Cool. Thanks.
I think it qualifies as common knowledge that the Soviets often said this. As I mentioned, it’s made a comeback in Putin’s Russia. I’ve seen it as background boiler plate in Russian language books and articles about the war or various planes, tanks etc (I’m a rudimentary Russian reader, specialist books/articles about military hardware and operational history of them is about all I can manage).
Now who actually believed or believes this, that’s a lot harder to prove. But it’s definitely a common Russian idea, general idea that the Allies had a goal of weakening them, not just defeating the Germans as quickly as possible. And in fairness, a lot of Western commentators have said that that should, at least in hindsight of the Cold War, have been an Anglo-American goal. But who actually thought it, how much did it influence anything, how could you ever prove it?
It’s apparent that waiting till 1944 for the invasion of France was prudent. It was not obvious dawdling, especially given other resource decisions the Allies had previously made, such as investing a lot in the bomber campaign (which they could reasonably have believed would significantly help Russia pre-1944) and in building an overwhelming USN fleet to defeat Japan, even though ‘Europe first’. Also even the Americans had some disagreement at the margin with Britain’s (Churchill’s) tendency to emphasize the Mediterranean as a past and hoped for future British sphere. The Americans went along with Sicily/Italy in view of the risks to themselves of a premature invasion of France, but not other Churchill ideas like getting involved in Greece/Balkans. But even so this was Britain’s perceived national interest, not necessarily specifically intended to harm Russian national interest. The totality of everyone’s deepest thinking though is very hard to nail down.
Indeed, even in a war full of disastrous judgment the decision to ‘scatter’ stands out as one of the worst calls of the conflict, Admiral Gallery quite correctly referred to it as “a shameful page in naval history”.
On Stalin, the Molotov quote shows that the Soviets didn’t really expect that the Allies could invade France in 1942 and be of any impact for the Red Army, though we’re talking about a man who had hoped that the Germans, French and British would duke it out long enough to turn attention away from the USSR, Khruschev’s memoirs recall Stalin’s reaction to the Fall of France being “…some choice Russian curses and said that now Hitler was sure to beat our brains in.”
Politically it suited him to put about that the reason the Soviet Union was getting seven shades of shit beaten out of it was not because of decisions of the Stavka, that is Stalin himself, but rather because the lazy capitalists were dragging their feet and breaking their promises. Stalin did write directly to Roosevelt expressing his disappointment which reads like the mother of all guilt trips, most likely hoping that would prompt other aid to the Soviet Union, which was already benefiting heartily from American supplies.
There may be an extent to which Stalin did believe that the capitalists were content to watch the Soviet Union bleed, as mentioned this was his reaction to outbreak of war between Germany and the Anglo-French. To the end of the war he never stopped being suspicious of his allies and that feeling they might make a separate peace, see the Soviet reaction to the Wolff meetings (on the surrender of German forces in Italy) at the end of the war, Molotov writing;
"In Berne for two weeks, behind the backs of the Soviet Union, which is bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, negotiations have been going on between the representatives of the German military command on one hand and the representatives of British and American commands on the other.…In this instance the Soviet Government sees not a misunderstanding but something worse."
Churchill was livid and Eisenhower mortified, as recalled by Churchill later, a reply from Roosevelt (though probably not penned by his ailing hand) going so far as to tell Stalin that "Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment towards your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates."
Hang on - in that form - that’s surely utterly newly apocryphal. It’s just a weirdly spurious non-quote. Nobody has ever previously suggested that Wellington ever said that.
The actually alleged remark is the rather more specific observation that he claimed that the Battle of Waterloo was won on “the playing fields of Eton”. That’s probably also apocryphal, but of somewhat more venerable vintage.