I did a Staff Report several years ago on trials in abstentia, but it seems to have vanished post-URL conversion, another great work of prose lost to the ages.
What I said therein was: The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCRMP - Rule 43) provide that, in a federal trial, the accused must be present at his initial appearance; the initial arraignment; the plea; at every trial stage, including impaneling the jury and the return of the verdict; and at sentencing. However, the Rule continues, a defendant who was initially present at trial waives his right to be present if he voluntarily absents himself after the trial has begun. He also is considered to waive his right to be present if he persists in disruptive behavior after being warned that he may be removed. These exceptions to the rule are consistent with the Confrontation Clause, since they are considered a voluntary act on the part of the accused. Most states offer some version of these …er…. escape clauses as well. In general, the accused must be present to start the proceedings – the government can’t just force a trial against you to begin without you. But once it’s started with you there, leaving means you waive your right to be there. (And being so disruptive that the judge is forced to exclude you counts as leaving).
But when you leaven that general rule with the spectre of a self-represented party, I can’t help but think that the government’s position gets pretty thin. In general, self-representation is a right, but it’s one that must be exercised by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Since it’s clear that in the vast majority of cases, an accused’s self-interest is NOT served by appearing pro se, judges typically engage the defendant who is requesting self-rep in a long, detailed conversation (a “colloquy”) to place on the record the judge’s warnings about the hazards of self-representation and the factual basis for the judge to find the “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” waiver of appointed counsel.
So theoretically, a pro se defendant who behaves so disruptively that he must be removed has waived his right to representation of any kind.
But this undermines our confidence in the result of the trial, since there was no representation of any kind on one side.
One solution that often comes into play is for the judge to appoint stand-by or hybrid counsel, a lawyer who is available to answer the defendant’s questions about law or procedure or to actually step in and serve as counsel during the trial if necessary. I would suspect, without knowing the state or the laws of the state involved, that an appellate court would look at this as reviewable under the “plain error” doctrine, and find that the judge abused his discretion when he failed to appoint standby or hybrid counsel that could have then protected the defendant’s interests when he voluntarily absented himself from trial.