Really not in general. Mostly the current DSM splits most everything categorically with then individuals getting labeled with several categories; ASD is one of the few in which it has moved more toward lumping. Apologies in advance but this post is likely going get deep into the weeds, both about the history of the DSM and psychiatric nosology beyond it, and the fact that to me psychiatric diagnoses in general are neurological conditions.
Background.
The DSM began with classification based on presumed etiology actually. “Organic” vs “function” … Understanding of etiology though was so poor that it was way off base and not the best tool. By DSM-III they “replaced psychodynamic formulations and related terminology with criteria that were atheoretical and agnostic with regard to etiology of psychiatric disorders.”
The move from there was refinements of the superficial descriptions without much dissent, mostly with more splitting, until the lead up to DSM-5: “The main priorities for the DSM-5 revision of the criteria were to incorporate etiological and neurobiological research into definitions of psychiatric disorders and to improve clinical utility of the criteria …”
It was already very clear that the same symptom complexes had different root causes and that the same root causes had different presentations. In one family cohort OCD anxiety and depression could all be common in different individuals and respond well to one medicine, while that medicine would be ineffective for a different cohort. It was very clear that the superficial descriptive method was missing shared causes across arbitrary diagnostic boxes. Problem was and is that the neurobiology is more understood but not understood enough. DSM-5 stayed atheoretical.
Disappointment in and criticism of that outcome lead to the Research Domain Criteria Initiative (RDoC).
DSM still rules but the flaws of its approach are significant. A good discussion about the tension here:
This DSM-ICD approach embraces an Aristotelian view of mental disorders as largely discrete entities that are characterized by distinctive signs, symptoms, and natural histories. Over the past several years, however, a competing vision, namely, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative launched by the National Institute of Mental Health, has emerged in response to accumulating anomalies within the DSM-ICD system. In contrast to DSM-ICD, RDoC embraces a Galilean view of psychopathology as the product of dysfunctions in neural circuitry. RDoC appears to be a valuable endeavor that holds out the long-term promise of an alternative system of mental illness classification
Highlight there the emphasis on psychopathology as a product of neural circuitry. Just like other brain disorders that get labeled neurological in origin.
The whole article is worth a read. Comorbidities being the norm challenges it’s usefulness:
some scholars have voiced concerns about the use of the “comorbidity” concept in most cases of psychopathology research given that it is unclear how many DSM conditions are distinct clinical entities (Lilienfeld, Waldman, & Israel, 1994), extremely high levels of covariation among ostensibly separable conditions may raise questions concerning their etiological independence.
The extent of the comorbidity problem is difficult to overstate. In the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being, 21% of participants with one DSM-IV disorder met criteria for three or more DSM-IV disorders … the presence of rampant comorbidity is a red flag that the DSM system is not drawing the correct diagnostic borders. Other authors (e.g., Maj, 2005) go further, suggesting that such comorbidity reflects the propensity of the DSM to attach different names to slightly different manifestations of a shared predisposition, a logical error known as the jangle fallacy
RDoC is not ready to replace DSM. But I have confidence that it will provide fodder to reconstruct the DSM gradually from its mostly atheoretical superficial checklist menu perspective to one that categorizes to actual root causes and with better treatment predictive value as a result.
I like how the article concludes:
In our view, the DSM-ICD will never provide a sufficient foundation for a comprehensive classification system, because psychiatric signs and symptoms, like fever, are inevitably nonspecific indicators of a host of psychobiological dysfunctions. Conversely, RDoC will similarly never be sufficient for a comprehensive classification system, because psychobiological dysfunctions can be manifested in a host of markedly diverse signs and symptoms as a function of innumerable moderating variables. As a consequence, a full characterization of psychopathology will require the DSM-ICD’s remarkably astute descriptive observations, informed by the best available basic research on neural circuitry relevant to psychopathology.