Here’s what happened:
The FBI seized a server that ran a website called “Playpen,” which offered categorized sections of child porn. They continued to let it run, and captured IP addresses of connecting clients. However, because many connecting clients used Tor, a service that masks the true IP address being used by a client machine, the FBI sought and obtained a warrant. This warrant is in a class called “anticipatory warrants,” so named because they are based on an event happening before the statement of probable cause becomes true.
To briefly explain, imagine that FedEx calls the police and says, “We have just discovered a large box filled with cocaine that was given to us for delivery to Joe Q at 1515 Riverside Drive.” Now, the police cannot simply get a warrant that says, “We have probable cause to believe that there is cocaine at 1515 Riverside Drive,” because there isn’t. The cocaine is at the FedEx office. On the other hand, they can’t wait until the cocaine is delivered to start the warrant application, because by the time the warrant is granted, the cocaine may be gone again.
So the law permits an “anticipatory warrant,” which says, in effect, “After the FedEx delivery guy visits, we have probable cause to believe that cocaine will be found at 1515 Riverside Drive.”
Similarly, here, the warrant authorized the FBI to install a snoop program on the defendant’s computer only after the computer was used to log on to the site, navigate to the section containing 11 year old girls having sex with dogs, and download a movie. Along with the movie came the FBI’s program, which ran on the defendant’s computer, collected its IP address, and delivered that to the FBI. (The program would have found a local, non-routable address, but the very act of connecting to the FBI’s server revealed the public IP NATted to the private one).
Armed with that information, the FBI subpoenaed the actual physical address from the ISP and obtained a warrant to search the home occupied by the defendant, and seized and searched the computers therein. Pursuant to that search, the FBI recovered a computer which contained child pornography.
The accused sought to suppress the evidence against him. He argued that the government’s warrant was flawed for a number of reasons that are not relevant to this explanation.
The Court’s opinion says that the warrant was valid.
In addition, it says, even if the warrant was not valid, the accused cannot complain about the IP address being exposed because he has no cognizable privacy interest in the IP address itself under these circumstances… in other words, because he connected to a remote server, he voluntarily exposed his IP address and system to an environment which a reasonable person would know that it was being handed to third parties. In general, cases like Smith v. Maryland have long established the principle that information you voluntarily hand to third parties is not information in which you can claim a privacy interest.