This is maybe one third GQ, one third GD and one third IMHO. Sorry mods.
Could the German military have beaten Russia in World War 2? Even given Hitler’s amazing ability to micromanage badly, I realise that Stalin was stretched to breaking point in the early years. However – even if Moscow or Stalingrad had fallen, would that have meant the end for Russia? I’ve been reading about the ruthless efficiency with which Stalin moved arms production back and was out-producing Germany massively by the end of 1942, and also the combination of ruthlessness and propaganda which kept soldiers at the front fighting.
If Russia was to fall, what would the decisive moment have been? I’m not convinced that the fall of Moscow would have destroyed morale. What would the impact on the war be? Given that the Germans couldn’t ship vast quantities of troops back to the Western front until they were sure Russia was subdued, could the Allies still have succeeded?
If England had capitulated early and if the U.S. hadn’t entered the war then yes, I think Germany would have definitely defeated Russia (this was how the war was supposed to go in Hitler’s mind; bolshevism was the true enemy, not the west).
Without allied bombing Germany’s war production would have continued unhindered. And I think that if things had really gotten bad Stalin’s government would have crumbled.
According to a BBC documentary, with new evidence from the
archives, in the early stages of the campaign, Russia was
not at all able to defend itself. They dropped stones instead of bombs on the enemy. Russian generals wanted a
cease fire, and let Hitler have what he wanted. Only Stalin
wouldn’t give in and the war continued.
Pity, I don’t remember the title of the series.
The idea that taking Moscow would have won the war for Germany is the major thesis of R.H.S. Stolfi’s Hitler’s Panzers East. Like you, I am not convinced (click here for my review of the book under the name “Daniel R. Baker”).
I do not think that a German military occupation up to the slopes of the Urals was ever possible. A limited German victory by negotiated political settlement might have been possible in the winter of 1941, with Germany hanging on to Belarus, the Ukraine and the Baltic states, but this probably could not have been achieved without the assassination of both sides’ dictators. And the sad fact is that the bulk of the German officer corps was still fairly content with Hitler at that stage in the war, such that an assassination would have been unlikely.
Had Germany been able to wage a real one-front war on Russia, by coming to an agreement with the UK, and switched earlier to a war economy, it is remotely possible that it could have reached the Urals. This is, however, to give the Nazi leaders credit for more intelligence than they had. The simple fact, despite Stolfi’s protestations, is that they had not the foggiest idea how tough a job Barbarossa would be.
In response to Allied bombings of German industries, war production actually increased during each year of the war due to German subcontracting.
The biggest drawback to Operation Barbarossa was its delay due to the Nazis bailing the Italians out of the Balkans. The Nazis were not prepared for the Russian winter which led to its biggest downfall. Napeloen almost conquered Russia but the winter, not the Russians, caused Napeloen’s downfall. The Nazis ran into the same problem. In my opinion, if either the Nazis conquered England before attacking the USSR or started earlier, we would be talking German to our European counterparts.
Not every year. Production went way down in 1945. I have generally heard that the switch to war production from peacetime industries was responsible for most of the increase. I’m not sure what “subcontracting” had to do with it.
Actually the delay would probably have happened even without the Balkan campaign; the Germans had to wait for the ground to harden after the rainy rasputitsa season was over.
A number of people are convinced that Germany could not have conquered the UK even if Germany had won the Battle of Britain. The theory is that the UK could have stopped the Sealion invasion just with the Royal Navy operating at night and long-range bombing from Northumbria and Scotland. This argument sounds outright weird to me, but there’s an astonishing unanimity of opinion from those who’ve studied the problem in depth. Anyway, a negotiated peace with the UK would have been a lot more feasible than an invasion.
Germany certainly could have defeated the Soviet Union. Any of a number of small or large differences could have tipped the balance. Some of the more common ideas include:
Germany could have prepared better logistically - The Germans could have prepared more troops for winter campaigns. They could have made rebuilding captured Soviet railroads a priority. They could have converted to full wartime production earlier. They could have stockpiled more spare parts. They could have standardized production of military equipment.
Germany could have made different plans - Germany could have decided on a general defensive stance in the Ukraine and concentrated more troops on the central and northern fronts in 1941. Germany could have decided to attack Leningrad rather than beseige it. Germany could have decided to advance on Moscow in the fall of 1941 rather than mop up pockets of Red Army resistance (although IMHO that would have been a mistake). Germany could have withdrawn to more defensive positions in the winter of 1941. Germany could have renewed their attack against Moscow in the spring of 1941 rather than head south (again, what would have been a bad idea in my opinion). Germany could have decided to try to target fewer objectives in their 1941 spring offensive.
Germany could have acted differently - Germany could have tried to co-opt the Soviet people rather than push them to full resistance. If Germany had claimed to be fighting to liberate the Soviet Union from communism or to be liberating other nationalities from Russian domination, they could have converted millions to their cause. Instead, acting on Hitler’s orders, German forces treated the Soviets as harshly as possible and gave them no alternative except to fight as hard as they could.
I’m not sure what subcontracting had to do with it - it seems to me your industrial production should always increase - but
German industrial production during WWII was in many ways inferior to what Germany should have been capable of. The apalling inefficiency of their war economy has been discussed in great detail on this board, and a good quickie summary can be found in Overy’s Why the Allies Won at your nearest bookstore.
It is virtually certain that German production would have been a lot HIGHER than it was without the bombing. German industrial production, and growth thereof, certainly lagged way behind their enemies.
During the Battle of Britain, Britain was producing almost as many fighter planes in a week as Germany was producing in a month. I cannot imagine what excuse you could possibly make for such crappy rates of production on Germany’s part.
A huge amount of that industrial production had to be devoted to fighting off bombers. A quarter of German artillery production from 1941 on was dedicated to anti-aircraft defense. The Luftwaffe’s aircraft losses against Allied bombing missions were horrifying, in the order of 20-30 planes a day at one point. Air defense used up shells, fuel, personnel, aircraft and EW equipment that would have been better used elsewhere had there been an option. Germany lost a lot of production just in the act of defending her production.
That’s not true. It’s certainly true that the Germans were unprepared for the 1941-1942 winter and the Wehrmacht suffered a lot of frostbite casualties, but it didn’t lose the war for them. Come summer 1942, the Germans were still kicking ass and taking names. To use Overy again, he notes in Russia’s War that during 1944 and 1945, the Soviets were inflicting more casualties than they were taking. They weren’t just swamping the Germans with numbers; they were a better-run army with better equipment, better strategy, and better officers.
The biggest German downfall was simply that the Soviets got better at fighting; they learned from their errors, sacked and/or shot the incompetent officers, and fought better than the Germans did (strategically, anyway. Tactically, the Germans fought like hard-boiled bastards.)
To answer the OP, let’s all remind ourselves that
Germany defeated Russia in a war in 1917!
Russia wasn’t unbeatable. The Nazis could have won.
1945? Well, considering the fact that Germany proper was invaded in '45, is it that big of a surprise that production went down? Are you seriously suggesting that strategic bombing was the main cause for that?
Sub-contracting had a lot to do with it. De-centralizing armaments production into “cottage industries” meant that there was no big factory to target and knock out. Also keep in mind that machine tools aren’t easily damaged. Unless they took a nearly direct hit, they were still usable after the rubble was cleared away.
Those who say bombing alone kept Germany from winning need to examine the timeline more closely. Sure, bombing helped divert resources and eventually crippled the Luftwaffe, but it was only one factor. (And IMHO, not by itself an outcome altering one. Perhaps in combination with other factors…) By the time the air war was having any real effect at all ('43, maybe not even until '44), Germany had no real hope of winning in the East. Stalemate, maybe…
I agree (and have argued that same position before). I believe that is the most likely way Germany could have won.
Well Whack-a-Mole has already pointed out a recent thread on a similar subject. Let’s just say that an enormous amount of scholarly work has been done on this subject. The answer? Maybe.
I personally think that the Germans could have beaten the Soviets in this time period. I however am not sure exactly what would have needed to be different. Production is one major problem. Until Speer took over the economy Germany was producing on a peace time level. And it wasn’t until late in '43 that Geramny realized that Hitler’s vision of a series of short Poland type wars was wrong. Hitler believed that no war would be longer than about 3 months. He anticipated a year or so between campaigns to prepare for the next one. This worked fairly well because he was able to deliver knockout blows to all his opponents with the exception of Great Britian and the Comonwealth. So when he attacked the USSR he thought it would take longer but had no idea that it would take more than 4-5 months. Both Stalin and Churchill realized they were in wars for the long haul early on and mobolized their economies for war years sooner than the Germans did. Hitler’s philosophy of future wars thus tied one hand behind his back from the begining. As part of this Hitler never felt secure in his position. He felt that if he started asking the German people to sacrifice he would be overthrown. His philosophy was litterally one of ‘Guns and Butter’ by which he meant weapons and luxuries. So if Hitler had been willing to push a war economy earlier he might hae been better off.
Secondly various historians have pointed out a large number of strategic or tactical mistakes made by the Heer, Luftwafee and Kriegsmarine. If they were able to correct these mistakes they might have performed better than they did. On the flip side all forces in WWII made significant mistakes so it is unlikely to imagine a scenario where somehow the German forces somehow are perfect. It is also important to note that although historians believe Geramny made mistakes they often don’t agree what was a mistake and what wasn’t. Here are several points that may have changed fortunes.
1- Dunkirk. If Germany had been more agressive in reducing the Dunkirk pocket they may have bagged several hundred thousand British soldiers (ang quite a few French). This would have been a terrible shock to the British and may have resulted in the fall of the new Churchill government. If a new govenmant had been installed it would likely have been Chamberlinish in character and sued for peace. Instead Churchill got a successful evacuation which he was able to hold up as a victory of sorts. In addition they salvaged a good number of some of their best soldiers. Of course even if the Germans had reduced Dunkirk there are a lot of maybes in the scenario and in the long run it may ot have mattered. In addition the Geramans were still very concerned about the remainder of the French forces which might have been able to regroup. In any case the Germans could not have taken Dunkirk without casualties of their own so that remains an open question.
2- Crete. In Germanys early campaigns their paratroopers were an invaluable part of blitzkrieg. When Hitler decided Crete had to be taken in order to secure the southern flank the only/best troops that could do the job were the paratroopers. Although they did accompish the mission they were decimated. Germany was never able to rebuild their forces to acceptable levels and never used paratroppers in large formations again. Of course while paratroopers would have been very helpful in later campaigns numerically they were not very strong. So they could have only helped in limited situations. It is possible the could have speed up the capture of Sevastapol or could have instumental in capturing Stalingrad or Moscow. But they couldn’t solve issues like a 2000 mile front or done much against the flanking actions after Stalingrad and they would have been useless at Kursk. So even if the Germans had been more conservative and withheld them from Crete it may not have helped much.
3- Spring Barbarossa. The Germans got off to a slow start because they felt the need to cover their Southern flank and invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. Some felt that if Hitler had gotten off to an earlier start in Russia they could have taken Moscow before the snows fell. However it had been a wet spring so the German panzers would have bogged down in the mud possibly allow the Soviets the luxury of planning a response. In reality the Soviets were caught off gaurd and were never given a chance to catch their breaths and regroup. It may be that if the panzers had attacked in the mud and rain the Soviets could have stopped them much sooner than they did.
4- Many, many others. There are literly hundreds of such issues that might have helped the Germans like the previous comments however none of them are cut and dried and their significance is questionable. In the end on paper the German forces and the Soviets look fairly well matched. So it becomes very hard to point to any one thing as being able to swing the tide.
My conclusions? After haveing read a fair amount on the issue I don’t think the Germans could have forced the complete surrender of the Soviets. Had Soviet leadership been different or something the Germans proably could have forced a generous settlement. In no case do I think the Germans could have taken the Urals. Best case scenario (for the Germans) is proably the capture of Lenningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad with the line stabalizing aroung the Volga. This frees up forces in the North, secures the Baltic for German shipping and eliminates the route of about 1/4 of lend lease. It cuts out the political, industrial, comunications and transportation heart out of the Soviet Union. And it cuts the Soviets off from their primary oil supply.
Another decent “what if” book on how Germany could have won World War II is How Hitler Could Have Won World War II by Bevin Alexander. Alexander points out the countless strategical errors made by both sides in the war and his thesis seems to be that if Hitler had only been less, well for lack of a better word, Hitler-like, there would probably still be a German Empire taking up most of Central Europe today.
On the question of the invasion of the Soviet Union Alexander seems to agree, like Stolfi, that had Hitler concentrated his forces on a direct drive to Moscow, rather than the three pronged attack they did use, they would have overrun the city before winter, forcing Stalin to the east and knocking out the center of the Soviet’s communications, making further attacks towards the oil fields to the south much easier.
Luckily for the rest of the world, Hitler often refused to take military advice from his wiser generals. Had he given Rommell a few of the divisions that he threw into the invasion of Russia, Rommell would have likely been able to easily seize Egypt and the entire Middle East, turning the Meditterrenan in an Axis lake and providing for Germany and her allies an endless supply of oil, further pinching off the British. No one in the war did more with less than Rommell yet Hitler did not see the opportunities Rommell offered him. The seige of Stalingrad was an entirely pointless affair from a strategic sense, yet Hitler refused to allow the Sixth Army to fight out from the city once they were encircled, fating them to a completely demoralizing defeat. He refused to allow the army to go on the defensive after the initial drive ground to a halt, make Soviet counterattacks all the more damaging.
Regardless of whether Hitler could have seized Moscow or the oil fields of the Middle East I am quite sure that he would have never truly defeated Stalin. Stalin would have waged a war of attrition from beyond the Urals and I’m sure that any long-term Nazi occupation of Soviet territory would have been costly enough to allow a plausible British-American invasion of Western Europe at some point, though it surely would have to have happened late than June 1944…possibly waiting until after the Americans defeated the Japanese in the Pacific.
Which is another thing that Hitler did wrong. He need not have declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor…but that’s probably a whole different topic.
IIRC Hitler was obliged to declare war on the US due to treaty obligations with Japan. To be fair, Hitler probably didn’t think his declaration of war would amount to much anyway. The US had thus far mostly stayed out of the war and probably figured once the we were in it we’d mostly be concerned with defeating Japan. The declaration of war would also free his U-boats to unrestricted sinking of any American ships. Not that they had exactly been pulling their punches prior to this now they at least had the excuse to sink any thing they wanted without any pretense.
It seems to me there was only one ‘good’ answer for Hitler to attack Russia and that was through the Middle East. The Middle East was wide open and wouldn’t have stood a chance against Hitler’s armies. Punch through Syria, Iraq and Iran then turn north to hit the soft underbelly of Russia and nab the oil rich Caucasus. As these things go this would have been relatively easy for Germany to do at least up till they went after Russia.
This would have had numerous beneficial effects for Germany. It would have secured an ample oil supply for them. It would have deprived a lot of oil from the Allies hindering their efforts (especially Russia once the Caucusus were taken). It would have helped the Japanese by potentially scaring Indian, Burmese and British troops into diverting troops to defend against a potential German attack from the west. Actually, if German armies pushed through and linked with the Japanese in India somewhere Hitler would have had a huge chunk of the world in his hands and Russia almost completely bottled-up. The Japanese could divert troops back to the Pacific theater causing the US to divert more troops there thus lightening the load in Europe.
All of this combined would have helped an eventual Russian campaign immeasureably. Yes, this would have bought time for Stalin while Germany galavanted around the globe but I don’t think Stalin would have used that time to prepare for an attack from Germany as he was too busy purging his armies and sending his people to Gulags to bother with much else.
Not true. Germany had an obligation only if someone attacked Japan, not if Japan was the aggressor. Besides Hitler had a non-agression treaty with Stalin so you couldn’t trust Hitler to keep his treaty obligations.
It would have been a good idea except that Germany and Italy did not have the shipping to acomplish it. Rommel got literally everything that could be shipped to him. By the time he was stopped at El Alamain, he was at the end of a very, very long supply train. Libya was a bad enough place for logistics that trucks carrying supplies across Libya were breaking down so quickly that a significant portion of the shipments had to be truck parts. In all about 90% of the material sent to Libya was to keep the supply train moving. And only 10% was actual supplies for Rommel. Add that to the fact that everything including water had to be trucked in and their simply weren’t enough ships and trucks to provide Rommel with anything else. The British Commonwealth had both the material and cargo capacity to supply men and material at a much greater rate. Given these restraints invading the Caucasus from the South was just a dream for Hitler, not that he wasn’t trying to do exactly that. By the way this is a very good tactic in the game Axis & Allies but it is not a very good simulation of the real issues of WWII.
This is a much debated point. Hitler was rightly concerned that if he marched on and took Moscow without neutralizing the Soviet army and Ukrainian food and steel production, his army would find itself in Moscow with strong and well supplied armies on its flanks and would be forced to retreat in winter like Nepolean had. The belief was that the army had to be neutralized first and Ukraine captured before a successful campaign could be mounted on Moscow. In fact Hitler changed his mind, as was his wont, several times during the campaign. Some divisions were transfered from one army group to another several times before the Kiev pocket was neutralized and the drive on Moscow begain in earnest. It is possible that the Germans could have succeded in all three goals if they hadn’t had orders change so drastically, so frequently. But a drive on just Moscow might have left the Germans in an extremely exposed salient. In which case they would have been slaughtered in the Soviet winter campaign. So I disagree with Alexander here. Of course historians are very divided on this issue so I could be wrong. In my view a successful invasion of the Soviet Union would have had to acomplish four goals, with a fifth goal virtually impossible. The first four are capture of the grain and iron production in the Ukraine, neutralization of the baltic fleet with the capture of Lenningrad, elimination of the communication and transportation linchpin that was Moscow, and capture of the Baku oil fields or at least their neutralization with the capture of Stalingrad and Astrakhan. The fifth of course would be the capture of the Urals. Hitler actually did accomplish one of these. The other three he almost acomplished at one point or annother. Had the Germans been able to take and hold all four areas they probably would have won the war in the East. If the US and GB are still in however, Germany might still lose the war in the west depending on how much men and materials even a defeted USSR needed to pacify it.
