In a very quickie reading of the opinion, it seems to be saying this: for some period of time, the US terms and conditions for copyright were different than the internationally-agreed Berne Convention terms and conditions. So some things went “Public Domain” in the USA that did not go Public Domain in, for instance, the EU. However in 1994 the US entered a trade agreement which included a commitment to abide by the Berne Convention, under penalty of WTO action, so US copyright laws have since been amended on various ocassions to bring them into compliance and one of those amendments was that Congress legislated to retroactively return to proprietary status those things that had gone PD in the USA but were not so in their legal “home country” under the Berne Convention. The Court rules that yes, they can do that, they have done it before, bringing the US law into compliance with an international agreement to which the USA is signatory is a function of Congress, and copyright has been extended and expanded before.
Breyer and Alito dissented, arguing this is contrary to the purpose of the copyright power as it appears in the Constitution, that is,* a limited-time protection to incentivize new creation*, not a perpetual income assurance (nor license to rights-squat forever to control and prevent publication) for the estates or successor corporations of those holding IP rights or their assigns, and that once the law in the US says you’re in the clear, dammit you should expect to stay in the clear in the US (not quite those words
). Kagan recused herself.
(Editorial: The Con justices presumably would be expected to favor property rights and enforcing treaties, but OTOH the Lib justices would be only too happy to join if the Cons themselves are saying the US should follow the international norm…)
Uderstandable worry is raise due to the explicit ruling that nothing in the Constitution makes the Public Domain inviolate or irreversible.
However, I’m not convinced as that Slashdot poster stated, that * based on this case* Disney could copyright for themselves all of Grimm, Perrault, Carroll, Andersen, Verne, etc., or of those two most prolific authors and composers of all, Anon. and Trad., just because their interpretation is the most commercially familiar to US audiences, or as Polycarp mentions, that the state or a title-squatter may copyright the statutes and limit their access and use. But the Court missed clarifying if this was not the case, as not being the matter at hand.
The controversy sprang from works of non-US origin that were copyrighted under the Berne Convention all along (e.g. Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf*) and had gone PD in the USA because the law here was different at the time, and whether there was a vested right to retain royalty-free public domain use that trumped reciprocal treaty compliance. Treaty compliance, or more bluntly, protection of property interests, won. Seems they ruled based on the presumption that this is to apply where at some point there IS a claimant of Berne Convention copyright that is a creator, their estate or their assigns. The majority decision states that the issue of “orphan” works, where no rights-holder can be identified to seek permission to publish, would be a matter for another piece of legislation.
(* The plaintiffs used it as one of many examples of harm they’d incur, robinson. The Court notes it and observes that ITO there is no undue burden, restriction of speech or “taking” in this, since* Peter and the Wolf* has been widely performed worldwide even where it was under protection, and that by comparison the works of Aaron Copeland, under copyright everywhere all along, are also widely performed.)