Did Americans have superior luck in WWII?

Factual Questions
1

Maybe this fact is irrelevent, but reading about carrier and air battles in the pacific it always struck me that in a somewhat even fight, the Japanese suffered way more casualties. When I would hear about ships getting sunk, I heard of many Japanese ships going down with all or nearly all hands, while American ships sunk would usually have a much better percentage of survivors. Also, when I would read about an American ship getting attacked by aircraft in many cases the bomb/torpedo that hit it was from some of the few planes that didn’t get blown out of the sky, on the other hand when an American squadron would attack an Japanese ship, there were times when not a single plane was lost. I know there are exceptions present here, but usually they reflect uneven odds (16 american torpedo bombers attacking carriers in Midway all getting shot down isn’t as surprising when you find out they were being attacked by sixty fighters). It brings up more questions, such as

  1. Did American ships have better damage control?

  2. Were American AA guns better/more accurate?

  3. Did Americans have superior naval tactics?

  4. Would a carrier vs carrier battle in 1942 in which neither side had any tactical advantage still favor America as the victor?

2

Whoops I meant to post this in General Questions. If any Mods see this, could you move it there?

3

I can’t really line up this with your question nos. sorry.

During the Quadalcanal battle, the Japanese navy heavily damaged the defending US fleet, mainly (all?) in night fighting. At that time the US was green and the Japanese experienced in that sort of fighting. But that was mainly mid-size boats.

Later, during in the PI, the shoe was very much on the other foot, even at night.

As far as carriers, it helps a lot if you know where the other guy is. So that explains Midway and many other actions after it.

But, the US carriers had far better damage control systems. Fuel pipes could be cleared out with carbon dioxide, etc. A US carrier could (and did, cf. the Yorktown) take far more hits than the Japanese flattops. Add to that that the Japanese were running out of experienced pilots and couldn’t match US innovation in planes made their carriers floating coffins even if the US didn’t have the advantage of intel.

Note also that Japanese loved to die for their Emperor. Going down with the ship was preferred over putting on a life jacket.

4

Yes, US ships had far, far better damage control. Damage control (and after-battle repairs) was a primary concern in US ship design and training, while the Japanese regarded it more as an afterthought. IIRC all of the ‘pacific war only’ histories I’ve read have gone into this in detail, I could turn up some recommendations if you want.

Early in the war I think both sides were pretty equal with AA guns, but later on the US definately pulled ahead with more and better AA guns on the same tonnage of ships. The US also came up with better anti-air doctrine, and would tend to have more airpower

I’m not all that clear on tactics (it’s been a while since I read up on it), but the US had two large strategic advantages that would affect tactical battles. First was MAGIC, the ability to decode large chuncks of Japanese communications which helped the US to pick and choose fights. The other one was logistics - the US had the capability to keep a fleet active a long way from port and a long way from home, while the Japanese were much more limited. This let US forces hang around and select fights to a larger degree.

As far as 1942, is that before Midway or after? Early in 1942 the US navy was still pretty green, and I’d put my money on the Japanese, especially because of their veteren pilots. After the disasterous losses at Midway, though, Japan couldn’t get competent (much less elite) pilots to fill all of her carriers, and once that happens I’d bet on the US winning an engagement. (US training for pilots was miles ahead of any Axis power).

5

Thanks for reminding me about the night engagements. I do remember that the Japanese were pretty well trained in night battles.

I’m also pretty certain that most Japanese captains went down with their ships. To them, it was probably preferable to not have to live with the disgrace of losing their ship.

BTW, when the Yamato was attacked and eventually sunk, did it shoot down ANY planes? I understand that it had previoously been refurbished with additional AA guns…having so many guns shooting up in the air has got to do SOMETHING. For one of the biggest, baddest battleships ever built, it didn’t seem to have a very effective impact (anyone know how many ships its sank?). At least the Bismark went down putting up a hell of a fight before she was sunk/scuttled.

6

I dunno. At the battle of Coral Sea, we each traded one carrier sunk and one damaged, but the Japanese lost a light carrier and we lost a fleet carrier.

In terms of luck, there is no question that luck played a tremendous role at Midway (although Nagumo’s over-cautious and vacillating personality was a bonus). Due to any number of small accidents, all the U.S. torpedo bombers (both island-based and carrier-based) arrived before the dive bombers. The entire Japanese air defense found itself at sea level when the dive bombers arrived, giving those planes an almost free hand to make their attacks. At the same time, Nagumo had ordered his bombers, armed for an attack on Midway, hastily re-armed with different bombs to attack the carriers when a single Japanese scout plane finally stumbled on the USS Yorktown. The HE bombs had been stacked on the decks (to allow the re-arming to go faster) rather than being returned to their magazines, so when the U.S. bombers struck, their bombs were augmented by the Japanese own bombs.

That battle deprived Japan of the core of their fleet carriers and experienced air crews.

Other than that, U.S. ships were built with an eye to survivability more than Japanese ships were. (The same was true of aircraft: the Zeke’s amazing maneuverability came at the expense of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks in the early models and none of the Japanese bombers were as well-protected as U.S. bombers.)

There were many incidents of luck–good and bad–throughout the war, but both sides had their share.

As to specific questions:
*1. Did American ships have better damage control? *
Yes.

*2. Were American AA guns better/more accurate? *
Not particularly. The earlier basic U.S. anti-aircraft weapon was the 1.1 inch gun (slightly smaller than 30mm). It was replaced, as available, by the Bofors 40 mm gun, usually in a quadruple mount, and augmented by a faster firing Oerlikon 20mm gun.

3. Did Americans have superior naval tactics?
Depended on the particular commanders facing each other. If you look at the string of U.S. and Allied defeats early in the war, it is hard to believe that the U.S. survived long enough to eventually win. The Japanese had superior aircraft, torpedoes, night tactics, and a few other weapons. Eventually, however, any U.S. ship that survived was that much more experienced–and the U.S. got radar a lot sooner than the Japanese.

4. Would a carrier vs carrier battle in 1942 in which neither side had any tactical advantage still favor America as the victor?
In the first carrier battle in which the ships were never in view of each other, (Coral Sea), the Japanese lost one light carrier and suffered some damage to one fleet carrier while the U.S. lost one fleet carrier (Lexington) and suffered extensive damage to another fleet carrier (Yorktown). On the other hand, the Japanese were turned back and failed to pursue their mission. A few weeks later, at Midway, three U.S. carriers destroyed four Japanese carriers, but at the cost of the Yorktown. (It was not all luck–the U.S. pilots did what they were supposed to do.)

Subsequent to Midway, however, the Japanese continued to inflict further defeats on the U.S., sinking the Hornet and the Wasp and damaging the Enterprise and Saratoga (along with numerous other ships), then going on to dominate the naval battles in the Solomons for the first few months. (The damage was inflicted by aircraft, surface ships, and submarines; not all battles were fought by plane.)

One quibble:

U.S. mass training was miles ahead of any Axis power. The training originally provided to the Japanese Naval Air Service might have been among the best (if not the best) in the world. However, it was a long, involved process that turned out only a few (but very competent) pilots at a time. After Midway, the Japanese had to abandon their extensive training methods to some extent, but they were never able to produce quality with the abbreviated methods whereas the U.S. training system just kept getting larger, more efficient, and more proficient. (One aspect of the U.S. program (that figures in lower “ace” counts for the U.S. than for some other countries) was a fairly rigorous program of sending experienced pilots back the the U.S. as teachers so that the students were learning “real life” lessons from people who had seen action. As tactics were revised in the field, those tactics were brought backto training squadrons rather than sending kids out with “book learning” who had to be re-trained to the situation when they got to their new outfits.)

7

Well, one might argue that the decisive battle for the Pacific (Midway) the Americans had a great deal of luck, or the Japanese a great deal of bad luck.

They were caught off-guard and one of the major reasons so many carriers were sunk is that the Japanese hadn’t secured their bombs and during the American attacks you had bombs detonating between decks on the Japanese carriers. They couldn’t respond with appropriate fighter support and subsequently lost the engagement.

If both sides had been equally prepared… well I’ll leave that up to the revisionists to decide.

8

Can anyone say Proximity Fuze? Later in the war this device, which only the Americans had, blew up a shell when it came close to a plane or the ground in land battles. Compared to fuses set to go off at altitude or timed, it was absolutely devastating, and one of the great unsung technical feats of the Americans during the war. Some of the more experienced Japanese pilots knew something was up because of the flack accuracy, but the German and Japanese commanders were clueless about it, as it was highly secret.

Allies had also broken the codes of the enemy, so rarely did the enemy have complete tactical surprise. Pearl Harbor is a notable exception that proves the rule.

Radar. While the Japanese had great night fighting with their navy, as soon as the Americans developed their tactical ability to use their radar, this was more than overcome. American detection equipment was vastly superior to the Japanese, as was the British compared to the Germans. The good guys could always shoot in the right general direction of something.

As for Midway. I think that all of the breaks went for the Americans, from the intelligence coup that indicated the location of the impending attack, to the execution of the battle, where even when the Americans took a pasting, it drew away crucial fighter coverage. The failure of the Japanese to have their scout airplane (out of a dozen or so) that did spot the American carriers from having a working radio was a tremendous break for the Americans.

Let’s keep in mind that the American pilots had only six months of combat duty by this time, compared to the Japanese pilots having several years. The Japanese planes were far superior at this time in the war. At Midway, the Japanese lost four of their top carriers and virtually all of their pilots. While the Japanese weren’t going to win the war, their awful blunders at Midway shortened it by a minimum of a year. The Japanese didn’t really have the ability to rebuild their navy while the Americans were just getting going. IIRC there were 16 top of the line Essex class carriers brought online during the war and over 100 total carriers counting the escort carriers by the end of the war. (Escort carriers were liberty ships converted to small carriers.)

9

The Japanese lost the war they started with America because they refused to heed the advice of their best naval commander, Yamamoto, who told them that their assumptions that the U.S. would sue for peace after a quick decisive blow, such as Pearl Harbor, was the opposite of what would happen. Having been educated in the U.S. Yamamoto knew that a furious resolve would result and the sleeping giant would be awakened. Tojo and the cabinet, having had the most successful military land grabs in history were too arrogant to see that they did not have the production capability to keep up even if all other things were equal. When Stalin was told of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was convinced that the Germans could no longer beat the Soviets and that the Japanese had made a colossal blunder, noting simply that the U.S. produced at least 10 times the steel (I forget the exact figure that Stalin knew off the top of his head) that Japan did.

10

A pilot training process that can’t turn out enough pilots to keep up with even minor losses (from what I’ve read, removing midway and keeping other air engagements would still have been too much for Japanese pilot replacements to keep up), which can’t be expanded while keeping reasonable pilot quality (the huge drop even after the biggest Japanese losses were taken), and which can’t institutionally learn much from experience (German and Japanese aces tended to stay in the air, while American pilots came back to teach as you mentioned) is inferior in my book, at least in the context of a war. While the Japanese training process may have been better in an ‘on paper’ sense, it wasn’t better in a ‘winning the war’ sense, and ‘winning wars’ is the standard I’d use.

11

Luck can play a role in war, it is true,. but luck only goes so far. The skill of a commander, the training of the troops, the power of their gear - all this goes into minimizing the impact of bad luck, and taking advantage of whatever good fortune you may have.

12

Of all the aspects that made the ultimate differance, it had to be US production capacity and resources.

Even if the US had been only half competant this would have crushed Japan.

Fact is that the US were very fast learners(except on the lack of convoys in the N Atlantic) and very competant.

The effectiveness of US subs cannot be overemphasised, this deprived the JIN crucial fuel supplies and led to the battleship group being stuck at Singapore whilst their carriers returned to Japan to collect pilots and aircraft just prior to the battle of Leyte gulf.

Even before this battle US subs had curbed some Japanese actions from lack of fuel, it was not the shortage of oil so much as the means to move it, the US sub fleet demolished the Japanese tanker fllet.

13

One small clarification which I don’t think detracts from the nearly fantastic coincidence which surrounded the five-minute window American dive-bombers took advantage of at Midway.

Once the Japanese Carrier Striking Force was fixed, Admiral Spruance’s staff appears to have calculated the time at which the Japanese carriers would be receiving the aircraft returning from the strike on Midway. Less than ten minutes after being given clearance to attack Spruance ordered his planes to launch, at a range so extreme that I don’t think any of TF16’s F4F fighters sent out were recovered.

In short, the Americans intended to catch the Japanese carriers while rearming and refueling. The fact that Dauntless dive-bombers arrived on the scene with all the Japanese guns depressed to sea-level and the air cover on the deck was still pretty close to miraculous.