Perhaps the “Principles First, Last and Always” crowd could explain to me how the courts should apply antitrust law without reference to empirical reality. Ditto for the Clean Air Act or various environmental laws.
I suspect that the writers of Brown v Board of Ed believed they were deciding a matter of law. Do you have evidence to the contrary?
Sure the format of the decision was a little different. But heck, it was touching on some rather central aspects of human rights and the US Constitution.
Just wanted to say that I thought Sampiro’s recap of the whole affair was beautifully well-written. I didn’t understand ‘p.o.d’ but that doesn’t matter. Exquisite prose, sharp style, wit to spare. Great stuff, and a very handy refresher course for people like me who only have a dim recollection.
There are times when the court is forced to consider consequences, of course. This is because sometimes the court is trying to further the intent expressed in the text of the law (or the intent as reflected in some other document, like Congressional statements). To do so, the court must ask which ruling would do so. But that is different from asking what choice would best further the justice’s own sense of what they ought to do.
Aside from the text of the decision you mean? The fact is that the court carefully decided on a policy that they thought would be gradual enough to prevent widespread rebellion in the South, yet strong enough to eventually achieve desegregation.
From a good article on the matter:
And:
Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 (Dec. 1991).
Thanks for the thought provoking cites and response RP. I agree that the courts should not base their decisions purely on personal principles.
But I find the Brown example puzzling. That segregation conflicted with equal protection in practice was partly an empirical matter but surely an evaluation well grounded in the 14th amendment. But since this realization flew in the face of precedent stretching back to Plessy, it seems to me reasonable – and consistent with humility and restraint – to craft the transition away from segregation with an eye towards the likely consequences of the decision.
Separately, courts can and do balance the effects of probable civil strife against the advantages of liberty.
Now maybe the courts made the wrong empirical call in Brown (I lack the knowledge to evaluate whether, “Experience proved Black and Douglas to be correct…”) But I fail to see how completely ignoring empirical considerations might be consistent with either judicial humility or restraint. And once you admit observation, then the courts become policy makers.
To summarize: it is appropriate for courts to be involved with policy and this is a natural outgrowth of a realistic, humble and restrained interpretation of law and precedent.
Caveat: IANAL and it has been years since I’ve read excerpts from the Brown decision. I have the strong suspicion that I don’t have sufficient background to perceive some very relevant differences between the reasoning in Brown and other Supreme court decisions.
PS: RL will take me away from this board in a couple of days. Thanks again for the interesting response.