IANAA, but I think there’s a huge difference between the pressure suits they wear for launch – the orange ones, right? – and the huge bubbly white thingummies they use for spacewalks. I don’t think the orange suits could protect the astronauts from open space, just from lack of air. There would still be the problems of radiation, et cetera.
Sam, please, my dear fellow, please read before posting. You’re about 30 posts behind the curve. I’ve already addressed the robotic arm, the extra EVA suits, the missing tiles, etc. Your vast field of strawmen will certainly get the attention of Census 2010.
Nowhere did I use the term “easy” in describing an effort to accelerate the second shuttle’s launch. I suggested it might have been possible. Remember Apollo 13? Remember how the best and the brightest joined hands to defy the odds and get the job done? Are you suggesting NASA couldn’t have done it again?
Also, who is talking about “engineering modifications”?
Your argument re: responding to thousands of conceivable emergencies misses the point. We’re talking about using available resources to rescue a distressed crew.
BTW, based on what meaningful data did NASA conclude the foam insulation analysis? What, based on the notion that “because no one was injured before, no one on Columbia will be imperiled if they deorbit today”? What branch of mathematics is that? What kind of public policy is that?
My point is this: given the number of former NASA astronauts who seem so familiar with the concept of loose foam insulation knocking off orbiter tiles–and then causing a possible [their term] “zipper effect”–why wouldn’t NASA bring ALL of its resources to bear in its determination of the extent of damage–especially when an impact causing many tiles to fall off would prove catastrophic?
Re: telescopic analysis–would someone answer my question re: spy satellite resolution vs. terrestrial based? A spy satellite can resolve a license plate, but a ground based telescope cannot see if MANY tiles are missing?
I cannot understand the decision of not even trying viewing the orbiter.
You misunderstand spy satellite resolution. You may find a good refresher course in a recent thread. A license plate might be detectable as few pixels in a picture, but you ain’t gonna be reading the numbers.
Don’t earth telescopes have a maximum (minimum ?) resolution of a couple of feet, due to atmospheric interference, regardless of the size of the 'scope?
If you mean we had two up in space, that’s not correct. The closest two flights have been together appears to be six days: STS-71 6/27/95-7/7/95 and STS-70 7/13/95-7/22/95.
Source: http://www.spacefacts.info/
Eric
Found this from the other link I mentioned, http://satobs.org/telescope.html
So, if I did see the picture that I am sure I did on TV, it was probably that one that aired on Sat AM TV and was quickly pulled.
After today’s press conference, we have some more details about the stuff we’re talking about.
First, they said that once before they tried to image the shuttle. They had a parachute door come off the back of the shuttle, so they tried to use ground-based telescopes to look at the back of the shuttle to see if it was okay. They said that the granularity wasn’t sufficient for them to really be able to see anything, and that’s one reason why they gave up on the idea of inspecting the shuttle from the ground.
As for a repair capability, they said that NASA actually worked on a plan to allow shuttle astronauts to repair tiles in orbit, but they eventually gave up after they decided that the risks involved in doing an EVA to repair tiles was greater than the risk of not having the ability to fix them.
During this afternoon’s briefing, NASA officials said they did not use a telescope to examine the tiles because they could not have gained useful information. The most they could have seen on the shuttle’s black belly was spots of white from damaged tiles. They could not have told how badly the tiles were damaged.
Moreover, the official (Dittemore?) said that even if they knew of damage, there was nothing that could be done to repar it or protect the shuttle on re-entry.
I assume that if their analysis of the insulation impact had suggested the possibility of major damage, they would have made the attempt to see what had happened.
Tsunamisurfer said:
Oh, please. I agree that skepticism of any big bureaucracy is generally a good thing, but it’s ridiculous to suggest their analysis was a simple shrug of the shoulders and an “Oh well, it didn’t cause any problem last time.” Computer simulations, detailed examination of the videotape, comparisons to past debris impacts _ all of these would have given NASA decent information on which to base a conclusion.
It’s not really much of a stretch anyway. You know the composition of the material (it was a spray-on foam). You can easily figure out how fast it would be going if it hit the wing, and how much energy would be involved. From that, you could easily determine whether the impact should have caused damage.
It sounds like the focus now is on the left gear well.
Here is a fairly thorough discussion of these issues from the Globe and Mail.
No, I do understand. I didn’t say “resolve the plate’s digits.” I said resolve the plate itself, i.e., to about a 5" by 9" minimum area.
A ground-based telescope might have been able to determine a catastrophic loss of tiles–a large section of missing tiles–that would have made reentry a suicide endeavor. Were such a worst-case scenario detected, then perhaps NASA might have opted for the crew to await the second shuttle.
With seven lives, a $2.1 billion spacecraft, and the resulting policy fallout on the line, how could it have hurt to try?
Better question: What good would it have done to try? Given that all credible evidence shows it wouldn’t have done a lick of good, I just don’t get your continued insistence that they should have done so.
tsunamisurfer seems to be saying this—
In a scenario when you do suspect the safety of deorbit, pull out all the stops to work the problem. I don’t think anyone has a problem with that as a possible scenario, but the real scenario isn’t like that. The NASA guys went over this in some detail in tonight’s press conference. Teams of people went over the tile-killing foam scenario, and not one thought it was a deorbit safety problem.
That was their overall conclusion. Certainly some engineers/management might have felt it was more than “a non-nominal event” in NASA-speak. And clearly, as deorbit risk to the shuttle itself rises - so too does risk to the southern USA.
NASA should be able to get good imagery of the shuttle once it’s reached orbit (digitally - so it can be sent to Houston) and could & should have contingencies that include repair or a rescue mission from another shuttle.
I think the biggest problem being overlooked is not one that has a simple answer. It has taken years upon year to develop all the rules and instincts involved in nautical and avionics. We (as a species) have been sailing for thousands of years, flying for 100 (ass of December 17th of this year), but only exploring space for about 50. There are a million and one scenarios that we have not even computer modeled that would be life threading to the crews.
The really hard thing to except is that most of these lessons are sadly paid in blood. Hopefully was can take everything there is to be learned from this tragedy and minimize the future losses, and honor those who gave their lives to further the advancement of the human race.
200 years ago President Thomas Jefferson got $2500 from Congress to fund Lewis and Clark’s expedition over the Rockies to the Pacific Ocean.
The astronauts on the Space Shuttle can no longer be regarded as are test pilots who daily risk their lives flying bleeding-edge aircraft in remote areas.
There will be another Space Shuttle launch and landing.
Best question: Say there’s a .5 percent chance that a high-resolution terrestrial telescope could have imaged large-scale damage on the orbiter and led NASA to order the team to await the next shuttle for a rescue attempt (read thread posts on page 1 re: “next shuttle”).
Why not gather as much data as one can, knowing that deorbiting with extensive tile damage is a death sentence for a shuttle crew? Swinging a telescope toward the space shuttle isn’t a Herculean effort.
I agree and disagree with you.
There must be continued exploration of space, by this and as many countries that can afford it.
I agree with the parallel between the space program and Lewis and Clark. In the sense of scope, space is as about as unknown on all fronts as the American frontier.
But I have to disagree when you say that astronauts are not test pilots. Because space is such a hostile place, and our understanding of how to get there and back is so rudimentary, (as this tragedy demonstrates) that is not safe for Mr. and Mrs. Jamal Q. public. They are brave individuals who do in fact risk their lives trying to better us all.
I totally agree. When I heard that during launches photos of the outside shuttle structures and boosters were photographed by on-shuttle cameras – terrific! Yet the photos were film, obviously kept a-board the shuttle.
It’s good that President Bush again re-affirmed manned-spaceflight today by calling for another half-billion in funding for NASA to discover and move on with the Shuttles. For now, I’ll assume there’s no ulterior motive such as his ‘son of Star Wars’ project.
The ISS (Space Station) relies on the Space Shuttle. The Hubble Telescope needs help from the Space Shuttle & crew next year.
…I don’t believe the answer to the OP has been tackled yet. That is, if it had been definately known that Columbia couldn’t return to Earth safely (and don’t ask me if it was even possible for anyone to have found out for sure beforehand)…
- How much longer could Columbia have stayed in orbit, and
- Could the launch schedule for the next shuttle (Atlantis, on March 1st, FYI) have been pushed up, and the ship redirected to rendevous with Columbia?