One problem that always arises in the endgame of revolt against a dictatorship (or in the cases of international sanction and/or war), is that the dictator reaches a point where it is unlikely that he will remain in power, but has no incentive not to engage in a Stalingrad defense, because if he loses, he dies/rots in jail.
A traditional way out of the endgame has been exile - a foreign country agrees to take in the despot. The despot gets to live and live freely (and often very well), and the country gets rid of the guy.
There are two problems with exile. The practical one is that offering exile is rarely a good deal for the foreign country; they take on security problems and foreign relation problems (quite often the victors back in the home country wanted to grab the despot rather than let him escape). The policy one is that, if exile is an option, there is less disincentive for a leader to start acting like a despot in the first place. Further, exile prevents retribution, also an important policy goal.
A semi-serious solution to the first problem that it occasionally bandied about is Despotamia - an internationally-administered island where despots can live - together - in relative (to opulent) comfort.
Should the international community jointly act to provide for the care and feeding of murderers?
Does the current need to prevent a violent endgame outweigh the future need to deter as much as possible the beginning of despotisms?
2a. Is deterrence even a valid concept when dealing with the psychology of despots?
Im just picturing a city council zoning dispute… you know, somebody wants to build ovens while others want to build mass graves… others want to use the land as shrines to themselves…
The ‘international community’ did this at least once before. Elba didn’t work out so good, but St. Helena did the trick. (Of course, the despotism is in the eye of the beholder…)
I’m a little confused by your thinking that the option of future exile somehow lessens the disincentive to become a despot. Are you thinking that someone with aspirations to despotism will say: “What they hay, why not start disappearing people? If it goes bad, I can always move to St. Helena?” That doesn’t seem likely to be the reasoning.
So I discount that negative.
I would disagree that retribution is an important goal, as well.
So I’d support the concept, though I’d hate to see the US alone deciding who deserved to be sent there.
And I think the violent endgame scenario is sufficiently nasty that we ought to prevent it if doing so will prevent death and hardship in the immediate term.
Though retribution is irrelevant, justice is, of course. And I think any jail cell, however luxurious, is probably just punishment. I’d require full disclosure of disappearance, etc. and forfeiture of the looted country’s assets from the despots Swiss bank accounts.
nogginhead, what should be done if the despot refuses to leave unless he can keep the looted assets?
As for Amin, I don’t know the details of how he ended up in Saudi, but he was overthrown by a rebel movement originating (IIRC) in the north of Uganda.
Good question. Basically, you’re asking how much I value human life. A human life. In cash. I don’t think I can do that.
I think that the deal is that St. Helena is comfortable, that there’s no way to get off and no way to have influence over what happens in the rest of the world. If you want the protection of your person, you leave your cash behind. If you’d rather die with your cash and play Stalingrad, that’s your business, but the interbational community would have to make clear that your heirs and cronies won’t get to keep their portion of the loot in either event.
This must be answered first. The other questions can follow once this one is answered.
I think the answer is no. The current need for a home for the despots, tyrrants and dictators does NOT outweigh the need to deter despotism in the first place. To have despotamia, you would be saving the lives that may be lost at the end of a despots rule. It will make the lives lost while the despot was in power, meaningless. There couldnt be an island big enuf to hold the future applicants once they find out they can rule for a few decades and comfortably (and safely) retire. What if they just chose their own successor? They retire in opulance to despotamia free from retribution and have a lackey rule in their place.
wouldnt this be like offering a serial killer, holding a few hostages, an island retirement in Tahiti if he promises not to kill anyone? What of the ones he already killed?
I agree, institutionalising such a thing would be like a reward.
Guarded on their island they would even be free of any fear of an assassination by a survivor of their crimes. A bliss they could hardly attain in their own country.
Idi Amin fled with his wives, children, and entourage by air to Libya. After a falling out between his security guards and Libyan police, he had to leave, in 1979. Then he went to Saudi Arabia. He tried to come back to Uganda in 1989, but only got as far as Kinshasa, Zaire, before someone spotted him and he had to hustle back to SA. The Saudis allowed him back in but are restricting his access to phone lines, and they pay him a small monthly stipend on condition that he keeps his mouth shut.
Panama is about as close to a real Despotomania as there is. We have a couple of Haitian military leaders (Raoul Cedras and Philippe Biamby), a corrupt Ecuadorian president, Abdala Bucaram, and a Guatemalan president, Jorge Serrano. Peruvian spy-chief Montesinos came here for a bit, but that fell through. Other famous “guests” were the Shah of Iran and Juan Peron.
I think we disagree on this point. It leads to an interesting question about the psychology of such individuals. Given the dearth of happy endings to aspire towards, I think you make the reasonable assumption that ruling for a few years would be their goal regardless of what happens after.
I’m more pessimistic. I think they become despots mainly to overturn other despots, and do so without planning ever to retire or be overturned. (Is there a parallel to the death penalty vs. life imprisonment as detrrent argument here?)
In any event, I find it hard to believe that this would be an actual incentive to despotism, rather than as the OP put it, a lessened disincentive.
As to the lackeys, I think we’d have to insist on radical change that would include (as I mentioned) full disclosure and appropriate punishment for those who benifitted unlawfully from the despotism. I’m not saying it would be easy. How would you be able to strip Suharto’s offspring of their cushy state-contract-driven wealth? I dunno, but that would be a condition. Or maybe you’s make all the offspring go away also… under the pretext that their lives were at risk.
Needn’t be a serial killer. But I think the analogy isn’t great, owing to the difficulty of becoming a despot vs. the ease of taking hostages. Any schmo can take hostages, and I agree many would, if it meant the gravy train for life, plus topless tahitian women. But few people can become dictators: there’s a lot of competition for few openings, plus the qualifications include charisma and leadership ability.
Colibri, do you think Panama’s history on this has been beneficial or harmful for Panama? Has it harmed or helped Panama’s foreign policy and/or image?
This has been quite controversial within Panama itself. Some people consider it shameful, others think Panama has provided a valuable and selfless service to other countries by providing an escape hatch for their dictators.
Much of this has been due to Panama’s history as a client state of the U.S. In the case of the Shah and the Haitian military in particular, Panama took these guys just because the U.S. asked them to.
This may be changing since the turnover of the Canal. Panama seems to be trying to spruce up its image. From Lonely Planet (Nov 2000):
The difference between a despot and a dictator is a very fine line and it usually differs depending on which side of the govt you are talking to. I regard a despot as any dictator who is willing to brutilize and oppress his people for his own selfish ends. Idi Amin, Omar of the Taliban and Saddam are good modern examples. These people became despots not to make it better for the people. They did it because they could and they did. They will continue to do so until someone throws them out or kills them. I agree that retirement isnt in their original agenda. But as with all depots, someone comes along that has the ability to do one or the other. Faced with the possibility of death or exile, I would think that any despot would chose exile. (altho I wouldnt be too sure of that with Saddam. A CIA supervisor once said, “we will not predict what Saddam wont do…”)
If a despot-wannabe is contemplating brutilizing his people and does a pro-con chart and despotamia is available, it woud be a big plus to his mind. Afterall, if all else fails, he gets a shot at Despotamia. A win-win for him.
Problem is whether a despot takes over another despot, or this a brand new despotism, its the people that are the losers. It is the people that the world must protect. To prevent and to remove despotism.
I can’t think of any examples of the other kind. Can you? How’s Musharraf behaving?
I think being a despot implies governing without the consent of the governed, which would mean in all practical cases ignoring dissent and supressing it if it became too vocal or widespread.
Agreed, if that kind of despot exists.
I agree, and I hope someone’s a better way than bombing, invasion, and ‘nation-building.’
I dunno, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines comes to mind. Altho his martial law rule prevented any dissent from the people until he lost his influence over the military, his programs did benefit the people to a certain extent. Civil order was restored in the beginning and all in all it wasnt that brutal. Benevolant dictators do exist. they are few and dont last that long.
and as far as ignoring dissent and suppressing opposition, that would describe any king in history. Not all kings were depots.
yeah but james bond is only one man and I think they did away with the CIA’s ability to do what he does.