during the Crisis.
It was debated after the SS-4 MRBM systems had been removed, whether to leave both short-range tactical nuclear systems with the Cubans, either with the Cubans controlling the launchers and missiles, but not the warheads, or with the Cubans in full control of both. Neither the FROGs, nor the FKR-2s, had the range to strike the Continental U.S., but they could have been used against either U.S. naval forces enforcing the blockade, or against the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.
In short, I agree with what I see as Cecil’s main point that the U.S. would not have been annihilated by Soviet nuclear weapons. (IMHO, that capability would have to wait until the development of the SS-16 through -19 ICBMs and Yankee/Delta SSBNs in the mid 1970s.) But the risk of catastrophic loss of life, both military and civilian, in both the United States and Europe, was greater than I understood Cecil to be writing in his article. In particular, with delegation of nuclear release to local authorities, and Malinovsky’s and Zakharov’s commands to use the nuclear means to destroy the invaders of Cuba, I estimate the risk of nuclear use by the Soviets in response to an American air strike or invasion to be much greater than, “most likely no mushroom clouds.”
I was in fifth grade at the time (same as Cecil I believe). We did those drop-drills too, even in far-off Los Angeles. Our teacher discussed that with us. He explained that anyone within a certain distance of ground-zero wouldn’t be any better off under the desk. (ETA: What he actually said, immediately after a drop-drill, was: “You’re all dead.”) But for anyone within a certain range of distances away, we might be protected from flying glass and other debris.
We lived all of 3 miles from an Air Defense Command Headquarters and MAC base. Curling up under my desk would have saved me, wouldn’t it? Maybe? Sorta?
Didn’t think so.
Even if America, Europe, and the Soviets completely destroyed each other, which isn’t really feasible, that still leaves South America, Africa, Australia, all of Asia, the Middle East, etc. Plus Canada and Mexico, though they may want to take a vacation.
I don’t have anything substantive add to the excellent summary by Gray Ghost except that according to McNamara, in an exchange he had with Fidel Castro at the 1991 Ibero-American summit, the latter admitted that has the US attemtped an invasion of Cuba he would have requested the Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons in defense. Most scenarios of the use of tactical nukes in this context typically lead to some degree of strategic exchange as well, and in fact, most ‘unrestricted’ simulations of nuclear warfare end up with a full-up exchange of weapons out of fear that delaying response will mean losing the ability to respond, e.g. being subject to a counterforce attack.
Of course, in 1962, the degree of response with the limited arsenal and poor accuracy and reliability of delivery systems would have provided some limit to the effectiveness, albeit more significant. Even in the heyday of Soviet nuclear arsenals in the late 'Seventies and early 'Eighties, the US, much less the world, would not have been completely destroyed despite hyperbolic claims, but the industrial and agricultural capacity would have certainly been diminished, potentially pushing back the technical capability to pre-Industrial levels. (This is especially true if a concerted EMP attack were made which could render the electrical production and distribution infrastructure unuseable.) We can say with some degree of confidence that an exchange between US/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact would have left both superpowers significantly diminished and most of Europe damaged and impoverished.
It should be noted that while there is no longer a Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact, and the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear arsenal is suspect at best, the spectre of nuclear war still remains, Even with the START reduced inventories and elimination of short and intermediate range nuclear armed ballistic missile systems, both Russia and China have the capability to reach the continental US (CONUS) and Europe. India and Pakistan have been in conflict to the point that the use of nuclear weapons in a regional exchange has been considered by pundits. Israel has a substantial, if not officially acknowledged, nuclear arsenal. Iran has sought the capability to make enriched nuclear material and has improved their ballistic missile technology (although it is not terribly reliabie and could not reach CONUS or likely even Europe). North Korea’s nuclear program is more saber-rattling than serious, but it is enough to keep US-ally South Korea nervous.
And the technology to build nuclear weapons from what are essentially off-the-shelf components is within reach of even a small group of technical people with funding from a government or large criminal organization. Despite decades of research and testing, not a single anti-ballistic missile system has been shown to be effective against ICBM-class vehicles, and has arguably limited effectiveness even at the theatre defense level against a mass or unanticipated attack, nor can any ABM system defend against unconventional attacks. The need for effective non-proliferation efforts, along with the recognition that we will never live in a truly “nuclear-free world” must be acknowledged and pursued. A single exchange, even at a regional level, could result in the deaths of tens of millions of people, critical loss of ariable land, and massive destabilization.
One thing we got out of the Cuban Missile Crisis, having approached so closely to that cliff, was a recognition of the need to avoid engaging in conflicts that could directly lead to a nuclear exchange, and the necessity of having robust communications with an enemy in hopes of being able to defuse a conflict before mushrooms started growing over Omaha and Colorado Springs, and their counterparts in the East.
I found Iran’s latest test of their Emad IRBM interesting for two reasons:
First, with a range of 2500 km per the wiki for the Emad, that’s just enough range for missiles based in NW Iran to meaningfully threaten Moscow.
Second, the warhead is a MaRV. You would know more than I, but AIUI, the reason for using a MaRV is to defeat an ABM system. I had forgotten about the Arrow Israeli ABM system, but I was thinking before that Moscow was the only significant target I could think of that was being defended by ABMs
Admittedly, a MaRV only has so much delta-V, and every high-G maneuver that the RV needs to perform robs it of that much more range. Still, I thought the two data points of range and MaRV were an interesting new wrinkle to the Iranian deterrent.
There was also the Oleg Penkovsky incident. Penkovsky was a colonel in the Soviet military intelligence organization GRU. He was also a double agent working for the CIA.
Penkovsky was under suspicion by the Soviets and in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis, he was arrested. Penkovsky supposedly had time to send off one last message before his arrest. He had been given a few pre-coded messages to use for emergencies. One was that he was being arrested but in the heat of the moment, either accidentally or deliberately, Penkovsky sent a different message: it was the emergency message that the Soviets were launching their missiles against the United States.
Fortunately, the Americans didn’t take this message at face value and didn’t order a counterstrike. But it’s not inconceivable that it could have happened. People were right on the edge and Penkovsky’s message could have been enough to push them over.
Even if things had gone off the rails, and the odd nuke popped off here and there, I think cooler heads would soon have prevailed. But that’s easy to say now. *
Quoted from Cecil’s text on the subject.
Sorry Cecil but you’re wrong. We wouldn’t exchange nukes tit for tat. Once the button was pushed, the sky would be full of missiles and bombers on their way from one side seeking to destroy the other before their side was destroyed. Those missiles and bombers targeted the other’s nuclear strike assets and other assets used to wage war, IE invade the homeland. There would have been no mercy in either sides attempt to take out the other sides ability to wage war.
One possible benefit of a MaRV is to complicate terminal-phase interception, although the viability of non-nuclear terminal interception (of a separating RV) is already suspect enough that it isn’t really necessary to make it more difficult, and a MaRV could not deliberately evade interception, just fly a varied path to make prediction more complicated. Other functions of a MaRV are more precise targetting and the ability to strike in areas where a purely ballistic RV could not reach, i.e caves built into deep canyons.
I suspect Iran’s true objectives, like most nations which develop nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems, is not to apply these weapons on the battlefield but to use them as political bargaining chips and obtain the prestige that goes along with owning them. The consequences of actual use are so grave that (it may be argued) no rational actor would actually use them, hence why they are considered so effective as a deterrent. However, that misses the point that they can be used, and under confusion, miscommunication, or deliverate subterfuge, e.g. “the fog of war”, they could be accidentally used.
Well, it depends. In the case of an initially limited exchange there may be restraint. The problem comes in the lack of communications, or trust in communications, between combattants. Because nuclear weapons can trump any mass of conventional warmaking capability–a single nuke can take out an entire airfield of planes or a regiment of infantry or armor without any practical ability for defense–any threat to attack conventional forces essentially demands a ‘proportionate’ response. And since the ‘proportions’ of nuclear capability are measured in the tens or hundreds of kilotons of TNT equivalent–more than a wing of bombers could carry in conventional ordnance–it is very easy for a scenario to escalate. Most realistic simulations predict uncontrolled escallation, but of course, we’ve never had a real scenario with genuine actors, so it is informed guesswork rather than empirical knowledge (which we will hopefully never have) to guide us.
Any way you cut it, we would be better off without these weapons in the world. But that really isn’t an option; even if we committed to unilateral disarmament, the basic knowledge and technology is available for a suitably financed and motivated party to construct such weapons. So it goes.
What is missing from most American accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis is that the Soviet decision to plant nuclear weapons in Cuba was a response to the US planting Jupiter missiles in Turkey and southern Italy in 1961.
Essentially, it was “you have nukes that can hit my country before we can do anything about it, we’ll put nukes in a place that can hit your country before you can do anything about it.”
If the Cuban missile crisis had gone very badly, it’s likely that these missiles would have been launched.
As part of resolving the crisis, the US removed the missiles from Italy and Turkey.
Although it was true that removal of the PGM-19 ‘Jupiter’ MRBM was part of the agreement with the Soviet Union, the reality is the USAF had already planned to retire the Jupiter once the LGM-25C ‘Titan II’ was in place, to be followed rapidly by the high availability LGM-30 ‘Minuteman (I)’. The Jupiter was accurate but troublesome to support logistically in Turkey and Italy, and proved to be unreliable in service.
Not all national or subnational leaders are rational, of course, and such weapons may someday be purposefully used by people so driven by religious, ethnic or political hatreds that they won’t mind - and indeed may even embrace - suicide.
Your point is well taken, but as you referenced, neither side trusted the other. If the initial exchange had been a nuclear torpedo from a Russian sub launched at an American capital asset, your theory might have proven true. However, if there was any indication that their ICBMs were in any way preparing to fly, then I’m betting the race to push the big buttons would have been on. I’ve seen coverage the crisis and it’s pretty apparent the military was ready to launch everything from hand grenades to nukes in response to a whatever the Soviets did. We all dodged a big bullet in this.
I just don’t think there will ever be the level of trust between the super powers, let alone the also ran countries, to allow any mutual trust. I can’t see us ever taking NK’s at its word.
I think the important factor is that neither side really saw a vital interest at stake in Cuba. Both sides were seeking to improve their position so both sides postured as if they viewed Cuba as an important issue. But that’s because both sides wanted the other side to step back first.
But in the end neither side was willing to sacrifice even one of its own cities for Cuba. So both sides would have been willing to abandon Cuba before facing even a “minor” nuclear attack.
The real danger during the Cuban missile crisis was that there would be a mistake rather than an intentional attack.
The reason “most scenarios” end in strategic exchange is because the scenarios were designed to do so for the sake of training exercises. A scenario that ended with nothing for the military forces to do would have been useless for training.
So we can’t really look at the outcome of “scenarios.”
We can, however, look at what actually happened approximately every decade. There was not only a deliberated step away from the precipice in 1963, but also in 1973 and 1983.
I was a wee bairn in the business–literally still in intel school–but I distinctly recalled how shaken my instructors were. I wasn’t fully aware at the time what the step to DEFCON 3 fully entailed… but let me say that DEFCON 3 is the highest level of operation that the Soviets could have allowed the US to attain without a pre-emptive attack.
This was not nearly as scary, however, as the immediate aftermath of EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER 83.
ABLE ARCHER was one of the most ambitious nuclear war exercises ever. While each of the services carried out its own annual nuclear war exercise, the big idea of ABLE ARCHER 83 was to coordinate every exercise simultaneously, and even bring in the National Command Authority (Warren Christopher wound up playing the president). We had never done anything like it; the Soviets had never seen anything like it.
There are a couple of good reports on it in Wikipedia and on YouTube. Look up “ABLE ARCHER.” However, neither of those reports illustrate how scary it was inside the underground command post of the Strategic Air Combat Operation Staff at Offutt AFB, NE.
We had just finished one of the scenarios that ended in execution of the Major Attack Option, and I was officially dead in the exercise. About an hour later, just before I took off for home, I got a call: “Come back to the underground command post right away.” When I got back they told me, “The Soviets have reacted to the exercise.”
“Reacted”…they were actually opening silos, flushing their boomers out of their ports, and moving their strategic forces.
While other elements of the US national command authorities were trying to convince the Soviets we weren’t really planning to attack them, at SAC we had to operate under the presumption of the worst. We were, indeed, planning furiously to attack. I noted that the faces of the generals were as gray as concrete. One colonel did quip, “Damn, we just bought a house.” I didn’t leave the building for four straight days.
It would have been sadly ironic to go to war over what was really just a misunderstanding. But ratchet back we did. We also discovered that there was more rationality that might have been thought among military forces on both sides.