I don’t know where you got your information from- but this is not correct:
Later, the British appointed a complete incompentent (Gen. Birdwood, AKA “Birdbrain”) to command the operation-his bumbling lead to missed opportunities and more losses.
Birdwood commanded the ANZAC troops and did so from the beginning. Sir Ian Hamilton was in overall charge of the operation, until replaced by Sir Charles Monro.
Birdwood was considered affectionately by his troops and was known as “Birdie” rather than “Birdbrain”.
Could the operation have succeeded? I suppose which part- the battleships forcing the Dardenelles and bombarding parts of Constantinople. It is hard to envisage that succeeding.
Even if you disregard the warning given by the attempts to force the Narrows, the purchase of local boats to assist in the landing (no landing craft as such- and of course news of the purchases could not be kept quiet), the landing at the wrong beaches. You possibly need to consider what may have been achieved with a more forceful commander in the landings at Suvla bay in August 1915.
As an aside, you may like to read “Gallipoli- The End of The Myth” by Robin Prior. It argues that the landings were never intended to succeed. I don’t agree with the book but it does give a different angle.
I read that at the time they gave up on a purely naval solution, the defensive cannon were severely damaged and almost out of ammunition. So, stopping to regroup allowed the defenders to repair and rearm. If what I read was true, then it’s possible that a day or more of bombardment could have achieved a purely naval solution, if there were no more strongpoints between the Dardanelles and Constantinople, which I don’t know about, either.
Some reports state that the Turkish heavy weapons were almost out of ammunition and another day of trying to force the Dardanelles would have seen the fleet through. What I can’t understand is why the thought of a fleet with no army component would make the Turks surrender. They still had a large army and the ships could not blockade forever.
In the days of sail perhaps. Even then they needed victualling ships. Maybe you could suggest how these predreadnoughts were to be coalled? A number of battleships could force the Dardenelles. there was nothing to stop the Turks rearming the Narrows and laying more mines to bottle up the ships.
The concept that the Turks would immediately surrender on the appearance of these ships belongs to a bygone era.
The Ottoman Empire was not held in especially high regard by most of the European powers- it had long been known as “The Sick Man of Europe”. So there probably was at least some expectation that the Turks would give up when British and French Dreadnoughts showed up at the Dardanelles.
You have to remember that from the 1860s to WWI, most of the wars the British had been involved in tended to be against Native Peoples like the Zulu and the Maori and the Mahdists, with the odd skirmish against the French and the Boers thrown in. For the most part, sending in a Dreadnought and a couple of Maxim guns was a fairly effective way of dealing with conflicts involving people that… well, didn’t have Dreadnoughts or Maxim guns.
The irony is that in the end the Ottoman Empire collapsed as a result of their involvement in WWI- even though the Gallipoli landings were an unparallelled disaster, the rest of the Palestinian Campaign went pretty well for the Allies, and Australia and New Zealand consider the trenches at Gallipoli to be the place where their National Identity (separate from Britain) was born.
Do you think this problem was somehow unknon or impossible? The creation of coaling stations was standard practice in wartime. The United States created a much larger blackade (with a more vulnerable, but shorter supply line). There are a lot of islands in the Med, and Britain would not find it difficult or objectionable to fortify one a supply base.
Seriously, that is the weakest objection I could possible imagine someone bringing up.
I’m not trying to insult you, but are you just skimming my posts? I said they could do so. It was standard practice for running long-distance naval operations. This is not some amazing wild concept, but what had been done before numerous times. Second, they didn’t have to crete them in the Sea of Marmara. Naval technology was capable of maintaing supply some distance away in much safer waters, although with a blockade and naval superiority it wouldn’t have been impossible to put one there.
Okay- let’s get back to basics- and I apologise to the OP as from reading the starting post I believe he was talking more of the military invasion of what is now referred to as Gallipoli.
Just as you know, I have a library of books on the operation. I do not claim to be a historian, or an expert- but I do know the details of the operation. I have not studied it from a Turkish perspective.
You maintain that it was possible to maintain a blockade.
Your arguments runs:
Do you think this problem was somehow unknon or impossible? The creation of coaling stations was standard practice in wartime. The United States created a much larger blackade (with a more vulnerable, but shorter supply line). There are a lot of islands in the Med, and Britain would not find it difficult or objectionable to fortify one a supply base.
Firstly the operation was not a blockade (I introduced that word and that was my bad but I didn’t really expect an argument that it could be done.). Churchill believed that “a naval expedition arriving off Istanbul would occasion a collapse of the Young Turk regime and secure peace” (From Admirals). So the problem was not addressed and was virtually impossible if carried out in front of Istanbul. As it turned out a squadron of battleships could not force the Dardenelles. However you seem to maintain that colliers would be able to travel up and down from secure islands in the Mediterranean and achieve this- when both shores were controlled by Turks with fortresses minefields, torpedos and swift currents. Turkey also had two powerful and modern ships in it’s navy which were transferred from Germany and although sailing under a Turkish flag had German crew.
I have no idea what blockade you are talking about regarding the USA- perhaps you would be able to provide details? The UK and allies maintained a “distant” blockade of the North Sea during WW1 and this eventually bought Germany to the point of collapse but the entire Grand Fleet could not maintain a close blockade due to mines, sub marines and the German Fleet. I would point out that such a blockade was probably illegal but the USA accepted it- it was not as barbaric as sinkings by Uboats etc.
Finally, if a blockade had to be maintained it could be maintained outside the Dardenelles without risking entry. The Allies commanded the Mediterranean and whilst this would not have stopped coastal traffic in the Sea of Marmara, Turkey had no vital overseas links. She was not industrialised as Germany was and did not depend on the same quantity of imports and exports.
If you have any further points I would be happy to address them but please make them precise not just a broad statement.
A slight hijack, but is there any recognition by the British that their WWI General Staff was among the least competent military leadership of all time? That these men are to blame for the loss of so many of their own people?
For starters, I made mine a damn sight more specific than any you posted then or now. I’m not here to do your thinking for you.
First, I know they didn’t try a blockade. However, they had the capability of operating one. The long distances were not intrinsically impossible to overcome. The only thing which was not practical was blockading the entire north of Anatolia. However, this is not necessary, either. Germany did not have any significant sea assets there and neither Germany nor Turkey could practically maintained useful shipping there.
As a comparions, I noted the vastly larger and more difficult U.S. Civil War blockade, which involved maintaining a blockade of numerous major ports protectd by significant defenses and/or complex channels and inlets, stretching from Virginia to Texas. After the fall of Sumter, the United States had precisely one inadequate base o the wrong side of Florida. Despite this, they established naval superiority (a far bigger task than England’s problems) and shut down those ports one by one.
Britain would have had to maintain a blockade to prevent any shipping or communication though the straights. It could certainly create a supply base to allow a fleet to maintain itself there, and it would of course have ahd to guard some distance north and south of the straight. But it was certainly possible, since heavy shipping required significant port facilities even then. It does not have to guard every inch of the straight - only where transports can practically cross.
The clear and unambiguous purpose of the blockade would have been to effectively cut off any resources from flowing to Germany from the Turkish-influenced or dominated areas in the Middle East, which even then was an important aid. It might also have effectively distracted the Turkish government, making it easier for Britain to affect events (or, in other words, to gain access to those resources themselves). And it would have cut of Istanbul from the rest of Turkey! (Attaturk moved the capital to Ankara in '23)
There is a book by Robin Neillands called “The Generals of the Great War” where he argues that the British Generals were not bad. Mind you he uses a rather strange logic- he says that the theory is that all British generals were donkeys. He then uses arguments to show that some were good and says therefore that logic is wrong. However he only covers virtually the corps commanders who you would expect to be the best- not other generals who really were awful (not all of them of course).
Smiling Bandit, your previous posts contained very few details. You only now state wwhich American blockade you were talking of- it could have been the Second World War for all a reader knows.
I’ll let them speak for themselves.
My argument is that Istanbul (as it is now) could be blockaded by a force outside of the Dardenelles. There was no need for a blockade to be enforced inside and it was NOT possible. I note you have not answered how this can be done). You may have isolated Istanbul temporarily but there was still a rail network that could have been used. It would not have cut off Istanbul from the rest of Turkey.
It’s generally acknowledged by most Military Historians that the WWI British Leadership was… Deeply Flawed, especially as they were trying to fight 19th Century Wars in a modern age.
For example, in 1915, the British Expeditionary Force asked for more machine-guns. The official response was “Get the men to fire their rifles faster”. The SMLE Mk III rifle is indeed the fastest operating bolt-action rifle ever issued, but it’s still no substitute for a Vickers or a Lewis gun. In the early stages of the War they were using mounted cavalry (and continued to do so in the Palestinian theatre all the way through), The British discouraged snipers as being “unbecoming” (which didn’t stop Canadian or ANZAC forces using them), and RFC/RNAC/RAF pilots weren’t issued parachutes to ensure they didn’t get any ideas about bailing out instead of fighting the Germans (there aren’t enough rolleyes in the world for that one).
As I mentioned earlier, the problem was that the British had very little experience in Trench warfare or fighting equally well trained and equipped soldiers and most of the people who were at the sharp end and in a position to suggest and effect improvements were dead by 1916.
The whole thing was an unmitigated disaster, but the realisation that the British really were quite content to order near-suicidal trench charges in what Captain Blackadder described as “A gargantuan effort to move General Haig’s drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin” was one of the many reasons that Australian and NZ troops started to become a bit more independent and move away from their previous identities “South Seas Poms”, so to speak.
Not demonstrably more so than any other participant’s leadership of the time.
Correction: in the early stages of the war they HAD mounted cavalry, always awaiting to exploit that breakthrough that never came. As it was realised it was a futile hope, they turned them into desperately-needed infantry. What are you suggested should have happened? That they correctly guess in 1914 that cavalry was suddenly useless after thousands of years of usefulness, including in the American Civil War 50 years before and the Boer War 15 years before?
And they continued to use cavalry in Palestine “all the way through” precisely because it was useful there, vis the Australian Light Horse.
First I’ve heard of this. Cite?
Name one other airforce of the time that did issue parachutes. Answer: none did.
How does any of this differ from any other participant?
As were all the others.
The reality is that NO-ONE in 1914/15 knew how to effectively prosecute the aggressive side of trench warfare. Aside from command failures, there simply wasn’t the concentration of artillery and ammunition for it, nor had the necessary firing protocols been developed. On the Western front the Allies copped it the worst as the onus was on them to attack, and the Germans had the high ground (and were, arguably, better soldiers). On balance the British commanders were no worse than any other.
But to return to the topic of the OP: Command failures at every level (virtually all British) unquestionably contributed to the pitiful showing at Gallipoli, but even with the best land and sea commanders in the world, and perfect operation security, the overwhelming likelihood is the operation would have failed to even occupy the Gallipoli peninsula, let alone the fantasy of it forcing Turkey out of the war somehow.
Just a very slight nitpick, the Australian Light Horse weren’t really cavalry- they were mounted infantry intended to fight dismounted (though at Beersheeba this clearly didn’t happen during the charge.
As regards pilots not getting parachutes to stop them bailing out (Martini Enfield) and Askance then indicating no air force did issue them, it seems that the main reason they weren’t issued was that parachutes at that time were too bulky for scout aircraft. The German airforce started selectively issuing parachutes in the spring of 1918 and the British shortly thereafter.
Quote from Gallipoli by Alan Moorehead (in respect to the forcing of the Dardenelles by the battleships). The thoughts of Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the ground forces:
" “Suppose the fleet could get through with the loss of another battleship or two- how the devil would the troopships be able to follow? And the storeships? And the colliers?”
De Robeck (Admiral in charge of the fleet) “How long could the Fleet remain isolated in the Marmara without coal and ammunition; and with the Goeben still intact? A fortnight? Three weeks?”
From Castles of Steel by Massie (Paraphrasing De Robeck):
“With the Turks holding both sides of the Straits, how long could the Fleet remain isolated in the Sea of Marmara starved of coal and ammunition? What would happen to Hamilton’s troopships and the thousands of men on board if their supply lines ran through a narrow strait dominated by enemy guns? And what about Goeben? With Inflexible damaged de Roebeck would only have old battleships, none of which was fast enough to catch the German battle cruiser”
There is no place in the Straits that a ship cannot be fired upon from either side. The Turks commanded both sides.