And you just had to point that out.
Not really. The deterministic model amounts to only the Schrödinger evolution; for indeterminism, you need that, plus a collapse mechanism that takes over whenever a ‘measurement’ occurs (nevermind exactly defining what that’s actually supposed to mean).
Huh? I think we’re talking about two different things here…
I’m talking about decay of radioactive elements. Some people say that this happens on a random basis, and that the half-life of Uranium is only a statistical aggregate.
But others have said that there is a “timing mechanism” by which Uranium atoms “know” when to decay. A little internal timer, or a fuse burning down. i.e., that atoms don’t decay at random, but by a deterministic, or mechanistic means. It has nothing to do with measurements or observations.
This may not be exactly the same brand of determinism everyone else is discussing, but it is a brand of determinism, proposed by many instead of randomness, and I thought it deserved mentioning.
You can have control in a deterministic universe. This is a mistake that people on both “sides” make; perhaps confusing determinism with fatalism.
Bell’s theorem does not rule out a deterministic description of physics. It just requires that if such a theory accurately explains quantum phenomena, it must be non-local, i.e. it has to have “spooky action at a distance”. David Bohm invented a deterministic non-relativistic, non local, hidden variables theory consistent with quantum mechanics, and hence, Bell’s theorem. He failed to create a relativistic version.
Pick your poison, “god plays dice” or “non local interactions,” both were anathema to Einstein, but quantum mechanics requires one or the other or both. I think the question is still open, though most all physicists would think Bohm was off-base and rule out hidden variables.
i think no, a choice that could be no other choice is not a choice.
again no, Einstein was right, physicists might not want it to be so but that’s too bad for them. Neither of your “poisons” are necessary or actual.
I consider something a choice where I reason through a situation and come to a decision.
It’s important to realize that that thought process is not an illusion; it’s real, it’s really how you’re making a decision. You’re a thinking machine. I can’t predict what you will do without also simulating those thought processes (directly or indirectly).
The whole thing of “could have chosen differently” makes no sense at all. It’s equivalent to rewinding a video tape and expecting to see something different this time. Why would anything be different?
Well, you only know whether or not an atom has decayed via observation. But otherwise, I must confess I’ve never heard of such a model being proposed… In any case, I just wanted to stress that there’s no necessity for indeterminism even in the absence of any ‘hidden mechanism’ that tells the atoms when to decay (and conversely, if there were one, it would not necessitate determinism, as there are other cases of state reductions which can’t readily explained in such a mechanistic way – see JWT Kottekoe’s remarks on nonlocality, and similar results).
A deterministic process is one whose result depends completely on data that can (perhaps theoretically) be obtained in advance of the result. When looking at processes that are typically cited as random–the throwing of dice is a good example–the determinist would assert that these processes aren’t really random; if we knew all the data that went into the dice throw (the position of the dice in the hand, their speed and orientation at release, all the pits and imperfections of the surface over which they were thrown), the determinist argues, we could accurately predict the outcome of the throw. Now, no one is going to be able to gather this information in advance of a dice throw, but in theory it could be done, so at best the determinist would say that such processes are only practically random (in the sense that it’s far more practical to analyze them using randomness as a concept than take into account all this difficult-to-measure data).
When this world-view interprets the randomness of QM, determinism applies the same “practically random” argument in a slightly new way. Rather than appealing to data which–in the dice-throw case–everyone would agree has at least some non-zero bearing on the outcome, it postulates this same data must still exist even if it hasn’t been (or ever can be) detected–the so-called “hidden variables”. The counter-argument is that QM results are truly random and not just practically random: The outcome of a process is determined only at the time of measurement, rather than sitting there waiting in advance of measurement, wholly determined by the unseen presence of these hidden variables.
Einstein–a determinist–argued against the truly random view with the EPR paradox. Suppose QM particles are produced in such a way that their observable values are related to each other (e.g. a process which must by the laws of QM create two particles of opposite spin), and then separated by a large distance before they are observed. If the value of these related observables are–according to the truly random view–only determined at the time of observation, checking one must cause the other to immediately jump into the opposite state, thus guaranteeing the two observers at the far-apart locations will always see opposite values, no matter how close together in time the two observations may occur. But this means information must be propagated between the two at faster-than-light speeds. Einstein thought it was far more problematic to assume FTL that to simply agree the two particles were in their opposite states prior to observation, i.e. that hidden variables not considered (or discovered) by QM actually determined the “true” state prior to observation.
On the other side of the ledger is Bell’s Theorem, an ingenious argument which shows that if Einstein’s proposed experiment is (a) modified to have the observations occur on different values at the different locations–x-axis spin at point A and y-axis spin at point B, for example, and (b) performed over a large number of cases, then with the underlying assumption of hidden variables and no FTL travel (non-locality), the cumulative outcomes of the experiments must obey certain inequalities (FixMyIgnorance’s analogy is a good explanation for how these inequalities are derived). Experiments seem to show that these inequalities are commonly violated; this can be because (1) there are no hidden variables and QM randomness is “truly” random, (2) faster-than-light “spooky action at a distance” really does occur, or (3) there is some underlying assumption in Bell’s theorem that’s being overlooked/ignored.
As JWT Kottekoe states, most physicists think (1) is correct, so Bell’s theorem is often cited as an argument against the determinists. But to be fair, (2) cannot be ruled out (although thought experiments which assume this produce even weirder results, where the outcome of an experiment can be “determined” by something that occurs after the observation is made!), while others would argue via (3) that conterfactual definiteness is actually a hidden assumption, one that the result of the experiment disproves to support a “many worlds” interpretation of QM.
Your right, the thought process is real, however your conclusion that it gives you free will is incorrect. Your life is like watching a virtual reality movie, you even get to think what the protagonist is thinking, but that protagonist (you) will always make the same choice and if I knew exactly how your mind worked I could predict exactly what you were going to do at each moment. You cannot do anything else. You do not make choices unless by “choice” you mean some arbitrary junctures in your thought process that precede your actions. If I understood the process well enough and could change the variables at will I could run you like a robot while you got around with the illusion of choices. “I danced on that table naked lathered in peanut butter and Tabasco sauce singing the national anthem because I chose to dammit!”
A computer program doesn’t choose to post my messages in this forum. It follows commands and operates on the logic of it’s programming. It isn’t programmed to have consciousness so it doesn’t have false beliefs about it’s actions. I’m sure one day someone will program one that will though. The complexity of factors in an outcome does not lend them supernatural exception from the rules of reality.
Being random or not random doesn’t change whether free will exists, but nothing is random in any case so meh.
I drew no such conclusion.
I don’t use the term “free will” as I’ve yet to come across a coherent definition of it.
Well, yes, if you completely simulated my brain and then basically put the question to it. But the prediction thing is a red herring.
Let’s imagine a universe that’s not deterministic, where there are souls, magic, whatever. And random factors all over the place. No-one can predict my actions here.
But…when it comes to choices, I am going to make decisions based on my characteristics (whether that be my soul’s “type”, neurology, whatever), my experiences to that point and the options I’m presented with.
IOW the same inputs, and the same logical process as the deterministic universe. It’s only the prediction aspect which is different here but what difference does that make to me? Why in this universe is someone more free?
These are big philosophical topics (see Strong AI, Compatibilism etc). Suffice it to say, there are a number of positions on the point you raise here, and the notion that computers will inevitably become conscious is far from as obvious as many assume.
Einstein was, of course, extremely smart, and he was almost always right. On this particular subject, though, his beliefs are inconsistent with the results of the actual experiments. Just because he’s been right so many other times, does not guarantee that he’s always right, and we’re forced to conclude that in this case, he was wrong.
And JWT Kottekoe, I didn’t mean to imply, by my mention of Bell’s inequality, that it disproved determinism. I do think, though, that if the OP (or anyone else) wants to insist upon determinism, that they ought to be aware of the other issues they must inevitably raise in the process. Maybe they’ll consider the loss of locality to be an acceptable price to pay, to keep determinism. But they should at least know that there is a price.