At the ultimate macro level (universe=“everything”), determinism and free will reconcile anyway.
Determinism says “all actions are causally determined by location, momentum, and effects from the current environment”.
Free will says “actions are determined by the actor making choices, (usually in order to attain a desired result)”.
Choices are not made in a vaccuum (indeed, in a vaccuum there are no choices to be made, or things to make them about). Mostly, when a free-choice proponent or defender takes exception to deterministic language, it is because the deterministic explanation takes the form “Action X on the part of Actors 1 through n are caused by Stimulus X”, where Stimulus X is an environmental factor, a prior shared experience, or the social location (socioeconomic status, age, etc) of the Actors. Free will proponents reject such mechanical explanations for behavior, and correctly so, since they are invariably incomplete and of low accuracy when applied predictively to individuals.
But if you say “Action X on the part of Actor 1 is caused by Stimuli X.1 through X.n” where n equals the sum total of all objects and experiences in the universe since the dawn of time, you’ve taken into account everything that could be taken into account by Actor 1, making the difference between free will and determinism one of sentence construction alone.
From the hints offered us by our studies of “chaos” (sensitive dependence on initial conditions), it seems reasonable to say at this point that REDUCTIONISTIC deterministic models of behavior are intrinsically flawed. You would, in practice, in order to be able to predict the behavior of sentient individuals flawlessly, have to have at your disposal more data than you could reasonably be expected to acquire by any means other than living the life of the individual whose actions you are trying to predict, firsthand.
So, in spirit, the arguments of the “free will” contingent were correct, and those of the “determinism” folks incorrect.