The speed-armor-firepower triad for capital ships have been supplanted by speed-firepower-stealth.
“the RN’s Aircraft Carriers which were the decisive factor” and “the RN’s submarines cut down Italian and Japanese shipping, hastening the collapse”.
Can you have a “fixation” yet also have that level of capability …
I think you will find that the Japanese actually laid down what would have been the original dreadnought , but the British ship building capacity enabled the Dreadnought to actually be launched first.
It does not need to prevent development completely. Just slow it downl
The RNs carriers were hardly decisive, because they didn’t really have that much competition. Though one might make a claim that the RN’s small escort carriers were decisive in the u-boat war as far as closing the mid-Atlantic “air gap”, I would say it was more due to improved weapons, sensors and tactics by all the escort ships.
That exotic armor wont do any good, if a torpedo detonates under the ship. Displace enough water and the keel snaps, so you would need a reliable defense against torpedos.
A ship class designated BB might come back in the future, but it wont have any resemblance to its parentage.
The Royal Navy of the dreadnought era was not lagging in the techological field, it lead the way.
Throughout the Industrial revolution, the Admiralty always tried to stay ahead of any competition (France, Germany, etc.), both in numbers, as well as battlepower. But the rapid evolution of the industrial revolution meant that “Line of Battle” Ships (which take three or more years to build) may become almost obsolete while still on the building slips.
When “Jackie” Fisher took over the Admiralty towards the end of the Victorian era, the Royal Navy had a large collection of this mish-mash of different types and classes of ships, many with different handling and battle characteristics. One thing was for certain: the size, mechanical complexity, and cost (in money and manpower) of these Battleships continued to grow.
Fisher trimmed a lot of deadweight out of the fleet lists, and looked for ways for technology to help Great Britain ease the manpower burden the ever growing Navy demanded. Fisher pushed forward the development of the radio (centralising control), submarine, and the airplane in RN service. While the submarine (which also grew in size and complexity) is now seen as a ship killer, dominating parts of the ocean it moves in, back then they were seen as a cheaper alternative for defending the important harbors and bases of the RN (like a kind of torpedo boat), freeing the big ships from being “shackled” to a small geographical location.
In 1910, Britain had more operational submarines than any two other nations.
While it’s true Admirals are a trifle nervous about risking something that’s going to take two or three years to replace, this is true for all navies.
The cost of having the most modern warships continues to grow, and this is what has caused the decline [in size] of any military (whether we are talking Navy, Army, or Air Force).
By the way, I think the premise is slightly mistaken. The RN did take risks in WW1 with their big ships.
The Royal Navy (along with their French counterparts) tried to force their way through the Dardenelles by ship only, assuming that Turkey would surrender when Istabul came under gunsights. (Didn’t work so well.)
The RN’s Battle Cruiser force was used aggressively throughout the war, both early on (at Heligoland Bight), and later (Jutland, in particular), with possible serious consequences in the offering.
They took a risk with pre Dreadnoughts. And one QE class ship. Three battleships were lost in the Dardanelles campaign.