Could the Texans have held the Alamo?

I discovered (from these boards, no less) that Napoleon wanted a 4-to-1 advantage when attacking a fortified position. It certainly puts some of those heroic stands in a new light, but what about the Alamo?

If 1600 Mexicans participated in the assault against the 180-something defenders, 8-to-1 is very tough odds for defense. But I read somewhere that the defenders had better rifles and more cannons than the attackers, plus the Mexicans were poorly trained.

Were the overwhelming numbers of the Mexicans enough, or did the defenders mess up in their defensive works and strategy? Could they have held out? Was the outcome or foregone conclusion, or could the defense have been better directed?

At San Jacinto, the Texans won with similar numerical disadvantages, which may say a lot about the quality of the Mexican army and leadership.

First off, the numbers given for both San Jacinto and the Alamo are wrong. The numerical disadvantage of the Texians at San Jacinto was more like 2-1, and there were around 6,000 Mexicans besieging the Alamo, against around 250 defenders.

Second, the defense of the Alamo was actually as good as it could be, given the number of defenders. What errors there were were twofold: Defending it in the first place with the numbers they had (it had no real strategic significance, and probably would have required 500-600 defenders for its size at the minimum), and the failure to obtain any assistance, either from Fannin at Goliad or from Houston, who was then attending the Texas Constitutional Convention.

As for advantage: The point I’ve seen is that the Texians at the Alamo had around four guns per man, resulting in them, at first, having a rapid rate of fire when the events of March 6th started.

(As for information on the battle, I own (and recommend) this book)

As Governor Quinn pointed out, it’s not just a ratio of attackers to defenders. A fortification of any given size needs enough defenders to adequately man its defenses. The Alamo defenders didn’t have enough men so they were spread out too thin. When the Mexicans attacked there were inevitably weak spots where they were able to break through the defenses.

The point Texans don’t like to mention is that was absolutely zero tactical or strategic reason to defend the Alamo at all. Wasted effort that just made martyrs.

IIRC, the Texans had no warning the Mexicans were coming, and the Mexicans had the Alamo surrounded almost as soon as the defenders were aware of their presence. They couldn’t retreat to join the main Texan forces, escape was cut off. Surrender and death were the only options. What should they have done?

People were moving into and out of the Alamo almost until the final battle. There was no purpose to be served trying to defend it, and retreat was possible until fairly late in the engagement. Hell, 32 men managed to make it into the Alamo on March 1st. The Alamo did serve as a delay to the Mexican forces, but that was all. A waste of resources, no matter what the Texans try to say about it.

-silenus (half Texan on his mother’s side)

From Wikipedia, it said about 1400-1600 actually took part in the assault. But it might’ve been updated by now.

IIRC, the point of defending the Alamo was not to save any strategic advantage but to blunt and slow the Mexican attack. In theory, it gave the Texans more time to organize. But I may recall incorrectly.

The Alamo Defenders worked pretty well as a speed bump. The Texians at the Goliad Presidio tied up General Urrea’s forces–for a while. They surrendered, but Santa Ana sent orders they be executed anyway. Thus, the “Runaway Scrape”–in which Texian settlers fled East as fast as possible. But Sam Houston & his forces stopped Santa Ana–assisted mightily by the arrogance of “The Napoleon Of The West.”

I had two years of Texas History in school, but have continued my education. (Of course, Walt Disney had already introduced me to Davy Crockett.)Here’s one account of the Alamo affair. Some reviewers bristle at “Revisionism”–probably those who never got past the Disney/John Wayne versions of the story. But I found it evenhanded. And here’s a fine modern history of the whole Texas Revolution.

The San Jacinto Battleground hosts an annual commemoration of the Battle. (Last Saturday–I missed it again!) Re-enactors represent both sides. A concurrent symposium discusses slavery, Indian relations & other topics far beyond Walt. And all who died there are memorialized. A handful of Texians died, but the Mexican forces were massacred with cries of “Remember the Alamo” & “Remember Goliad.”

Santa Anna (who ordered “No Quarter” at the Alamo & ordered the massacre at Goliad) disguised himself & fled. When he was captured, General Houston allowed him to live. So he went on to do more damage to Mexico in his long & checkered career.

Sorry for the verbosity. But Texas History is interesting–once you realize that what they teach in school is not the whole story. (But it never is, is it?)

I suspect this common point of view is mostly post-battle justification. Obviously, there’s no way the Alamo can be spun as a Texas victory. And nobody wants to say that the Alamo defenders died for nothing. So the easiest thing is to claim that their defeat was a necessary sacrifice to the bigger picture of winning the war.

I was under the impression that Travis and others made repeated pleas for help and reinforcements and were continually ignored.

Well, no-one expects the Spanish expedition.

Travis’s pleas for help came after the Alamo was besieged. But Texans had warning that Santa Anna was on the way.

From the Handbook of Texas.

(General Cos lost the original Battle of San Antonio.) The Battle of the Alamo was “necessary” neither for the Texans nor for Santa Anna.

Previously I recommended Texian Iliad: A Military History of the Texas Revolution. The writer explains the somewhat overblown title by comparing the skirmishes in Texas to that obscure Bronze Age disagreement. In both cases, the legends are probably bigger than the actual battles.

(“Texian” is now often used to refer to the Anglo rebels. Mostly because there were many Tejanos who also fought against Santa Anna.)

By the way–I don’t think there’s any way the Texans (whatever you choose to call them) could have won the Battle of the Alamo.

Well, beseiged forces are always playing for time; the undoubtedly intended to bloody Santa Anna’s nose. Given the disp[arity in forces, I assume they didn’t not plan on winning in an all-out assault. But the fact that they stayed when they could have run implies that they were trying to win advantage in the larger conflict. They probably didn’t expect the massacres; they probably didn’t expect an all-out assault.

This kind of thinking is pretty common. Beseiged forces, if they can make an assault too costly (and the Mexican attack was way too costly), can force a long seige in which the attacker has more to lose - momentum, deaths due to illness, supplies, favorable weather. Meanwhile, the defender’s allies can assemble a relieving force to reinforce the garrison, drive off the defenders, or pin them against the fortress.

Mind you, it was a loss for Texas. It was simply a much greater one for Santa Anna.

A good number might have been able to sneak out, but that would have left the cannons in the hands of the Mexicans. The defenders had 18 cannon, including an 18# monster. Leaving the canno there would have doubled Santa Ana’s artillery train in one fell swoop.

Cannon can be spiked. Nope, the Texans were just being stubborn.

As usual. :smiley:

But in order to be a part of a plan it has to be part of a plan. Sam Houston wasn’t basing any plans around the defense of the Alamo - he had in fact told the defenders to abandon the Alamo and was probably unaware it was still be defended at the time the battle was going on.

The Master had something to say about this

http://www.straightdope.com/classics/a1_104.html

Although it was clearly not Houston’s intent (see Little Nemo’s post) , the defeat at the Alamo and at Goliad served to distract Houston’s army and give them a fighting spirit that they had lacked up to that point. Many of them were disgruntled with Houston’s leadership and ready to leave up to that point.

I may have the time line wrong on this next point, but didn’t the presence of the Texans at the Alamo cause Santa Anna to split his army? If Houston had met up with a unified Mexican army at San Jacinto, the results may have different. If he had met up with the group led by Cos, Santa Anna would not have been captured and the war would have continued.

I can only speculate on this, but what impact did the large number of casualties have on the remainder of the Mexican soldiers by the time they reached San Jacinto? Do you think their willingness to fight for Santa Anna could have been diminished by the senseless siege on the Alamo. “This guy’s an egotistical idiot. He’s going to get us all killed. If we surrender, maybe they’ll let us go home.” Of course, that thinking was wrong, too.

So, the battle of the Alamo (IMHO) had a strategic impact on the outcome of the war, albeit by accident.

Well, I got my impression from Michael Lind’s book-length epic poem, The Alamo, and its appendix, an essay “On Epic.” From the poem, Book VI:

From Book VIII:

From the appendix: