When the Brits got into the war, they started pouring a lot of men’s blood into the same trench-lines the Germans and French had established. Why play that game? Britain was still the world’s greatest sea power. It could move troops – and supplies – to any shore. Why not invade by way of Germany’s north coasts and march on Berlin, or something? If they failed to make progress, they could at least force the Germans to a three-front war.
Because the German Navy was the second most powerful navy in the world at the start of the war, and was based in the portion of the German coast between Holland and Denmark, both of which were neutral during the war.
Also, that area was heavily fortified and mined. They would have been sailing into the teeth of the German Fleet and its naval defenses.
We’ve done this one before but to recap:
[ul]
[li]There was the little matter of the German Fleet. The Battle of Jutland confirmed that Britain and Germany were stalemated at sea: the German fleet could not break out of the North Sea into the Atlantic, and Britain could not attack Germany’s coastline.[/li][li]In addition to it’s fleet, Germany had extremely strong coastal defenses- minefields, shore artillary and iirc torpedo boats.[/li][li]There was a tentatively planned invasion but the land stalemate was broken by the time it was ready.[/li][/ul]
From what I’ve read, Churchill wanted to do this (yeah, same ol’ Winston Churchill who ran Britain during WWII… In WWI, he was First Sea Lord or something impressive…)
Trouble is, Germany had a gigantic battle fleet, right smack dab in the way. The British could never be sure it wouldn’t sally forth and sink all their transports.
In hindsight, we know that both fleets were somewhat paper tigerish – when they did clash at Jutland, it wasn’t really decisive. (Strategically so, as the Germans rested in port for the remainder of the war…) But at the time, no one dared run that kind of gauntlet.
The Heligoland Bight was mined to absurdity, established bridgeheads from amphibious assaults against industrialized nations of equal output is near impossible and Britain didn’t have local naval superiority.
There was talk of involving The Netherlands whether they wanted it or not, but was deemed to risky.
Regarding the Baltic coast of Germany, it was inaccessible without violating Danish neutrality. The Danes mined these passages shortly after the start of the war, and almost certainly would not have granted passage to the Briitish.
Even if an invasion fleet did force its way through, keeping an invasion force supplied through such restricted and hostile waters would have been impossible.
Midway through 1918 the RN did actually try naval raids on Zeebrugge in Belgium, but it wasn’t terribly successful.
There was a constant tension between different strategists over whether the war could be won in France or through the opening of multiple other fronts elsewhere, but after fiascos like Gallipoli that argument died.
Inaccurate.
The three passages bordering Denmark had been international waterways open
to both civilian and military traffic since the 1857 Copenhagen Convention.
Impossibile.
It would surely have been a violation of international law for a neutral to mine
an international waterway.
And even if it had been legal Denmark would not have wanted to chance inciting
the wrath of any of the several much stronger warring powers by sinking any of their
ships. This would have applied especially to Germany, with which Denmark shared
a land border.
Numerous Russian Empire ports would have been available at least until 1917.
However, I do think an RN Baltic incursion would have been much too hazardous
to consider. The Germans might have been able to use the Kiel Canal to obtain
local dominance over the RN Baltic squadron. They might also have been able
to occupy Denmark, closing the exit door behind the RN Baltic squadron. If not
that then submarines would have made RN ingress and egress difficult or impossible.
Germany had a strong submarine force, which was mis-played during the battle of Jutland. I imagine subs could have been used (in addition to the other naval assets mentioned) against an invading British fleet, especially being close to home. Just too dam many Jerrys in the way.
Thanks for the lead to the Copenhagen Convention of 1857. I did some looking into it and it is not entirely settled even today that it applies to naval vessels, and is still a matter of dispute and debate. It seems that the focus of that convention was more the elimination of the toll (the “Sound Dues”) that Denmark had previously collected on shipping through the Danish Straits. Apparently it is the Danish government’s position today that the Convention only applies to merchant shipping, not naval shipping.
In any case, I suspect that even if the Convention applies, a distinction is made between allowing the passage of individual or small groups of up to three warships with prior notification and permission (under the concept of “innocent passage”), versus allowing a large invasion force to sail freely into Danish waters without Danish permission, which certainly would not have been granted not only because of Denmark’s desire not to upset its neighbor to the south, but also because it would not be clear to the Danes that the target of the invasion fleet was not to seize Danish territory.
It may be “impossible,” but that is exactly what Denmark did. Germany made this exact demand on Denmark on August 5th, 1914, and Denmark began mining the straits within a few days, basically to appease Germany.
In addition to all the reasons listed above: amphibious invasions are really difficult. Think about the level of preparation and planning involved in D-Day, and imagine trying to do that not over a fifty or sixty mile stretch of water, but rather two to three hundred miles. The Allies had tried several amphibious invasions already in the war: Tanga, which was a disaster, and Gallipoli, which was even worse. Both of those landings were first-class Allied troops invading places guarded by third-class armies, and the Allies were thrashed both times. By the end of the war, the British command was pretty unlikely to try landing against a heavily defended target.
So suppose you land an allied army in Hamburg. Now what? What is your waterlogged unsupplyable army going to do to the Germans in Germany that the allied armies haven’t been able to do on land in France? Let’s hope the Germans didn’t just march straight into Paris while you were busy with your amphibious invasion of unprecendented size. They almost did that the first time around after all, and probably would have succeeded the second time were it not for massive American intervention.
WWII: Why didn’t the Japanese invade Oregon by sea?
The Allies did - indirectly. Gallipoli on the Dardanelles. It didn’t work out too well.
Total Allied deaths were 43,000 British 15,000 French 8,700 Australians, 2,700 New Zealanders and 1,370 Indians. Total Turkish deaths were around 60,000. New Zealanders suffered the highest percentage of Allied deaths.
New Zealand and Australia commemorate this every 25th April.
Lest we forget.
Officially second anyway. At the time, the U.S. was most likely the practical second-place runner. Germany’s status came from its really big ships IMHO, which proved to be only semi-effective. The real importance of the fleet was not its “power,” but the fact that destroying it would cost the British more than they could afford, or at least were willing, to lose.
The Germans knew they would get obliterated if they actually tried to take the British all-out, which is why Admiral Tirpitz never really tried. Much like Kaiser Wilhelm, he was a man of immense bluster and erratic follow-through.
Fisher did have a scheme to make amphibious landings in the Baltic, but Germany, operating on interior lines of communication with the railways intact, was always going to be able to reinforce more rapidly than any invasion force would be able to do.
Are you seriously asking this? Because the rest of your post basically answers it. The shortest possible line of supply from Japan to Oregon is 5,000 miles long and passes directly by the Aleutians, which American had fortified against just such an eventuality. Landing troops on American soil would trigger a massive American shift toward the Pacific war and draw lots of additional American ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There was no way for a Japanese army in Oregon to be supplied in the long run, and such an army would be slaughtered by American troops whose supply lines are extremely short and American partisans who would harass such an army anywhere they went. The only positive thing that an invasion of the West Coast would accomplish would be a big distraction from the rest of the Pacific war, and any forces committed would be lost in their entirety as KIA and POW. It was feared at the time, but it was never actually very likely.
No, he wasn’t.
Didn’t the Japanese land troops in the Aleutians?
I have spent about an hour googling but cannot find a site with the 1857 CC text.
According to the following citeArticle I of the Convention states (emphasis added):
“No vessels shall henceforth, under any pretext, be subject, in its passage of the
Sound or Belts to any detention of hinderance”.
Elsewhere the Wiki articles dealing with the subject specify that the convention
pertains “to all military and commercial shipping”.
This is correct. I was suprised that Germany did not simply carry out such
operations itself, but it did in fact demand that Denmark do so, and Denmark
complied. The Danish King directed the operation, and sought to decieve
Germany by laying defused mines. The Admiral in charge misunderstood and
did not defuse the mines, leading to the UK being the decieved party when
the King sent a secret message to it wrongly promising that the mines were
defused. Luckily for the UK it did not attempt any major Baltic operations.
See Google books: “The Danish Straits and German Naval Power 1905-1918”.
Yes. Hilarity ensued.
Well, not for the Japanese. You can read up on it from Wikipedia if you like. It was an unpleasant campaign for all involved, and the Japanese were gruesomely crushed.