Dear Partisan scandalmeisters of America:

[lucwarm]

*Originally posted by Evil Captor *
I am looking at this from the Big Picture viewpoint – within the context of all the Repub did to smear Clinton, from the little elves to the impeachment.

It’s obvious you are looking at the “Big Picture.” That’s why you cannot focus on the issue at hand.

There is no question that a lot of people tried to smear Clinton. But it does not logically follow that the judge was biased.

**

You keep desperately attempting to make people believe that so long as the court followed the right procedures, it couldn’t POSSIBLY have been part of the conspiracy to smear Clinton. **

Gah. Spare me your strawmen arguments. It’s possible that the court was part of a conspiracy, there’s just no evidence of it.

Ask yourself – why do you continue to evade my questions?

(1) Are you claiming that what was allowed in Clinton’s case was significantly different from what is routinely allowed in other sexual harassment cases?

(2) If so, what was different?

(3) If not, what is the basis for your claim that the judge’s decisions were the result of bias?

**

You may fool people who weren’t around back then, and I’m sure those partisans who share your viewpoint will gladly agree with you – but no one else will.**

I’d love to see ONE lawyer here try to defend your position.

**

It doesn’t matter whether or not the judge scrupulously adhered to proper court procedures or not. Whether a vile thing is done according to the letter of the law, or outside the law, it is still a vile thing.**

Perhaps, but your claim is that the judge was BIASED. Assuming for the sake of argument that what took place was a “vile thing,” it does not follow that the judge was biased.

See, what some people consider injustices take place all the time in our legal system. For example, if you file your case a day late because your car broke down on the way to the courthouse, the judge will dismiss the case. Even if it’s a really good case, the plaintiff is a penniless widow, and the defendant is an evil tycoon.

The judge in such a case simply does not have discretion to ignore such an issue. Ultimately, the legislature has determined that justice will be better served for all if “statutes of limitations” are implemented and strictly enforced.

Similarly, Congress and the Supreme Court have decided that our court system should have liberal discovery rules. What this means is that, as a practical matter, plaintiffs can go into court with relatively flimsy allegations and get the opportunity to depose defendants, demand documents, etc. Of course it results in injustice and inconvenince in many cases, but the determination has been made that in general, justice will be better served with liberal discovery rules.

Frankly, I am not sure who decided that America should have liberal discovery rules, but your beef is with that person – not with Judge Webber. In any event, I would speculate that the Republicans would be all too happy to pass legislation allowing judges to dismiss cases quickly without giving plaintiffs a chance at discovery.

**

Got it? Of course not. You never will. **

Of course not. However, it is you who are ignorant – not me. Ask yourself, why do you continue to evade the questions I have asked you?

(1) Are you claiming that what was allowed in Clinton’s case was significantly different from what is routinely allowed in other sexual harassment cases?

(2) If so, what was different?

(3) If not, what is the basis for your claim that the judge’s decisions were the result of bias?

---

And one more question: Do you have any reason to believe that Judge Webber would have acted differently had the defendant been a Republican President?

[Hamlet]

Because ElvisL1ves appears to be too uneducated to make a proper argument, and because I want all the information out so people can make up their own mind, I will attempt to make his argument for him.

The gist, as I understand it, is that Judge Webber-Wright was biased because she did not dismiss the lawsuit prior to discovery. After losing the issue of Presidential Immunity before the United State’s Supreme Court, Clinton filed a motion to dismiss the case on the pleadings. The judge issued a 20 page ruling, which can be found at Jones v. Clinton, 974 F.Supp. 712 (E.D.Ark.,1997.) I apologize I couldn’t find the text of the opinion online for free. Judge Webber-Wright granted his motion in part, and dismissed it in part. I believe Elvis is trying to argue that because she didn’t dismiss it in full, she was biased. Putting aside the obvious faulty logic of arguing that she was biased due only to the outcome of the ruling, Elvis could, if he had one iota of intelligence, argue that the ruling itself was wrong.

Judge Webber-Wright outlined the legal standards in determining whether to grant or deny Clinton’s motion to dismiss, and stated:

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12©, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought after the pleadings are closed and is to be analyzed under the same standards that would have been employed had the motion been brought as a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). St. Paul Ramsey County Med. Ctr. v. Pennington County, 857 F.2d 1185, 1187-88 (8th Cir.1988). See also Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990); James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 12.38 (3d ed.1997). In considering such a motion, all facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true. Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir.1997). The complaint should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, McMorrow v. Little, 109 F.3d 432, 434 (8th Cir.1997), and should not be dismissed unless it is clear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no *719 set of facts thereunder which would entitle him or her to relief. Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149, 117 S.Ct. 1081, 137 L.Ed.2d 216 (1997). A motion to dismiss is not a device for testing the truth of what is asserted or for determining whether the plaintiff has any evidence to back up what is in the complaint. ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 467 (D.C.Cir.1991). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, irrespective of a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations or a judge’s belief that the plaintiff cannot prove what the complaint asserts. Id. See also Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 565 (8th Cir.1988); Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir.1982). Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted " ‘as a practical matter … only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.’ " Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)).

Judge Wright cited not less than 10 separate cases, which shows she, unlike Elvis actually does research and provides cites.

Judge Webber-Wright then discussed each of the Counts that Jones had alleged, and ended up dismissing two counts (a due process claim and a defamation claim) and not dismissing the sexual harassment claim under equal protection, the conspiracy claim, and the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her full and complete rationale, including additional citations, can be found in the case, but the one that Elvis seems to have the biggest problem with is the one that eventually led to the dismissial after discovery. Judge Webber-Wright ruled that

Contrary to the President’s assertions, then, plaintiff has alleged that there was a threat, has alleged that she suffered a tangible job detriment, and has alleged that there was a causal relationship between her rejection of the Governor’s alleged sexual advances and the harm she allegedly suffered. Whatever may become of these allegations, they suffice at this time to state a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Finally, Judge Webber-Wright went on to state that:

Nothing in this Memorandum Opinion and Order should be construed as indicating how this Court will rule on any motion for summary judgment on the issues that remain in this case after today’s decision. The standards governing motions for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 are quite different from those under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12© and 12(b)(6), and the resolution of any such motion will depend in large part on the evidence or lack thereof that is revealed by discovery.

If I thought it would do any good to highlight this in blue and purple so Elvis may actually pay attention and think critically about it, I would. At it’s most basic, Judge Webber-Wright’s ruling came down to that Jones had alleged enough in the pleadings to allow the case to go forward to discovery.

Now, Elvis seems to be arguing that this ruling was improper, that the case should have been dismissed at this point. After reading the ruling, and researching the cases, I find absolutely no credibility to this argument. The ruling, as I, and pretty much everyone who took the time and effort to read and understand it, is intelligent, well-written, and completely in line with precedent. There is nothing, and I’ll repeat, NOTHING to indicate that Judge Webber-Wright ruled incorrectly, or had any kind of bias agasint anyone. Allegations to the contrary, are spurrious at best, and the product of continued ignorance at worst.