I misspoke, a slight correction - German panzer divisions were supposed to have a battalion each of Panthers and Pz-IVs, not a regiment of each.
Once you chaps have determined which is better, the T-34 or the Sherman, there are a few more things you have to consider.
How many of each design were in ETO in June, 1945?
What was the capacity of each side to produce each design in June, 1945?
What was the capacity of the United States, Britain and the Soviets to deliver those tanks to ETO, and how easily could the other side interdict those deliveries?
And then when you’re done worrying about that you also have to consider the hiccup in production which the “allies” would have experienced due to the United States cancelling a large number of its production orders for war machinery in early 1945. In a smaller sense, the United States (and most likely Britain as well) would have been repeating Hitler’s mistake of tangling with the Soviet Union before ramping up to a full wartime economy.
And every time this comes up I’ve been dying to compile an order of battle for all forces in Europe in 1945. Here is the Amercan OB. So far I have yet to find any others, but I do know this: in 1944 the United States scrapped its student-soldier program due to quality manpower shortages. The British were unable to do anything other than supply replacements for its army in Europe in 1944/45–they were tapped out. France had put together an army of perhaps six divisions by the end of the war? Other liberated nations in Europe could be expected to contribute less manpower than France.
My preliminary guess is that in the middle of 1945 the Red Army had the majority of its combat troops and equipment occupying Eastern Europe–probably over six million troops, judging by the 5.7 million deployed in the destruction of Army Group Centre in 1944. American troop strength in ETO was right around 3 1/2 million. I’m guessing here, but I highly doubt that the total available troop strength of the non-Soviet, non-American allies in Europe exceeded the number of American troops deployed there.
The result would have been an invasion with a roughly 1:1 troop strength ratio, with communist insurgency a known problem in some areas, fascist-type insurgencies a possibility elsewhere, and a supply line which extended some five thousand miles from the Great Lakes to Moscow. German troops killed Soviet troops at a ratio of somewhere between 2:1 and 3:1 over the course of the entire war, and it’s widely accepted that the Red Army was in a lot better shape at the end of the war than it was at the beginning. If the “allies” enjoyed a similar ratio of battlefield deaths I think the American and British war-dead figures could have easily doubled the actual figures.
I’m still working on it, but right now I feel confident enough to skip the “what if” part and unequivocably state that an attack against the Soviet Union in 1945 would have been a very, very bad idea.
Some raw production figures for the US and USSR 1939-45, US figures listed first:
Aircraft: 324,750 to 158,218
Tanks: 88,479 to 105,232
Artillery: 224,873 to 547,348
Major Naval Vessels: 8,812 to 161
Source is The Oxford Companion to World War II. Not by any means an indication of what was available in Central Europe in mid-45, but there it is.
Of course, before we even get into comparing T-34s/Shermans, airpower, manpower and such, we have to first ask the question: How and when do we end up fighting the Rooskies in the first place? It seems to me that the political question is critical. Are we imagining a Soviet sneak attack in 1948? Or no friendly link-up in 1945, but our troops start fighting even before Germany itself is completely conquered? Is Hitler already dead? How much of Germany have we occupied? Can we trust Nazi generals and politicians, or for domestic political reasons do we have to purge and de-Nazify the Wehrmacht first? Has Japan surrendered? If not, and we are fighting the Russians, would we even have a chance of occupying Japan? Do the allies strike first, betraying the Russians? Which side acheives strategic suprise? How many atomic bombs can the west deploy? Has either side begun demobilizing in anticipation of victory yet? How effective are communist fifth columnists in the west? Or pro-western fifth-columnists in the east?
Politically, I don’t think we could count on many pro-western partisans in eastern europe, Ukraine and Russia. Yes, there were many who welcomed the Germans at first. But then the Germans disabused them of such silly notions. And then the Germans lost and Stalin returned. Probably most of those who would have collaborated with the west were already dead by 1945. On the other hand, we could probably recruit a lot of Russian POWs who knew that Stalin would send them to the Gulag if they tried to go home.
My point being, that just like you can’t compare militaries in a giant tank arena, you can’t just line up armies and have them fight each other either. Political questions determine military outcomes. A western sneak attack on Russia is politically unsupportable, and could sap morale on our side and stiffen morale in Russia. And although the Russians had a totalitarian political system, the reverse might be true too. How many Russian divisions would defect to our side if Stalin ordered them to attack their allies? What sort of incidents would have to be manufactured to allow the war to take place?
And crucially, which side does the average Russian soldier EXPECT to win? Never mind what the logistics and manpower and such are, if the average Russian soldier expected or was lead to expect a Russian victory, it seems that a Russian victory is very likely. If the average Russian soldier can be convinced that the west is likely to win, the Russian military might collapse like a house of cards. In 1945 the Russians knew they would defeat Germany, and so they trusted their leadership unlike in the early days of Barbarossa.
Fun topic, but I’ve been out of this for far too dang long. Nevertheless, my $0.02.
I would dispute the Super Sherman as being “common”. From what I found, only 250 or so were in service. More likely a T34-85 (12,000+ produced) encounter would be with a M4A3 Sherman with a 75 or 76mm gun and much thinner armor. (It’s late, and since google searches are turning up a bunch of model kits and wargames I can’t pull up any numbers.)
Of course, then there’s the JS-I and JS-II series, with their 122mm guns, and the JS-III with even heavier armor, make things increasingly difficult even for the Super Sherman and the Pershing. (I’m not sure either of the latter can take out a JS-III frontally.)
Lost track of who said this:
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I’ve been looking around as requested but I am having a helluva time finding comparisons between the T-34 and the Sherman.
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“The Sherman Tank” by Rodger Ford apparently as a short reference to their service in Korea.
–Patch
The link from earlier in the thread lists the production at 4500 - most of which concentrated towards the end of the war, so that they’d become fairly common.
If we had continued Sherman production full blast in preparation for and during a war with the USSR, it most likely would’ve been that model. So, they were fairly common at the end of the war, and our industry would’ve been even further geared that way - so I feel confident in saying they’d be common in such a conflict.
I think it would need a vulnerable spot to penetrate frontally as the 90mm wasnt that good, it was inferior to the German 88L56 which would have struggled to penetrate. I dont really think these tank vs tank comparisons would have had much bearing on the overall war though. The biggest weapon in the Allied anti-tank arsenal would be their airpower destroying Soviet supply lines. An abandoned JSIII hurts no one.
I doubt either side could maintain the same productive effort they did in WW2. The Soviets would be suffering from needing to divert resources away from armaments to make up for the loss of lend-lease supplies. And the United states would go from a situation of numerical superiority during the war vs Germany (most of the Germans being off fighting Russia) to being grossly outnumbered by the Red Army. The US Army wasnt all that big in WW2, about 90 divs IIRC, its going to need to get bigger to fight Russia, and the manpower is going to have to come out of the labour force.
In my view the Allies would win but it would be bloody. Airpower and the atomic bomb would be ultimately decisive as would the cumulative war exhaustion of the Soviet Union.
Also in contrast to Lemur866 I think the Soviets may have suffered from major partisan problems. As it was nationalist guerilla forces remained in both the baltic states and the Ukraine after the German retreat. They werent finally quashed until 1949 in the baltics and Stepan Bandera’s guerillas held on in the Ukraine until 1953. We could reasonably expect a much bigger threat from them assuming allied air drops of supplies. Poland would be another source of partisan trouble for the Russians.
On the other side of the coin, much of the western european resistance movement was dominated by communists, and communism was at this time a significant mass force in France and Italy. So allied forces may also have encountered sabotage directed from Moscow. Greece as well for that matter, its historical civil war would be subsumed in the wider one.
It’s not an exact figure, and it’s from December 1944, but official US Army history states ‘not many’ 76mm armed M4s. IIRC the volume on The Final Offensive lists some figure on the number of Sherman Jumbos that had either been produced and shipped to the ETO or been field modified to more or less the same armor standard by arounf March 1945, but unfortunately that volume isn’t online. I don’t think the number was that great, likely in the low hundreds. To my knowledge the 75mm M4 remained in the substantial majority at the end of the war.
But the Soviets also has a strong air force by 1945, with their own line of ground attack fighters. Allied P-47s and P-51s flying uncontested across Soviet supply lines isn’t going to happen.
Now, I’ve always been more interested in tanks than in aircraft, so are there any WWII aviation buffs on the thread who can comment about aircraft numbers and capabilities?
–Patch
Words fail to describe how sick and tired I am of the message board eating my posts. 
I don’t believe the Jumbo Shermans are as common as you think. The numbers you’re referring to (4500+ production) are for the M4A3, with a 63mm frontal glacis plate. The up-armored Sherman (the Jumbo, or easy Eight) was more rare, with only 254 produced from 6/44 to 7/44. See:
http://us4tharmordiv.tripod.com/m4specs.htm
You can also check out:
http://www.combatmission.com/articles/usmedtanks/m4a1.asp
for more on Sherman development. In short, the T35/85 has the capability of popping a Sherman past 1500 yards. And we haven’t begun introducing the numerous other armored vehicles out there on both sides.
In any event, I think the question of air superiority needs a harder look for a US/USSR conflict in 1945. Both sides have long supply lines, and interdicting them would be a critical factor in the conflict.
If you’re proposing a conflict later, such as 1948 (maybe the Berlin Airlift starts the war), then the US would have higher numbers of Pershings and maybe heavy Shermans, but then, the Soviets would have a higher number of their heavy tanks as well. Can’t say it would be any easier.
–Patch
They did have a strong airforce , but it was weighted more towards ground attack , than towards air to air. By 1945 the majority of german fliers that were thrown into battle had too few hours in the seat and generally inexperienced in any dicipline.
In an aerial melee , casualties on both sides are going to be high, but between long range american bombers taking out factories, medium range bombers hunting airfeilds , and british and american fighter pilots , and possibly luftwaffe pilots , the red airforce is going to be degraded over six months , to back to flying out of dispersed airfields and surrendering the tactical control of the skies to the allies.
I also dont doubt that the allies could have put the V1 and 2 into production faster , and with more mature designs. The only reason the soviets got what they got ,was cause they were the first into Berlin , for the spoils of war. Between 1945 and when ever , they may not be given the luxury of reverse engineering and production, while american and british have the whole atlantic ocean to shield the american heartland.
For the person who asked how it would start , probably if the soviets were not going to stop at germany ,and keep going. I am pretty sure that someone had to be keeping an eye on them , in our time line , just to make sure that they were not just pausing before resuming the war.
Declan
Ok, my mistake. I was under the impression that those production numbers on the E8 were specifically for the E8, not M4A3.
Odd, though, because as far as I know, the M4A3 was the biggest model Sherman - out of 50,000 produced, it doesn’t seem that only 4500 would be M4A3s.
Regarding the availability of 76mm guns - I’ve read that in Jan. 45, give or take, they were around 1/4th to 1/3rd of the force, but by the end of the war, when you’d expect a Soviet conflict, they were up to roughly half the number of US Shermans there.
I can check on those figures later.
Well, even throwing away the E8, the M4A3(76)W+ (the plus meaning field armor kits added) was a pretty common tank, and a match for the T-34-85(44).
Indeed we were…The JB-2 “loon” was a U.S. built copy of the V1, reverse-engineered from a crashed “Buzz bomb.” We’d produced about 1000 by the time VJ Day came around, and they would have been used in the invasion of Japan.
I think a war with the Soviets in that time frame would of been won or lost in the air. I know there is a huge tank debate going on, but I maintain that dominance of the air would have been the key to winning or losing. The Soviets never faced a serious air threat that interdicted their logistics as well as their tactical deployments when they were on the offensive and pushing for Germany. By that time the Luftwaffer was a pale shadow of its former self, having been worn away by the allies.
Depending on how the war starts, I see the Americans, British, maybe French and reconstituted Germans on the defensive initially on the ground. Americas superior artillery would have been crucial during this time. While our ground forces were initially on the defensive, I see our air forces, combined with Britian and again Germany, maybe with French manpower as well, being used strategically to bomb factories and such (which I think the Russians would of countered with their deception and camoflage strategies eventually) and tactically to interdict supplies as well as to destroy army units moving towards the front. This would of been of far more importance…after all, its what we had done to the Germans (P51’s and such flying escort were basically turned loose on the homeward leg to seek targets of oppertunity). From what I remember this strategy was EXTREMELY effective against the Germans, maybe as important as the strategic bombing itself. I think the Russians would have fought us hard in the air, but that their own air force was less flexable, and also it was created with a different purpose in mind (it was more a tactical support for ground forces, not an air supremecy or strategic force as I recall). I think that, in the end, the allies air forces would have been too much for it…and once air superiority was the allies it would have been all over for the Russian army.
It might have taken years to finally conquer Russia (and maybe it would have never happened…maybe the allies AND the Russians would have sued for peace or at least a cease fire once the allies pushed the Russians out of Eastern Europe and back into Russia), but I just don’t see how the allies could have lost. In the end America’s relatively unhurt state (we suffered far fewer casualties than any of the other major allies…certainly far fewer than the Russians did), our massive industrial capacity (I can’t believe this is even an issue…how can anyone think that Russia could compete with America for industrial output??), coupled with the fact that America would have been relatively free to develop all kinds of new toys while the Russians would have had to concentrate their resources on more incremental developments (better prop planes instead of Jets, better unguided rocket artillery instead of long range heavy rockets, no atomic program, etc etc).
My only ‘proof’ of the above bullshit is history, and the knowledge that if Stalin had of thought he could win, he certainly would have tried. As he would have been overjoyed to possess ALL of Germany, and the rest of Europe to boot, but did not in fact push the allies militarily, I can only assume that he, at least, didn’t feel he could win at that time against the other allies.
Well, thats just my opinion though…I could CERTAINLY be wrong. 
Great debate BTW.
-XT
DOn’t forget, you’ve got another 7,000 M4A3’s armed with 75mm and 105mm guns. And with the M4A1(76)W and M4A2(76)W, you have another 6,500 Sherman’s armed with a 76mm gun.
A bit over half the Shermans in the ETO at the end of the war were armed with the 76mm gun.
–Patch
By the same token, the American and British were in the same boat. Both sides were accustomed to controlling the air over their supply lines.
Given that most of the Soviet production reachable by American/British bombers had been overrun and destroyed by the Germans in the previous years, this wouldn’t be that effective. Plus, Germany was able to keep their productions levels up in spite of large scale bombing. More important targets would be the transporation infrastructure (rail networks/bridges) and airfields…
…which you now point out. 
The Soviet Union mustered over 6,000 tanks and 41,000 artillery pieces for the Battle of Berlin. Imagine those forces mustered for an offensive to punch through Western lines. Control of the air would be very critical in such a war.
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I think the Russians would have fought us hard in the air, but that their own air force was less flexable, and also it was created with a different purpose in mind (it was more a tactical support for ground forces, not an air supremecy or strategic force as I recall).
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But how much damage could they have inflicted upon the Western armies before they lost control of the air? Coupled with their massed artillery and tank formtions, they could have torn rather large holes in the Western lines.
I think the best that could be hoped for would be a rough stalemate within Germany, holding until late 1945 when America drops the atomic bomb on Japan. A cease fire is arranged either soon after, when Stalin realizes what he’s up against, or later that year, when they are used against Soviet cities.
This is an interesting debate. Wish it had occurred 15 years ago when I was up more on WWII armaments.
–Patch
The Luftwaffe was able to achieve local air superiority to some small degree pretty much up to the very end, but the USSR was on the offensive against Germany non-stop from mid 1943 and in an on again/off again fashion from late 1941. On the whole, the Luftwaffe took a pretty substantial beating from the Red Air Force as well as from strategic bombing.
**I agree wholeheartedly with patchbunny about the lack of factories to target. Rail lines and transportation infrastructure would have been a more likely target.
In regards to conquering Russia and the US having a relatively unhurt state – I’ve said before in this thread that too much of the OP depends on the how, why and when the war starts. Assuming an unprovoked surprise invasion of Western Europe by the USSR, the US would probably have been willing to accept very heavy casualties, though it would have been many times what World War II actually took. Less than that, and the US public might have been more willing to accept a stalemate rather than total victory. Regarding industrial output, I’ve already provided a reliable cite on armaments output by the US and the USSR during World War II. The USSR out produced the US in tanks and artillery, but was out produced by the US in airplanes and naval vessels. General US industrial output was greater than that of the USSR, but not as great as you might think. The US needed a large navy and merchant fleet during the war to defeat the U-boats in the Atlantic, to defeat Japan, and to move all that material to distant theaters. The USSR did not.
To effectively fight Russia, the US would have to drastically expand the size of the army. US doctrine was to keep divisions as close to full strength as possible by providing large number of replacements, but this system was strained while fighting Germany due to underestimations of the numbers of replacements that would be needed, particularly amongst the infantry. A large batch of air corps pilot candidates was shifted to the infantry during the war, as were a large number of the essentially superfluous personnel in the overly large number of anti-aircraft units created at a time when control of the skies wasn’t so certain. The number of divisions created has been questioned by some – it might have made more sense to create a larger number of them and not attempt to keep them entirely close to paper strength. To fight into Russia and cover the enormously larger frontage, more divisions would have been needed.
Also bear in mind with the air ,and to a certain extent the land campaign, where were the soviets getting their gas from, both avgas for the airforce , plus diesel for the army.
What works for the soviets also hinders them, their roads are crap ,and their rail lines are few. To continue an offensive ,the russians need gas , take that out , it grinds to a halt.
It also afflicts the allied side as well, but to a lesser degree with better logisitic as well as any persian gulf oil that may be tapped, this could be the other front in the new war , with the soviets heading into iran.
Declan
Why assume the war is predicated upon a soviet attack? The reverse is possibly more likely and Churchill in May 1945 had his staff prepare a plan for an allied attack on the soviets. It was called Operation Unthinkable which gives an inkling of how the planners assessed its likelihood of victory. Its interesting to see how we have assessed allied prospects with hindsight compared to their contemporary gloomy assessments.
Some extracts from the report:
“Superior handling and air superiority might enable us to win the battle, but there is no inherent strength in our strategic position and we should, in fact, be staking everything upon the tactical outcome of one great engagement.”
“If we are to embark on war with Russia, we must be prepared to be committed to a total war, which would be both long and costly”
“Our numerical inferiority on land renders it extremely doubtful whether we could achieve a limited and quick success, even if the political appreciation considered that this would suffice to gain our political object.”
“As regards Strategic Air Forces, our superiority in numbers and technique would be to some extent discounted by the absence of strategical targets compared to those which existed in Germany, and the necessity for using these strategic air forces to supplement our tactical air forces in support of land operations.”
“Our views, therefore, that once hostilities began, it would be beyond our power to win a quick but limited success and we should be committed to a protracted war against heavy odds”
Some information on Unthinkable
here
Russia was by and large self sufficient in oil, though it did receive supplies of it from the US via lend-lease. There was very little oil being pumped out of the Persian gulf area in the 1940’s, the discovery and drilling for the oil didn’t happen until later. The US was actually the largest producer of oil in the world at the time, with most of the oil coming from Texas. Iran was already spilt between the USSR and the Western allies, it had been occupied during the war to provide a route for lend-lease supplies to flow through.
70% of Lend Lease was sent through Iran. Again, I’d argue that Soviet logistics were not much worse than that of the Western Allies.