One way to define free will is that it causes an output action to not be a strict function of its observed inputs. Someone with truly free will can do two different things in the same situation - agree?
However, if in reality we can never know all the inputs that go into making a decision, we can also never know if apparently different decisions are the result of free will or the result of unobservable inputs. In the latter case it looks like free will but is not.
I won’t dispute that people find this discussion terribly important, but if we cannot even in principle distinguish free will from chaos and unobservable inputs to a decision, I propose the discussion is useful as entertainment but nothing more.
The body and the mind, which is a product of the body, make up the actor. There is no distinction between your brain doing something and you doing it. Mind/body dualism is false.
Most decisions we make are calculated. Often, the calculation is obscured by the depth of instilled pattern sets, but sometimes a simple or elaborate syllogistic hierarchy is at least partially evident (e.g., “if I buy the Moose Tracks Ice Cream, everyone else will eat it up before I get any, so I will not waste my money”). Free will is not a requirement for decision-making, and really, the vast bulk of our decisions follow prettymuch set patterns.
Because, you see, thinking is hard and it is reductive. Once a thing has been thought out, the data used are discarded or shelved in favor of a behavior pattern that is much easier to effect. Where exactly free will fits in there is not at all obvious, I submit that the burden of proof lies with those who claim that it exists rather than those who claim that it does not.
He lost his free will in so doing.
He now has no freedom at all.
So what? We can define eras of the history of the universe when various properties didn’t exist.
First there were no leptons, things had to cool first.
Then it got too cool to create new ones, freezing the ratio between protons and neutrons (other than as reduced by neutron decay).
Next, the first atoms appeared. Before that, no atomic phenomena happend.
Later, it the universe got transparent. Before that, no light transmission!
Then stars formed. These went nova and created bigger atoms, of which we’re made.
Each of these watershed events changed the universe dramatically, and changed what could happen in it.
Eventually, life evolved, which eventually gave rise to a truly new phenomenon: subjectivity. Before that, there was nobody to observe the universe.
I consider that a landmark event. Does it change particle physics? Nope. But is it a significant, transformative event? Yes. And perhaps, it creates the stage for something we call free will to appear.
The appearance of atoms didn’t change physics, but it changed what could happen in the universe. We’re nowhere near really understanding what subjectivity is, how it works, and what it’s capable of.
Note that we understand subjectivity only empathetically. It would be difficult to communicate it to an intelligence that doesn’t already have it (if such a thing is possible; my guess is it’s not).
I haven’t read every single post in this thread, but I’d like to jump in here.
It seems to me that the contra-causal libertarian idea of free will is the kind subscribed to by the vast majority of the non-philosopher population out there. Pretty much all my relatives, to pick an example, would be shocked that I think that our actions, choices, are the direct result of physical electrochemical processes that go on in the brain, and of nothing else.
And, it seems to me, that the compatibilist definition of free will favored by the philosophically-inclined is just a redefinition of the term “free will” to make it mean something that we do have. I’m not sure why they feel the need to do that - I certainly don’t. I’m perfectly happy saying that our choices are made by physical processes, just like in a computer but way way more complex, and that this is in contradiction to the idea of free will that most people subscribe to.
I’m not really interested in discussing how we should define it - is there anyone here who thinks that our choices are not the result of physical processes in our brains?
I think a lot of this thread has been people talking past each other because they’re using different definitions. People like me and Pjen who say we have no free will gladly acknowledge that we make decisions. Computers make decisions too.
For me, it’s not a redefinition, it’s the only definition that ever made sense. Compatibilism goes back to the ancient Greeks, after all, it’s not some sort of face-saving compromise.
Due to this discussion, I watched a Sam Harris’s lecture on youtube and bought his book. I’m just partways into it, but I’m intrigued. Don’t know if I totally grasp his argument, but I’m persuaded by the stuff I do grok.
I think people are conflating making decisions with free will. I keep doing the same thing. But I was thinking about this while walking home from work, and I think I have it figured out.
I have involuntary movements. Nothing too major, but nowadays they are a constant companion. The most common “quirk” of mine is repetitive nonsensical thoughts. But the thing is, I’m not always aware it’s happening. A switch gets pulled or a button is pressed, and suddenly I’m aware I’m entrained on total gobbledygook. As soon as this happens, I switch to other thoughts. I “decide” to think of other things…presumably this is when I could pat myself on the back for a job well done.
But Harris would argue–and I totally agree with him, after having deal with this shit for several years now–that I haven’t exhibited free will. Because not only are the repetitive thoughts involuntary, so is the awareness of them. Just as magically as they appear, they recede–allowing me just enough edge to be aware of their presence and think about something else.
But I don’t think about what I’m going to think about next. The next thought is always unknown to me until it comes. It’s not like I have multiple lines of consciousness, one that does the thinking and the other that does the thinking about thinking. So when my awareness of the crazy thoughts shuts them down, how do I control what’s going to happen next in my brain? The truth is I don’t. Even if I think to myself, “Let’s think about pizza!”, I have to question why my brain pulled out “pizza” instead of, say, “toejam”.
Because I like pizza a whole lot more than toejam, is the obvious answer.
But why do I like pizza more? Have I chosen to like pizza more than toejam, or are my tastes established through processes beyond my control?
Sometimes the first thing I think about after coming out of a “loop” IS the loop. And what do you know? Before I know I’m mentally spinning around again. But it’s not like I ever plan for it this to happen.
I have decided to work on tricks and strategies to help me cope with the situation. This is admirable and makes me feel like I have power. But I don’t think these “tricks and strategies”, if they are working at all, are working through my consciousness. So ultimately I don’t have control.
It does seem like a whole lot of navel-gazing. But I find it quite interesting.
Well, I totally agree that there are significant limits on volition. Some decisions are hard. Some actions are beyond our physical ability. If I try to hold my hand in an open fire, other parts of my mind will take over and make me yank it away. I do not have the “free will” to go on a shooting rampage.
I’m still trying to get the difference between volition, which the antis here agree exists, and “free will,” which doesn’t seem defined yet.
More or less, yeah. That’s why I emphasize “volition” which I’m pretty sure we do have. I’m willing to throw out the bathwater of free will, but not the baby of volition.
I definitely agree that “What we have here is failure to communicate.”
Computers make decisions, but we aren’t computers. Insects…may be “computers” of a sort. I’m pretty sure a modern computer could be programmed to emulate the entirety of an insect’s behavioral existence. And, some day, if computing continues to advance, maybe a person’s. The real key difference is that we have conscious access to the decision-making parts of our own brains. We can fiddle with the inputs, to a remarkable degree.
For instance, we can “work ourselves up” to a difficult decision. We can “steel our nerve.” We can also engage in self-deception.
(In fact, the sad thing is how bad we are at not engaging in self-deception!)
Our thought mechanisms are rusty, crusty, and untrusty – but I don’t feel it right to deny that we really do think.
Determinism also goes back to the pre-socratics. In fact it is quite difficult to find any reference to something like Free Will in pre-socratic writings- the same as any idea similar to Cartesian Dualism is not found in that era.
Some (like Julian Jaynes) would suggest not only that we do not have free will and that dualism is false would go further and maintain that both concepts are artefacts of the dawn of consciousness where reflection on internal processes became a possibility and the human mind faced logical paradoxes.
I would claim that volition is an experience, not a cause.
That complex neural processes give rise to consciousness (we have not yet found consciousness outside the animal kingdom)
That such emergent conscious processes have developed by evolution to improve decision making in higher animals.
That consciousness is necessary for such a process to occur and in integral part of the process, but that our awareness of this awareness is an artefact that is not part of the causal process.
Julian Jaynes argues that the first writings of humans show that the concept of consciosness and action existed but that what was missing was the self-awareness of the awareness and any ownership of responsibility. Early thinkers accepted that they were essentially automatons doing as instructed by nature.
The paradoxes of Free Will and Self Consciousness only emerged a few thousand years ago as complex thinking was turned in on itself.
This explanation (and the evolutionary development of consciousness described above) is parsimonious and fits well into a physicalist model.
I suggest that dualism is false, but that we do have free will, though of a different type than what you seem to mean by the term.
I continue to struggle to understand why you claim that because choices are the result of the physical processes in our brains (which I completely agree with) they are therefore predetermined or deterministic. I hope you can elaborate.
Analogies to computers fail at a certain point. Few computers are sophisticated enough to learn, and those that are capable of learning are demonstrably not as efficient at it as the average human child - at least not yet. No computer, AFAIK, has demostrated self awareness.
You and Pjen point to an evolving awareness of the human experience through thought:
[QUOTE=Pjen]
I would claim that volition is an experience, not a cause.
That complex neural processes give rise to consciousness (we have not yet found consciousness outside the animal kingdom)
That such emergent conscious processes have developed by evolution to improve decision making in higher animals.
That consciousness is necessary for such a process to occur and in integral part of the process, but that our awareness of this awareness is an artefact that is not part of the causal process.
Julian Jaynes argues that the first writings of humans show that the concept of consciosness and action existed but that what was missing was the self-awareness of the awareness and any ownership of responsibility. Early thinkers accepted that they were essentially automatons doing as instructed by nature.
The paradoxes of Free Will and Self Consciousness only emerged a few thousand years ago as complex thinking was turned in on itself.
This explanation (and the evolutionary development of consciousness described above) is parsimonious and fits well into a physicalist model.
[/QUOTE]
If I understand this correctly, you’re suggesting that the concept of Free Will is a late comer to human evolution; That it’s a construct of modern reasoning. Okay, so what? Our understanding of nature is a late comer as well. For most of human history we had no understanding of the physical laws of the universe. Does that mean that this recently acquired knowledge is suspect?
To tie this back to the OP, you’re suggesting that we make choices but that the availability of choices available to us is pre-determined. So I can choose chocolate of strawberry because those are the available flavours which (you argue) were determined at the time of the big bang. Very well. But if I choose neither because I’m on a diet, that’s a valid choice as well, right? So all these choices that I make are subject to what has been determined by the laws of physics. But you also make the claim that what I choose in the next moment is also pre-determined. This make me question why the universe would give a damn about me choosing chocolate or strawberry. It does not seem very parsimonious to me. Allowing me the freedom to choose seems far more efficient.
Physical processes are either determined and determinable (most of physical science) or chaotic and indeterminable.
If thought is a result of brain states, then as brain states are physical processes, then thoughts are either determined or chaotic. There is no space for free will acting at a level above the physical processes.
Current computer analyses are not valuable, but should it become clear that in fact consciousness is an emergent feature of complex information processors, then future computers may claim and actually possess consciousness- but that is current science fiction.
Your use of languah=ge is leading you astray. Using normal English usage, any declarative by an individual assumes an actor and so begs the question.
For instance you use the phrase " So I can choose chocolate of strawberry .." whereas I would rather use the more neural phrase “there was an awareness of a choice between chocolate and strawberry…” and you say “So all these choices that I make are subject to what has been determined by the laws of physics…” whereas I would phrase that as “So all the choices made are subject to the Laws of Physics…”
You are assuming an actor rather than an observer in the causal chain.
My claim is that volition exists as an experience, but it is a reflection of the underlying physical process, not a direct part of the causal chain.
Think of consciousness and self consciousness as the physical brain’s sandbox:
Difficult choice ahead- chocolate or strawberry?- physical brain throws previous experiences of both into the sandbox and this results in the perception of the choice; the physical brain makes that choice depending on the wiring of the brain and what is perceived is initially that ‘a decision has been made’ but with human interpreation and self awareness this becomes the (false) belief “I have made a decision”.
Evolution is not goal directed, but merely a process in the here and now. The brain does the choosing, the sand-box awareness is part of the choice process of which we are aware, but this does not mean that there is a further actor beyond the physical structure of the brain- the sandbox is a trick of nature that allows complex consideration for problems and has developed as organisms with this ability have been bred from superior ancestors than those that did not learn this trick.
You would agree that there is room for various cognitive processes like emotions and instict and ability to process abstract ideas (not unlike this conversation), correct? Why not the ability to evaluate available information and make decisions? e.g. I may go for a run today, or maybe just hit the gym and do some weights. I will almost certainly do one or the other. In your deterministic view, can you elaborate for me about what’s going on in my brain as I attempting to process what seems to me like a free will decision?
P.S. You may have answered my question while I was posting this… I will read and ponder.
If an explanation is more parsimonious, it should be preferred. Additionally the latest EMR Brain analysis is gradually showing that decisions are most often made before the person concerned has agreed that they know what they are going to do.
The initial experiment was by Libet who showed that action potentials to make muscles move were apparent several seconds before the person experienced willing the event- that certainly means that the experience of willing cannot be the casuse of the event as it does not precede it- a necessity for causation (time does not flow backwards.)
The latest experiemnets involving Magnetic resonance are even more indicative of the lack of causation in the experience of willing. I do not have the reference with me currently but will provide it as soon as I can. What they did was aske people to choose between to possible mental states (I forget what they were- say snoozing in a peaceful meadow on a summer’s day, and marching with a brass band. People repeatedly imagined one then another until the scientists could see the pattern on the MR brain imager elated to each state. They were then instructed to think of neither, but to suddenly think of one and indicate exactly when that decision was made. The Brain Images indicated the choices with incredible accuracy- the images read before the person said they had decided!
Experiments like these that are occurring with great rapidity are indicating strongly that conscious consideration is a fact, but that the experience of it is not part of the causal process, but a shadow, and epiphenomenon.
Not sure what you are trying to put forth here, but the reasoning sounds a little specious. What it being observed is a lag between the primary mental processes and the conscious perception of them. It is exactly like when a computer converts JPEG data into a rasterized image: the decompression and conversion process happens very quickly (usually), then we see the image. You might say that consciousness is the UI on top of cognition, so there will be a lag. Anyone who has developed a physical skill can attest, one reacts to a situation (“here comes the ball!”) before they are aware of reacting. The brain is made up of a bunch of feedback loops that coördnate perception, memory and logic, our conscious experience just receives the output when it needs to. There is no reasonable reason to imagine that reasoning works any differently.
In the end, the present was about 250ms ago, we spend our lives in the past.
Except that it denies any conscious control of the process!!!
I quite accept that the human brain problem solves magnificently. However there is no evidence than conscious cognition is part of the causal chain, and hence the common or garden view of Free Will is out the window.