It sounds very American and empowering, but what the hell is it? Does it mean my cognitive ability to decide between white or rye bread? Cause that ain’t free–surely it’s predetermined by my likes and dislikes (innate or learned), current “mood” and all the psychobiological parameters thereof, subliminal thought processes, et cetera. I may be free to do what I like, but that also means I am only able to do what I like, and nothing else. And if I weren’t so constrained by cognition, logic, and emotion, choice would have no meaning whatsoever. So I repeat myself: WTF is free will?
Are you suggesting you only choose the path of greatest perceived pleasure? You must have a nice life.
Free will is the choice between applying yourself to travel the path toward human perfection and a legacy or wasting your time and impacting nothing. The only logical basis of determinism is that a person’s character will almost certainly determine their fate. The most noble of men are remembered for their achievements, and the most depraved are remembered for their failures.
We have free will because nobody can predict what someone will do. Science gets better and better at making physics related predictions, but it’s beginning to look like no amount of science or knowledge of the universe will allow us to accurately predict a person’s behavior.
“Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.” – Arthur Schopenhauer
I think that’s still the best assessment of the issue. If you intend for ‘freedom’ to mean the freedom to do what you will, the freedom from coercion, from duress prompting you to do against your will, then you have free will in that sense – most arguments for compatibilism (that I know) are in some way of this kind; however, if you intend for ‘freedom’ to mean something which is not determined by prior cause, something’s being left to a choice that itself is free, i.e. not merely a consequence of some decision procedure (for instance: chocolate tastes better to me than broccoli, so I’ll eat broccoli), then you run into problems.
Most people intuitively feel their will to be free, however, which means the idea ought to be given at least some consideration; though, looking at things in a slightly more detailed way, it seems almost like there’s not much grounds for this belief, as most things going on in our heads are decidedly unfree – for instance, you don’t get a choice whether or not you laugh at something you find funny; circumstances do play a role, however, and if you expect a joke, you might prime yourself in such a way as to be able to keep a straight face, but in general, you simply either laugh or not. Dreams are similar – you don’t decide on their contents (lucid ones excepted), and often enough, your own actions in them will feel distinctly unfree. Thoughts, even: you don’t choose a thought to think before you think it – how would that be possible, after all? --, thinking just kind of happens. Sexual (or even non-sexual) attraction, favourite meals or colours, what music you like, even whether you believe in a god or not – the list of decidedly unfree choices ‘forced upon us’ seems to go on and on; those instances where choices actually are the product of deliberation (Am I going to have another beer? Will I really submit these ramblings?) almost seem negligible in comparison. And even then, you can watch yourself weighing up the relative merits of both alternatives up against each other – I’d really like another beer; I’ve got to get up early in the morning – to reach a decision. That’s not freedom, that’s an algorithm!
So, not only does free will seem logically a bit inconsistent; it turns out, after having a good, hard look, we’ve got precious little reason to suspect we had it in the first place!
Sorry for rambling, by the way, but I had no choice; I am going to get another beer, though.
The term is Free Willy, and it’s a fish. One of those mammal fish.
…Turns out, I’ve run out of beer. Well, so much for freedom!
Psychologically it’s an illusion in my opinion. Created by our apparently built in feeling that we have it ( “Everyone believes in free will. We have no choice.” ) and our blindness towards most of our mental processes.
Philosophically it’s a mess. Most of the time “free will” is either left undefined, or given definitions that make no sense when examined closely. “I believe in free will” is nearly a meaningless statement unless the speaker goes on to actually define the term.
I think this should be “We think we have free will …” The outcome might be totally deterministic, but if we can’t predict it in real time it seems free.
Don’t ask me to define it, but I know what I mean when I say it. Certainly not even I know what I’m going to do ahead of time. Most people recognize that there are a great many choices at every juncture in their lives (and I mean every single one, including where to place their next footstep) and that they neither plan these in advance nor do they see the route taken as inevitable. They recognize that there is a huge range of choices they could have made, and that these are not constrained at all by circumstance or their own drives, and could easily have taken some other path without any qualm or resistance, but only took the one they did because one must choose something.
By contrast, Determinism is usually presented as some case where choices are pre-ordained by something (God, biological drives, the laws of physics, whatever one or combination of these), and it certainly doesn’t feel as if that’
s the case. They know they could as easily have taken a different route. (“What if I don’t follow you up into your Martian castle, John?” The book and the movie have her follow, but Silk coulda just stayed put and made her point.)
In reality, probabilities almost certainly rule, and my choices might be constrained probabilistically, but there’s quite a bit of uncertainty in the outcomes. We might be machines, but we’re machines that play dice with the universe.
Everybody has to believe in something…
In one of his essays, Martin Gardner makes the point as the OP. The choices that we make are either the product of our lifetime of experiences, or they’re random. There are no other choices, and neither of those attractively represents what we think of as “free will.”
That doesn’t fit with my (vague) idea of free will. For one, your explanation would allow free will to be just some kind of mental die throwing to make decisions. But I don’t think that would match anyone’s idea of free will.
To be frank, I haven’t heard a good definition of free will that I thought was plausible - and actually “free”.
As far as I can see, In order for free will to be actually ‘free’ - that is, making its own decisions independently or in spite of any variables trying to influence it, ‘will’ would have to be a fundamental and indivisible entity, intrinsically and inscrutably capable of complex behaviour - wanting things not because of some pre-existing mechanical cause, nor because of uncaused random meaninglessness, but because of its very nature being to want.
That’s a description of what free will might be, if there were such a thing, but it’s not an explanation for how it would work - but that’s entirely the point - because in order to be truly free, it could not be explainable.
In naturalistic terms, I think it’s possibly important to wonder if there can be top-down operation of the human mind, as well as bottom-up - that is, our thoughts and actions being the result of a huge superposition of elecrochemical operations, but also that our thoughts and actions, as composite objects, exerting influence upon their underlying low-level operations - not just as a big complex feedback system, but also as communication between distinctly different layers or levels of operation.
Maybe I just run in the wrong circles, but when I hear “free will” it usually means “cannot be predicted, but isn’t random”. And it’s invariably used as a solution for the Problem Of Evil, usually as a part of self-contradictory arguments. :rolleyes:
Of course self-contradiction is probably to be expected, because the concept of free will that I gave above is, itself, self-contradictory. The decision-making process can be divided neatly into deterministic and nondeterministic portions, and inevitably every aspect of the decision that is based on preference, thought, consciousness or will will find itself falling into the “deterministic” portion. When all reasons for doing something are removed, all that remains is randomity, which would not count as free will to most people.
(Some portion of humanity has noticed the above fact, and define free will in a way that is compatible with determinism, or at least which doesn’t give undue importance to any randomity which might occur.)
So, the reality is that we’re all just very complicated machines. And the illusion of free will, of unpredictability, is caused by the fact that we have a persistent mental state that is constantly being adjusted and changed by a number of factors internal and external. This means that our reactions to things will change over time, which means that from the outside it is difficult or impossible to predict with certainty how a person will react to any given stimulus, since their mental state will be at least somewhat different than it was at all prior points.
But, to want what? The ability to want certain things requires a method of discriminating between them. The ability to select one want over another requires a method of choosing between the options.
These methods, these discriminations, either determine the outcome to some degree, or to the degree they do not determine it, by definition leave it to complete randomity. This is logically inescapable - other then by closing one’s eyes to the logic, anyway.
Being unexplainable isn’t enough - it needs to also be indescribable. Because if I can observe its actions and preferences and find patterns, then then I can describe those pattern - and a description of a pattern is an explanation of the behavior. Describability implies explainability - at least, all the explainability that is required to note that the behaviors are determined by certain preferences and moods of various duration.
That which effects reality, can be observed. That which can be observed, can be described. That which can be described, that is not completely random, can be modeled. And a model is an explanation.
Huh? if the complex system is composed of simple elements, then any “feedback” is itself just the result of simple interactions. So, the entire complex system can be described in low-level terms, without requiring a top-level analysis, and certainly not requiring top-level and low-level analyses to be considered in a simultaneous or mixed manner.
Sure understanding things at the lowest level is likely to require you to keep track of a staggering amount of information, but that doesn’t mean it can’t theoretically be done. And alternatively, any feedback that is happening between “composite”, higher-level objects can be described in higher-level terms too.
You answer your own question. Let’s look at the white vs. rye decision. According to you, the decision that you make is determined by “likes and dislikes, mood, subliminal thought processes, et cetera”. But what is et cetera? And what are these subliminal thought processes are influencing your decision? And aren’t “mood” and “likes and dislikes” merely broad descriptors of your mind? So aren’t you really saying that your mind determines what decision you make, or in other words that you have free will?
You can choose white or you can choose rye. It’s not predetermined by likes or dislikes. You can simultaneously like white better and eat rye. You can eat either type of bread regardless of your mood. Subliminal thought processes are an oxymoron. If you’re thinking something then it’s not subliminal. As for et cetera, it’s not defined. So to summarize, you decide whether to eat white or rye, or to eat something else or nothing at all or to eat a little bit of both or a lot of both or to do something else entirely. It’s a decision that originates in the mind, that is to say in the single consciousness that you experience whenever your awake and that defines you as a self-aware being.
Subliminal thought processes are thought processess, of course. Et ceteras are not listed, but that’s a matter of simplification, not a declaration that they’re made of fairy dust. And of course the fact that a preference or mood does not completely override all other considerations doesn’t mean it’s not a determining factor.
When you take out the nonsense, I don’t think there’s much left here.
When people talk about free will in casual conversation they usually mean that it’s the opposite of destiny. With free will one’s path in life is made through their choices - no matter how those choices arise. With destiny their path is controlled by an outside force (fate, God etc) and they are unable to deviate from a course set for them by something else. Saying someone has “free will” means you believe they chose to strangle six kids and set that nunnery on fire, not that God/Satan/fate made them do it and they were powerless to avoid doing those things.
But what decides what you like and dislike, and how your mood’s gonna be? And what decides that which decides what you like and dislike, and so on? You can’t will your will.
Speaking more broadly, do you decide on the ideas that come to your mind? Do you decide to have or not have them? To think or not think a thought?
Your likes and dislikes, your mood, your ideas and thoughts, and ultimately, your decision whether to eat wheat or rye are all intermittent links in a long causal chain; that you are only conscious of a few of them from a certain point (when they are your likes, dislikes, etc.) on does not mean they originate there, nor that they are limited to that domain – likes and dislikes are, for instance, very much a consequence of the physical reality of tastebuds (just try a miracle berry some time), moods are determined by hormones and other external factors, etc.
Conscious choice is a weighing of factors, which themselves are not subject to choice (at least, not in last consequence – you don’t choose what you like and not like, and you don’t choose to throw a particular factor onto the scales; you just come up with it, or you don’t); and the scales either tip one way or the other. If they didn’t, how could the choice be made?
But only if there is something to override the preference for white; else, you’d eat white.