Did US Defense Build Up Cause Russian Economy Too Colapse?

Great Debates
1

Hey All,

I have a right wing co-worker who always picks on me when I say things like…

“Man, I remember I was so happy when Clinton first took office. I was so glad to finally get rid of Bush and Regan”

He asked me why I thought that, and I said because I was tired of the Regan/Bush getting credit for the fall of the Russian Economy and the “Wall” coming down."

His point of view is that Regan and Bush brought the Russian Economy down by causing them to spend money on Defense by spending US’s money on Defense. They couldn’t keep up and their economy crashed and we won the cold war. He then went on to add that all the Mafia Stuff was Clinton’s Fault.

My point of view is that the Russian Economy was plagued with corruption and black marketters and the Mafia arose out of the ashes of the failed economy, that would have failed if we had done nothing.

So I guess I’m asking is why did the Russian Economy Fail, and what are the facts that support one opinion over the other.

Thanks in Advance For Your Help,
-Sandwriter

p.s. I’m sure he got his point of view from Rush Limburger!

2

Oops

TO collapse, not TOO collapse

And Reagan, not Regan

3

yes, the reagan defense buildup brought down the russian economy due to cold war spending. I have a lot of problems with reagan and bush’s domestic policies, but it is rather obvious now that reagan bankrupt the russiams with his defeicit-spending military buildup.

4

Way too simple an answer, zuma. While it is certainly a much cherished notion among certain segments, the actual evidence for it is hardly unambiguous.
(I do hope no one trots out the quotes from some Russians that have appeared on several web sites. I tracked down the more popular ones and discovered that the authors tended to be low-level Soviet dissidents who had a desire to support their own “pro-West” positions from before the fall, none of whom were actually in a position to know whether or not the U.S. actually “spent” the Soviets into ruin.)

The Pro arguments do include a time element (that may or may not be simply the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy if/when we ever get some genuine information).

The Con arguments note that the War College and the CIA had each submitted separate reports in the late 1970s indicating that the U.S.S.R. was teetering along on its last legs and that if it continued its involvement in Afghanistan, it would suffer the same sort of inflationary self-destruction that harmed the U.S. in the Viet Nam era and the 1970s without having the large civilian and private sector economy that helped the U.S. to survive until Voelker could rescue us. (It should be noted that our involvement in holding the Soviets in Afghanistan did not require either a 600-ship Navy or a Star Wars defense system.)

5

Reagan’s spending policies on SDI and defense, along with his occasional hawkish statements, were definitively the final nail in the coffin of the Soviet economy. The real question is whether the coffin was already nailed shut.

That’s a tough one to answer. Certainly, by the time Gorbachev took office the Soviet economy was stuck in horrible stagnation, with much of the populace turning towards the black markets as the source for their real income and goods. Chances are, Gorbachev’s reforms would never really have made a difference- either he would have been too conservative and not made enough difference, or been too liberal and let too much dissent catalyze. The perfect middle path would have been tough to find.

However, Reagan’s actions basically forced Gorbachev’s hand. In order to do any reforms, Gorbachev had to pacify the hardliners, and Reagan’s hawkishness made pacifying the hardliners a very expensive proposition. As a result, Gorbachev didn’t have nearly the money or the leeway he probably needed to do a true reform of the Soviet economy.

So in my opinion- assuming no miracles, the Soviet Union was doomed to fall at some point in the mid-to-late 90’s; Reagan’s budgets moved the timetable up to 1990.

6

Of course, as a secondary point- most of our knowledge of “well, it was going to come crashing down anyways” comes from the wealth of information about the true hollowness of the USSR following its collapse. Had you stated in 1986 that the Soviet Union would fall apart in six years, most people would consider you a lunatic.

7

The Russian economy was already in lousy shape, but remember - this was a totalitarian country. That means that the Soviet Union COULD have stayed intact and dangerous for a long, long time. Decades, certainly. One only has to look at the fact that Saddam is still in power 11 years after Desert Storm to realize just how tenacious a totalitarian dictatorship can be.

So why did the Soviet Union collapse? A lot of reasons, but Reagan plays a big part. Not just for the cost of the military buildup, but because he broke the WILL of the Soviets. Remember, it was only a few short years before Reagan took power that people were talking about Soviet ascendancy. They invaded Afghanistan, they stepped up arms shipments to Cuba and Central and South America, they were interfering all through Africa and the Middle East, etc.

The difference was that the American public’s response to Vietnam, coupled with the election of apologist and appeaser-in-chief Jimmy Carter emboldened the Soviets. They felt they were winning the war for the hearts and minds of the world. The Soviet ‘sphere of influence’ was growing. Key American supporters like Iran moved away from America.

Then along comes Reagan. He starts a vast military buildup, and a program of aggressively opposing the Soviets throughout the world, both militarily and with rhetoric. He’s willing to put the cards on the table and call them an evil empire. In the meantime, Afghanistan turns into the Soviets’ Vietnam. The tide starts to turn. The Soviets install a series of hard-liners (Chernyenko, Andropov), only to see them die in office in rapid succession. The people start to grow dissatisfied. The politburo makes a momentous decision to attempt to turn the tide of opinion by selecting a young reformer in Mikhail Gorbachev, rather than instituting a brutal crackdown on dissent.

I believe that the rise of Gorbachev was the Soviet Union’s attempt to look more moderate and legitimate to counter the growing anti Soviet rhetoric championed primarily by Reagan and Thatcher. And that’s exactly what would have happened if the world wouldn’t have had those two people at that time in history. If Carter had been President, he would have responded to Glasnost and Perestroika by easing up on the Soviets and giving them breathing room. Which is exactly what the Politburo wanted. So did the American left, by the way. I was quite involved in the debates around this back then, and the Democrats were portraying Reagan as a monster for his ‘evil empire’ talk. Reagan was burned in effigy in Europe, along with Thatcher. The popular culture was dead set against them.

But Reagan and Thatcher saw Gorbachev’s rise as a crack in the Empire, and turned up the heat, both rhetorically and militarily. SDI was a brilliant stroke, because it moved the cold war into the realm of high technology instead of brute force and raw numbers, which was a game the Soviets were simply unprepared to play. Reagan went to the Berlin wall and yelled, “Mr. Gorbachev - Tear Down This Wall!”. And by now, thanks to Glasnost and Perestroika, the Soviet people were able to see and hear exactly what was going on. It was about this time that the point of no return was passed, and the collapse of the empire happened startlingly fast.

So the defense buildup was part of it, and SDI was part of it, and Reagan was part of it, and so was Thatcher. History has proven that Reagan and Thatcher were right, and saved the world from a lot of grief (along with Gorbachev, who must be given a big chunk of the credit).

Those three people acting together were the real catalyst. All three were necessary. Without Reagan and Thatcher, Gorbachev would almost certainly not have been allowed (or had the desire) to institute the reforms that ultimately brought down the empire. Without Gorbachev, Reagan and Thatcher’s rhetoric would have fallen on deaf ears.

It’s interesting that after the cold war ended, the three main principles became actually quite good friends. In fact, they were all friendly during the cold war. It’s also interesting that they give each other the credit they deserve. Gorbachev agrees that Reagan was a big factor in the collapse of the Soviets. Reagan gives credit to Thatcher and Gorbachev. Thatcher gives credit to Gorbachev and Reagan.

They were all right. The left in the United States and Europe was wrong. The world is a much better place because for a short period when the world needed it most, those three people rose to power together.

8

Is this actually recorded in print, anywhere?

9

“The left in the United States and Europe was wrong.”

Wrong about what, Sam?

BTW, this is a bit of a hijack, but I thought readers of this thread might be interested in this article about the current administration and Russia.

An excerpt: “Barely six months after Russian President Vladimir Putin became the Bush Administration’s most valuable ally in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the promise of a historic US-Russian partnership is being squandered.”

10

Wrong that Reagan should back off and seek a weaker form of detente’ These were the times when the peace movement was seeking nuclear freezes and opposing development of the cruise missile. Had the U.S. taken that advice and stood down, it would have removed pressure on the hardliners and allowed the Soviet Union to continue.

Tomndebb: Oh, sure, make me work for it. I’ll see if I can dig up a cite, but its been a long time since I read it. I think it was in an interview I read in a journal like Policy Review.

11

Too simple again Sam Stone, and yet again you smear the left in America, There was no mourning when the soviet union went down, Michael Moore himself did go with hammer and chisel to help tear down the Berlin wall. and Tomndeb already mentioned that new weapons were not much of a factor in the collapse.
Now that you mention the British, is interesting that historians on the BBC do not give too much importance to Reagan but to Gorbachev:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/coldwar/index.shtml

Essentially, it was Reform that brought to light many of the horrid mess the system was and people demanded change, Gorbachev then deserves credit for making that a reality without bloodshed:

And lets not forget Yeltsin:

Notice the elected part, under Gorbachev for the first time people opposed openly to the regime were given the chance to be elected, by the time the hardliners did the cue attempt, it was too late to get back (but it was close)
I do agree with Tomndebb and John Corrado, Reagan was the final nail in the USSR coffin, but taking credit for the whole funeral and not paying for it?

12

Whoa. First of all, I didn’t say that the Left liked the Soviets - they wanted an end to the cold war as much as anyone. They just disagreed on the strategy. And I believe they were wrong. If we would have had a unilateral freeze and withdrawal of missiles from Europe, and conceded Star Wars by treaty, it would have simply prolongued the cold war, perhaps for decades.

13

One could equally make the argument that these actions were only counter productive to the reforms Gorbachev was trying to introduce. He had little fear of nuclear engagement with the US and there was no attempt throughout the 80s to match the american buildup or crank up SDI. On the other hand, Reagan’s rhetoric and actions would have provided considerable ammunition to hardliners who wanted to slow reforms.

I think the better reading of Reagan’s actions during this time was that he completely misread the mood and capability of the USSR. Back when it started the buildup wasn’t about attaining massive superiority but playing catch up with an enemy that he imagined to be far more powerful than it was in reality. Certainly the revisionist strategy of spending to victory is wholly unsupported by the simple fact that the USSR made no attempt to match spending.

I find myself in rare agreement with Sam Stone that the key change was the installation of Gorbachev as continued hardline leadership could have survived for decades even with economic problems. Where we part ways is his rationale of placating the west as I do not believe that those who supported him had any fear of the West. They were interested in reforms that would deal with the economic problems in the country.

If Gorbachev gives Reagan credit I think you will find it is for the support of reforms late in his presidency rather than the hawkish stance he began with.

14

That’s why I said it wasn’t that the military buildup bankrupted the Soviets, but that it broke the WILL of the Soviets.

Totalitarian regimes survive through expansion. As long as the Soviets saw the U.S. in decline and their sphere of influence growing, they had incentive to keep up what they were doing. They had to be shown that the U.S. WOULD oppose them, and that they would never win.

There’s also a fair amount of luck here. Andropov wasn’t that old - he could have lived another 15 years. And we wouldn’t have seen one iota of change under Andropov, regardless of what Reagan did. And then who knows? Whether a reformer would have come to power would have depended on the specific world situation at the time of his death. We might still be in the thick of the cold war today.

15

Cite for this? North Korea has been as totalitarian as they come, and their last attempt at expansion was a half-century ago. True, the Great Leader and the Dear Leader after him have been kind of hemmed in, but they haven’t fallen during that time either. And the USSR under Brezhnev was nowhere near as closely controlled as North Korea.

As for the rest, I pretty much agree with what Ned said.

I’d also just throw in that according to most accounts, Gorbachev was not elected by the Politburo because he was a pleasant guy who could fool the West into thinking the Sovs were really just nice misunderstood people with everyone’s best interests at heart; rather it was because he had a reputation as a khozyaystvennik - a good manager and adminstrator who wasn’t overly ideological. He was Andropov’s protege, after all. And it was Gromyko who officially nominated him, famously saying “He may have a nice smile, but he has iron teeth.”

16

One advantage of Reagan’s use of the blunt term “evil empire” is that it discouraged the US and the West from propping up the Soviet Union. Investors lost a lot of money on foolish deals which benefited the USSR.

Note that the America’s policy today helps the government of North Korea survive. We have been giving them aid in exchange for their not building nuclear weapons, even though we believe that they are continuing to build nuclear weapons. One hopes that when W gets a spare moment or two he will review this policy.

17

The fatuous observation that “totalitarian regimes must expand to survive” is not derived from fact, but from Cold War rhetoric. That view, seductive to some for its simplicity, also brushes away gradations within totalitarianism, the differences between it and authoritarianism, the need of either to avoid too drastically ignoring the assent of the people, and the applicability of those terms to the real situation. It most especially ignores the influence of outside pressures on such regimes.

That said, it seems clear in hindsight (as it did to many of us at the time) that the Soviet decision not to intervene in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the late '70’s meant the forthcoming end of the bulk of Soviet authoritarianism. The historical pattern of revolutions in almost any country is that the beginning of a gradual reform movement by a generally-authoritarian regime simply whets the people’s appetite for more-rapid reform, and sharpens the perception that the regime was always the problem and not the solution. The slippery slope keeps getting steeper, and it doesn’t take long for the overthrow after that.

In the USSR’s example, the success of a popular movement to establish more popular rights in a client country, right next door, certainly helped stoke those feelings in the neighboring republics, especially in the Baltic. The only remaining question was how strong the military counter-coup attempt would be and how long it would take, once the ruling class had its own power and privileges threatened. The weakness of the counter-coup only shows how weak the military and its support had been for a long time.

The key events happened in the late '70’s, and I would trace the origin to the election of a Polish pope in 1978. His moral support and encouragement of the Poles to start the revolution seem to me to be the key contributors. Next, you have to give credit to the leadership in Moscow for recognizing that reform was necessary and for choosing Gorbachev to do it. But certainly not to the soundbites of a US president elected a few years later.

18

Would anyone mind if I forwarded the link to this debate to one of my professors? He came from Russia, and I asked him about this before. I forget what exactly he said, but perhaps I can get some information on this!

Thanks!

19

Elvis: Well, yes. I also did state that Totalitarian regimes are extremely tenacious, and can survive long after they clearly non-functional. North Korea is a perfect example: There is mass starvation in areas, extreme poverty, the infrastructure is crumbling, etc. But hell, it could still be there 50 years from now.

That’s what I meant when I said they had to expand to survive. They do a terrible job of managing their own infrastructures and building their economies. They stagnate, and fall behind the rest of the world. Expansion and capture of new peoples and resources helps keep them going. If they don’t do that, they are doomed. Actually, they are doomed anyway, especially in the modern world where they need high technology and an educated people to compete. But man, the death throes can be ugly, and can go on for a long, long time.

I do think you have to chalk up the relative speed and peacefulness of the Soviet collapse to a fair amount of luck. As I said, Andropov could have lived a lot longer, and the world would have been different. The coup against Yeltsin could have succeeded, resulting in an even more hard-line government than we’d seen at the end of the Soviet regime. And I know you’ll disagree, but I believe the election of a moderate appeaser in the U.S. and/or U.K. would have prolonged the cold war substantially.

After all, Gorbachev was not interested in democracy at first. He was a Communist through-and-through, and still is. He thought Perestroika was the way to save the Soviet Union, not break it up. He just found himself being pushed into a position where he really lost any choice in the matter.

20

Sam: “And I know you’ll disagree, but I believe the election of a moderate appeaser in the U.S. and/or U.K. would have prolonged the cold war substantially.”

First of all, I don’t think you’ll find any “moderate appeaser in the U.S.” ever got anywhere near the White House. I think that if you check your facts you’ll find that Jimmy Carter did his fair share of cold warring and neither spoke nor acted in terms of appeasement. (Perhaps you’ve got the wrong era on your mind and your actually thinking of Neville Chamberlain? :wink: ).

Ultimately we’re dealing with a very complicated historical event and your approach to it–an example of the Great Man Approach to History at its most reductive–is, as I see, it fairly unpersuasive.

But let’s say for argument’s sake that Reagan’s Cold War posturing and policies sped up the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and that Carter’s, had he remained in the White House, would have delayed that event by 20 years.

Let’s say, during that period, we had a reformist Gorby in power; an increasing tendency for satellites such as Poland to go their own way; rapprochement between East and West Germany; and a strong movement towards nuclear disarmament.
Let’s even say that short-sighted Cold War policies such as funding jihad lovers in Afghanistan were reconsidered under the belief that detente and reform were working their way.

I’m just curious what exactly you think fatal about this picture. In what sense would the world be a worse off place had history taken a course of this kind?

Relevant here is the irony is that most of the foreign policy experts that dominated Cold War decision-making believed that a balance of power–between East and West–was the most stable world configuration possible. Recent events even seem to lend some credence to that notion (though I’m not myself a “realist” of this sort).

But this is an aside. I’m really curious to know your answer to my previous question.