Did the CIA install Saddam Hussein?

I’ve recently come across a number of news stories which indict the CIA for support of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq during its nascent years. The condemnations range from CIA complicity with pro-Ba’athists to direct assistance for Saddam Hussein. This information surprised me at first, since even the comprehensive indictment of CIA interventions in “Killing Hope,” by William Blum, makes no mention of it. Although I do not believe the articles’ information contains bold-faced lies, I do strongly criticize the circumstantiality of the evidence provided, as well as the lack of cited evidence. It also appears to me that a lot of the presented attestation goes to lengths to provide imputation that the CIA was involved in certain events without real evidence. The authors of the articles primarily used sources from Adel Darwish, Said Aburish, and Roger Morris, as well as UPI interviews. I especially dislike the way one of the sites avows certainty regarding the issue, but states that the information was, “pieced together,” from interviews. I guess it’s true that currently well-known American-supported coups like Pinochet’s in Chile also began as pieced together information, but when that coup occurred I also felt justified in doubting it (especially after Kissinger declared that, “contrary to anti-American propaganda around the world and revisionist history in the United States, our government had nothing to do with planning his (Allende’s) overthrow and no involvement with the plotters”).

According to the articles, when the monarchy was overthrown in Iraq in 1958, Abdel Karim Kassem (Abd Karim Qasim) was brought into power. The West took little notice until he became increasingly pro-soviet and began “seeking new arms rivaling Israel’s arsenal, threatening Western oil interests, resuming his country’s old quarrel with Kuwait, (and) talking openly of challenging the dominance of America in the Middle East.” He was overthrown and killed in a coup in 1963, which brought the Ba’athists to power, who apparently received CIA support both during the insurrection, as well as during their short hold on power. They were ousted nine months later, resulting in another CIA-backed coup in 1968, cementing their dominance.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/2003/0314history.htm
This New York Times article says the CIA supported the Ba’athists in the following ways during the 1963 coup.
-“Washington set up a base of operations in Kuwait, intercepting Iraqi communications and radioing orders to rebels. The United States armed Kurdish insurgents. The C.I.A.'s “Health Alteration Committee,” as it was tactfully called, sent Kassem a monogrammed, poisoned handkerchief, though the potentially lethal gift either failed to work or never reached its victim.”
-“Using lists of suspected Communists and other leftists provided by the C.I.A., the Baathists systematically murdered untold numbers of Iraq’s educated elite.” On a related note, the CIA is known to have done this during Suharto’s 1966 coup in Indonesia and Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile.
-“The United States also sent arms to the new (Ba’athist) regime, weapons later used against the same Kurdish insurgents the United States had backed against Kassem and then abandoned.”
-The article also details direct CIA complicity with Saddam, according to one former-Ba’athist. “Among party members colluding with the C.I.A. in 1962 and 1963 was Saddam Hussein, then a 25-year-old who had fled to Cairo after taking part in a failed assassination of Kassem in 1958.”
-The article mentions that the 1968 coup had, "CIA backing,” although he provides little evidence except testimonies by CIA members he talked to when the event was happening, who apparently only admitted to have “close relations” with the Ba’athists.

http://www.sikhnet.com/sikhnet/discussion.nsf/0/E04FB880F4335A4487256D06005E9536
This article elaborates on Morris’. The information comes from, “almost a dozen former US diplomats, British scholars and former US intelligence officials.” “The CIA declined to comment,” on its revelations.
-“He (Saddam Hussein) was part of a CIA-authorized six-man squad tasked with assassinating then Iraqi prime minister General Abd al-Karim Qasim.”
-“According to another former senior State Department official, Saddam Hussein, while only in his early 20s, became a part of a US plot to get rid of Qasim. According to this source, Saddam Hussein was installed in an apartment in Baghdad on al-Rashid Street directly opposite Qasim’s office in Iraq’s ministry of defence to observe Qasim’s movements. Adel Darwish, a West Asia expert and author of Unholy Babylon, said the move was done “with full knowledge of CIA” and that Saddam Hussein’s CIA handler was an Iraqi dentist working for CIA and Egyptian intelligence. The assassination was set for October 7, 1959, but it was completely botched. One former CIA official said the 22-year-old Saddam lost his nerve and fired too soon, killing Qasim’s driver and only wounding Qasim in the shoulder and arm.”
-“While in Beirut, the CIA paid for Saddam Hussein’s apartment and put him through a brief training course. The agency then helped him get to Cairo. During this time Saddam made frequent visits to the American Embassy where CIA specialists such as Miles Copeland and CIA station chief Jim Eichelberger were in residence and knew him.”

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/aburish.html
This is a PBS interview of Aburish regarding one of his books on Saddam. I criticize his method of consistently repeating that, “there is evidence” for his claims without stating what the proof is, although he does mention, “a record of Saddam visiting the American embassy frequently.”

I’d be interested in seeing if anyone has anything to add or, even better, a list of specific sources documenting where this information was received from. If more of this can be traced to reliable witnesses or, even better, government documents (if there are any), it would seem particularly relevant, if not ironic, today.

I think you’ve pretty much done all the research here. The most commonly accepted short answer is that the CIA didn’t directly install Saddam per se, as they did other dictators in the region like the Shah, but they did play a critical role in the Baath regime coup. They were looking for a reliable pro-west replacement for Kassem and Saddam just happened to be the Baathist who managed to fight his way to the top of the list, and once there the US ingratiated itself to him and vise versa.

At least that’s the story that was relayed to me in Middle Eastern studies in college.

Probably should point out that the US didn’t give nearly as much help as many of the west European governments. Not sure why. At the time, I suppose he looked like someone who was sympathetic to the west.

Saddam equipped his forces with Soviet material. I think he sort of later became more friendly with the Reds.

Did the US install the Shah? I thought that he was already there, and the US and Britain supported him until the Iranian people overthrew him.

If they did, they should check out the original disk – there may be an uninstall program.

Shah Reza Pahlavi was de facto ousted twice. The first time resulting from a failed power struggle with the democratic opposition in Iran, led by the then Prime Minister, Dr. Muhammed Mossadeq, in 1952-53. As Mossadeq was an ardent nationalist with suspected socialist leanings who has spear-headed the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, Britain and the U.S. launched a complex covert campaign to oust him. The plan was, just barely, a success, and led to a coup that placed the Shah back in power as essentially an absolute monarch, where he remained until thrown out for good a quarter century later.

  • Tamerlane

This might get a broader range of responses in Great Debates. I’ll move it for you.

-xash
General Questions Moderator

Tamerlane, do you have a favorite book on the Iran debacle? It’s on my to-do list to read something about that.

Well, on the coup itself a decent article is Operation ‘Ajax’ Revisited: Iran, 1953 by Moyara De Moraes Ruehsen, published in the journal, Middle Eastern Studies, Vo.29, No. 3, July 1993, pp.467-486.

My favorite book on modern Iran I mentioned in my reading list thread - Nikki Keddie’s Roots of Revolution:* An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*. It’s widely available in a recently revised edition. She also covers the Mossadeq coup of course.

  • Tamerlane

On a side note:-
Does anyone have any idea what the reasoning was for the decision to keep Saddam in power after the first Gulf War.
The usual reasons for supporting a dodgy government, political/military alliance or “regional stability” seem pretty unlikely

If you want a good book on the coup in Iran, go with All the Shah’s Men. It’s pretty good. By the same guy who wrote A Peace to End All Peace. His name escapes me at the moment.

As for Hussein, cainxinth sort of mirrors my understanding. It was indirect support. The CIA supported the Ba’athists and Hussein just happened to be at the right place at the right time when things came together.

So Tamerlane,

What’s the verdict on the OP?

I’m old enough to remember when Saddam was being touted as a progressive, relatively modern guy who was modernizing Iraq. The standard of living was pretty high for a while and the role of women especially was looked at when I was at Wellesley and compared favorably to the rest of the Arab world and Iran. I think Saddam even received some sort of UN award in the late 70’s for improving the lot of his people. Sure, you heard he was a little nasty to his political opponents, but such people were a dime a dozen back then. And besides, the same philosophy was around then as it is with China today: engage, don’t isolate, flood them with products and ideas and surely, surely, the tyranny will loosen and then fall.

“Tales of the Tyrant” in the May 2002 ATLANTIC MONTHLY (it’s on the web but I can’t link right now) goes into details about what happened when Saddam decided he was the new Saladin and invaded Iran.

I know this isn’t a very fact-filled post but I just wanted to express the feeling of the time, a feeling shared by Europe as well as the US.

No, regional stability actually had a fair bit to do with it.

To begin with the coaltion forces were never really willing to go into Baghdad from all appearances, however thay had hoped to destroy a rather larger part of Saddam’s military capability. The failure to do so stemmed from a combination of factors, including a strategic error made by the senior Bush ( setting an arbitrary date for ending hositilities in advance for symbolic reasons ) and partly a failure of communication between Schwarzkopf and one of his key subordinates ( perhaps a “military culture” failure according to some, as the two men, coming from different branches of the army, failed to completely understand the reasoning of the other, resulting in a somewhat divergent idea of how operations were to proceed ). The upshot is that the best of Iraq’s army was left largely intact, the bulk of the casualties and captured being disposable units of very dubious value and loyalty to begin with. This left Saddam rather more internally secure than had been predicted.

The second failure, derived in part from the first. It was sincerely hoped that Saddam would be displaced by an internal military coup. It was this that the senior Bush’s public call “for the people of Iraq to rise up” had been referring to and hoping for. Instead the military and intelligence structures central to the regime, largely left intact after the fighting, remained loyal to their patron. What happened instead in response ( in part, anyway ) Bush’s appeal to were genuinely popular insurrections in the south and north. Unfortunately this was adjudged an even worse case scenario than removing Saddam, because for reasons of the internal ethnic and religious divisions within Iraq, it presented the spector of a tri-partite split of the country, with a Kurdish dominated north, a Shi’ite south, and Sunni middle ( roughly ). This, it was feared, would completely de-stabilize the regional balance of power, particularly as regards to Turkey and Iran ( but also Syria, to which the Sunni Arab Ba’athists might have appealed to for aid in extremis ). Consequently the U.S. tacitly, if not explicitly, allowed Saddam to crush the revolts ( for example exempting his surviving helicopter fleet from the “No Fly-Zone” rules ) to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. A moment of ugly realpolitik that led to some real festering resentment towards the U.S. in the region.

  • Tamerlane

Well, I actually don’t have much more to contribute re: the OP. I agree the case as presented seems a little more circumstantial than not, especially as regards Saddam in particular, though I consider it a fairly reasonable assertion. Ditto for the earlier CIA backing of the Ba’athist coup in general which may have a little more solid factual basis ( I’m giving the NY Times the benefit of the doubt here and assuming they did some real fact-checking ).

However, in the end I don’t consider it an overwhelmingly important point. While it would be a bit ironic, it would hardly be unprecedented for such incidents to come back to haunt whoever. For example the U.S. favoring of Islamic fundamentalists in general ( and in Afghanistan in particular ) during the Cold War era as a hedge and counter against communism, certainly has had some real blowback.

More to the point, one has only to point towards the U.S.'s realpolitik embrace of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, if you want to find a far more unambiguous ironic counterpoint to the current situation.

  • Tamerlane

They could learn a lesson from me – last week I couldn’t get a program to uninstall so, like the dumass I am, I got snarky and just ripped it out because I was in a hurry and wanted what I wanted changed changed now!. Of course, then the computer just kept crashing and complicating my life until I recovered the files, and went about figuring out why it wouldn’t uninstall and addressing the actual problem. Strange how much simpler life then became.:wink:

Tamerlane

(I wish I had a cite for this dammit!)
You say Saddam was still in a powerful position at the end of the Gulf War but I’ve read a number of times in different places that approaches were made by senior Iraqi generals with a view to getting America to rubber-stamp their coup, IIRC an attempt was made by the CIA to prosecute the operative who, in good faith, tried to act as a go-between. (on the grounds of trying to overthrow a foriegn power)

I first read this (I’m pretty certain) in the (UK)Independent on Sunday
magazine just after the first war itself. At the time it was the only such claim I read - so I pretty much dismissed it, even by the standards of the CIA it seemed daft.(Saddam had shown himself to be totally unpredictable - a Ba’athist gov without him may have been nasty - but not as likely to do something that would throw the whole region into choas).
But with the build-up to the second war, I saw a quite a number of articles (in UK broadsheets) and programs (inc on the BBC) that repeated these claims - including an interview with the CIA operative who was nearly locked up for his part in the premature “Regime Change” - so I assumed it was common knowledge

Well, not quite. He was in a precarious position, but perhaps not as bad as folks thought at the time or had hoped for earlier. Regardless, if there one thing you can say ( or said, if it turns out he is pushing up daisies right now ) about the slippery bastard, is that he is a masterful survivor.

I dunno, that sounds a bit dubious. Possible, I suppose. It is not unknown for one decentralized branch of an agency or government to work at cross-purposes towards another. But everything I’ve read seems to indicate the U.S. was hoping for a regime change, just a nice stable one. Perhaps there was a breakdown at some point if a number of analysts concluded no such stable regime was possible without Saddam and the administration pursued a different course after awhile. Can’t say though, as I haven’t seen or heard details of the report you’re referring to.

  • Tamerlane

Tamerlane -
Doing a quick google the best I can come up with is:-
http://www.representativepress.org/Saddam.html
I’ve no idea who the hell Representative Press is, or it’s agenda, but it quotes John Simpson reporting for BBC Panorama and various other sources on storys that sound like the reports I read/saw. (No mention of an attempt to prosecute a CIA guy though)

Simpson :-

Which sort of answers my original question on why there was reluctance to see Saddam toppled

Ohhh…I get it! Captain Beefheart.